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OORODUCTION

Private antitrust enforcement is riven by a tension between public enforcement goals and the self-interested agendas of private enforcers. The antitrust st.atutes give private antitrust enforcers
powerful weapons, attesting to the public importance of competition goals, the pursuit of which Congress was unwilling to leave exclusively in the hands of government officials. At the same time,
private enforcers are driven by the strong winds of their own economic interests, which may sharply deviate from antitrust goals. It
falls on the courts to reconcile these often conflicting purposes -
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as demanding and challenging a task as any that confronts the
judiciary.
This article examines a vital problem of private antitrust enforcement - the standing of private merger litigants - where the
unresolved tension between public antitrust goals and the private
interests of litigants threatens enforcement breakdown. Private
merger enforcement is at risk not because courts have determined
that such enforcement is undesirable, but because courts have failed
to see the problem as an issue of systems design requiring effective
integration of public and private enforcement. Instead they have
focused on particular elements of antitrust standing - feared
abuses by wrongly motivated plaintiffs - neglecting systemwide effects and jeopardizing the health of private enforcement as a whole.
In this paper, I attempt to develop a coherent method for reconciling public interest goals and private enforcement incentives that
will be useful not only for merger enforcement, but for other areas
of antitrust law, and perhaps for public interest litigation generally.
Part I describes the present plight of private merger enforcement, where narrow standing rules threaten enforcement breakdown. Part II sets forth the substantive goals, procedural
mechanisms, and incentive structure that underlie coherent policy.
Part III proposes criteria for assessing standing rules and private
enforcement procedures and for managing the distorted incentives
of private enforcers. Parts IV and V apply the proposed enforcement criteria and procedural controls to competitors and takeover
targets - the private enforcers upon whom effective enforcement
of the merger law inevitably rests.
This paper focuses on merger enforcement alone because such
enforcement is critical in order to maintain effective competition
and because by treating a single enforcement policy in depth I am
able to develop a fully specified methodology that appears suitable
for other types of antitrust and nonantitrust enforcement as well.
In a time of increasing skepticism toward public interest litigation,
such an approach, concentrate4 on achieving systemwide goals and
effectively managing the incentives of private enforcers, provides a
constructive alternative to more draconian proposals that would
close the door to many types of private suits because of feared litigation abuse.
I.

THE CRISIS IN PRIVATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT

Restrictive judicial decisions threaten the ability of private litigants to challenge unlawful mergers. Where once private merger

4
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cases centered on the anticompetitive effects of the merger, now the
spotlight of attention focuses on the plaintiff's litigation credentials.
Thus, the merger court must engage in a microscopic examination
of the injury sustained by a plaintiff, in order to determine whether
the injury is of the character that gives the plaintiff standing to sue.
In technical terms, courts ask whether the plaintiff has sustained
"antitrust injury" - the standing doctrine at issue in merger cases.
While courts at first thought the rule would not apply to merger
injunction actions, that view changed in 1986, resulting in drastic
curtailment of private merger enforcement.1
At the same time, public merger enforcement atrophied during
the 1980s.2 The disturbing result was that mergers that appeared
clearly unlawful under core judicial holdings occurred with virtually
no restraint. This led to a frantic rush to inerge, intensified by the
desire to take advantage of a permissive regime that many believed
could not last. The growing merger wave of the mid-1990s gives
renewed urgency to merger enforcement policy.3
A.

The Cargill Decision

The crisis in private merger enforcement was brought to a head
by the Supreme Court decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 4 In a divided ruling, the Supreme Court held that a competitor, which in the judgment of two lower courts had proved a
clear violation of the Clayton Act,5 lacked standing to bring an injunction action to block the merger. The problem was not that
there was doubt that the merger·between the second and third largest meat-packers in the United States violated the antitrust laws, for
the Court did not review the merits, or that the plaintiff was not
1. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, JusnCE DEPT.: CHANGES IN ANTITRUST EN.
FORCEMENT POLICIES AND AC11V1TIES 48 (Oct. 1990) (50% decline in ratio of private merger
cases to Hart-Scott-Rodino filings in 1987; 90% decline as compared with 1982-86); ABA
ANTITRUST SEcnON, MONOGRAPH No. 16, PRIVATE LITIGATION UNDER SEcnON 7 OF THE
CLAYTON Acr: LAW AND POLICY 5 (1989) (stating that antitrust injury doctrine may cause
private merger enforcement to "wither on the vine").
2. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 47-52; Thomas G. Krattenmaker
& Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST
Buu.. 211, 213, 225-28 {1988).
3. See Shifting Deal Flow Back to the Fast Lane, MERGERS & AcauismoNs, Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 60 (arguing that merger activity is "starting to resemble the 1980s"); Randall Smith,
Rising Tule: Higher Stock Prices Are Feeding a Revival of Merger Activity, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 1993, at Al; Greg Steinmetz, Mergers and Acquisitions Set Records, but Activity Lacked
that '80s Pizazz, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1995, at RS.
4. 479 U.S. 104 {1986).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 18 {1994) {barring mergers that "may • . . substantially lessen
competition").
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threatened with injury as a result of the merger. The defect in the
case was that the plaintiff had not suffered "antitrust injury," a judi. cial limitation on antitrust suits that requires a plaintiff to prove not
only that it has been injured by an antitrust violation but also that
its injury is an anticompetitive effect of the violation.6
The plaintiff in Cargill had claimed antitrust injury because the
merger created multiplant efficiencies that would enable the defendant to compete more vigorously with rivals, lowering the plaintiff's profit, and because following the merger, the defendant would
attempt to drive the plaintiff out of business by "sustained predatory pricing."7 Although these claims of threatened injury had satisfied the lower courts, the Supreme Court found them insufficient
because the first claim, based on lower prices due to increased efficiency, was merely a claim of injury from intensified competition,
and the second claim, future predation, was neither effectively alleged nor proved.8 Moreover, the Court found that the market did
not have the anticompetitive structure necessary to support predatory pricing.9
The Cargill decision is notable, not because of these findings,
but because the Court applied the antitrust injury doctrine to a
merger injunction action. As the Court had explained in an earlier
decision, to allow parties to collect damages for losses that stem
from competition even though the transaction itself violates the antitrust laws would undermine the very purpose of those laws.10 The
Supreme Court, however, had previously applied this limitation on
standing only to damage cases. In Cargill, the Court held for the
first time that the antitrust injury doctrine prevented a plaintiff
from maintaining suit under the antitrust injunction statute.11 The
Court reasoned that it would be "anomalous" to allow a plaintiff to
obtain an injunction to prevent a threatened injury for which the
plaintiff could not obtain damages if the merger occurred and that
the injunction and damage statutes are "best understood" as providing "complementary remedies for a single set of injuries."12
6. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 109-13; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 484-89 (1977) (providing the first recognition of antitrust injury doctrine).
7. 479 U.S. at 117.
8. 479 U.S. at 114-19.
9. The postmerger firm would have neither high market share nor excess capacity sufficient to absorb the market share of rivals, and there was no showing of high entry barriers
sufficient to permit predatory pricing. 479 U.S. at 119 n.15.
10. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 487-88.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994).
12. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 112-13. The Court relied on the sketchy legislative history of the
injunction statute, which it found to be at least consistent with the view that injunctive relief
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A strongly worded dissent written by Justice Stevens and joined
by Justice White expressed concern that the majority decision
would effectively bar private enforcement of the merger law.13 The
dissenters· feared that the majority had rejected the prophylactic
and preventive purpose of merger enforcement by requiring what
amounted to proof of a Sherman Act14 violation. The remedy
sought was an injunction, which required proof only of threatened
future loss or injury, but the majority would demand evidence of
actual injury, as in a damage action. The Court's decision would
lead to a statute "enforceable by no private party."15
Thus, the standing of private merger plaintiffs remains unclear
after Cargill. What proof must a merger plaintiff present to show
antitrust injury? If the plaintiff is a competitor of the merging
firms, must the plaintiff prove threatened price predation by the
same evidence that would be required in a damage case? Apart
from predatory pricing, what evidence must the competitor plaintiff
present to demonstrate threatened injury from other anticompetitive effects, such as nonprice predation, market exclusion, or cartel
punishment? How do the Cargill decision and its progeny affect the
standing of other private merger litigants, particularly takeover
targets? What constitutes antitrust injury as to them, and how is it
to be proved? If both competitors and takeover targets face difficult or impossible standing requirements, what private party with
the incentive and legal resources remains to challenge unlawful
mergers within the fast-breaking pace of a merger injunction
action?
B. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions
Since Cargill, the lower courts have been deeply divided in their
approach to standing in merger cases, and the circuits are in direct
conflict. In competitor cases some lower courts have required rigwas available only to prevent injuries for which damages could be recovered. See 479 U.S. at
112-13.
13. 479 U.S. at 122-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1994).
15. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The issue of standing in merger cases
was not clarified by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), a nonmerger case, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 70-75. In denying standing to the plaintiff, however, the Court - perhaps heeding the Cargill dissenters' concern about antitrust statutes enforceable by no private party emphasized that other viable private enforcers existed " 'whose self-interest would •.• motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement' " 495 U.S. at 345 (quoting
Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542
(1983)).
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orous proof of predation, which plaintiffs have been unable to present in advance of the merger, and as a result mergers that appeared
patently unlawful were upheld. Other lower courts have been willing to base findings of threatened antitrust injury on proof of market structure and economic conditions that create the capability and
incentive to engage in predation or other anticompetitive conduct.
The Fifth Circuit followed the rigorous proof approach in
Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 16 and refused to enjoin a
merger between Kodak and another film processor that would give
the merging firms between sixty-six and eighty-five percent of the
wholesale photo-finishing market, augmented by the dominant position of one of the merging firms in the upstream photo materials
market. The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's attempted showing of threatened predatory pricing and other monopolizing acts because the plaintiff could not prove that the merged firm would sell
below cost. In ironic tones, the court explained that the "facially
sensible proposition" that a competitor "of a monopolist always has
standing to challenge the conduct forcing it from the market ... has
been undermined by Cargill" and that' "merely facing the specter of
a monopoly" does not create standing.17 Conceding that it would
be difficult for a competitor to make a showing of predation in advance of a merger, the court could only suggest that if "bad acts"
occurred, the victim might be able to sue afterward for treble
damages. 18
The Second Circuit took a different approach to competitor
standing in R. C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N. V. 19 The court held
that evidence that the merger would create a dominant firm having
a market share of eighty-four percent, with the plaintiff remaining
as its only rival, was sufficient in itself to create an inference of
antitrust injury requiring a trial on the merits. The plaintiff had
produced no evidence of past predatory pricing or present intent to
engage in predatory behavior, but the court gave plaintiff "the benefit of all reasonable inferences" that those who deliberately acquire monopoly will use it to eliminate competition by such acts as

16. 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1023 (1988).
17. 842 F.2d at 100.
18. 842 F.2d at 102; see also Treasurer, Inc. v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 682 F. Supp. 269
(D.N.J.), affd. mem, 853 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1988) (requiring proof of actual predation in competitor suit).
19. 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S., 815 (1989).
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reducing the plaintiff herbal tea manufacturer's access to supermarket shelf space.20
The lower courts are similarly divided on the standing of takeover targets - the other significant private merger litigant. In
Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Products, Inc., 21 the Fifth Circuit read
Cargill to preclude a target from challenging the legality of a
merger that would "dramatically decrease competition and raise
prices" because the target would suffer no injury relating to the anticompetitive effects of the violation.22 Although the target would
lose its independence as a result of the merger, it would suffer the
same "loss" whether or not the takeover violated the antitrust laws.
Moreover, far from being injured by the merger, the target and its
shareholders would benefit from the resulting increased prices and
reduced competition.23 A district court, taking a similar view, commented that the target "is a poor private attorney general" because
its managers may seek "to defend their own positions, not . . . to
vindicate any public interest."24
By contrast, in Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco,
S.A., 25 the Second Circuit held that a takeover target suffered antitrust injury because it faced curtailment of its production as a partly
owned subsidiary of a rival firm, because it would lose its independent decisionmaking authority as to price and output, and because
the standing of target firms is necessary for effective private merger
enforcement.26 The court would not speculate whether in some
sense the target might derive economic benefit from the merger because the antitrust laws protect the target from loss of its right to
compete in the marketplace by mergers that violate the antitrust
laws. Indeed, the court could not conceive of a more direct injury
to competition than "the elimination of a major competitor's power
to determine its prices and output."27 The court supported its determination by relying on the absence of other viable private
merger enforcers and the need to construe standing doctrines to
20. 867 F.2d at 111. The Second Circuit distinguished Cargill on the grounds that the
postmerger market share in Cargill (20%) was insufficient to justify an inference of predatory
conduct. See Cargill, 419 U.S. at 119 n.15.
21. 976 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 491 (1993).
22. 976 F.2d at 250.
23. 976 F.2d at 251.
24. Bumup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
25. 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
26. 871 F.2d at 258.
27. 871 F.2d at 258.
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promote effective enforcement.28 This concern with effective enforcement articulates an important theme of this article.
C. Enforcement Failure
Restrictive judicial decisions have limited the ability of private
litigants to challenge unlawful mergers.29 This result was not a deliberate policy choice; in Cargill, the Supreme Court rejected arguments calling for general disqualification of competitors - key
private litigants in merger cases. Rather the isolated focus of the
courts on one element of the enforcement system - antitrust injury
- has jeopardized the system as a whole. By creating doubt as to
whether competitors and takeover targets - the only two viable
private merger enforcers - can challenge unlawful mergers, recent
merger decisions threaten to destroy the private merger action as a
viable enforcement instrument.
This weakening of private merger enforcement has occurred at a
time when private enforcement would have been of utmost value in
filling an enforcement void. During the 1980s, federal authorities
drastically reduced merger enforcement against all but the most
egregious mergers.30 As a result, market-concentrating mergers
and joint ventures that violated existing judicial standards were not
challenged.31 This departure was all the more serious in view of the
incipiency standard of the Clayton Act,32 which rests on the premise that merger enforcement provides the first best policy for controlling anticompetitive conduct.33 The combined effect of
28. 871 F.2d at 260. Recent district court decisions in New York and Louisiana have
followed this analysis. See Square D Co. v. Schneider S.A., 760 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
A. Copeland Enter. v. Guste, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'l[ 68,713 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 1988).
29. Indeed, the plight of private litigants has worsened in recent years. In 1991-94, private litigants (excluding state attorneys general) obtained standing in only 6 of 16 reported
cases, and in 2 of these, the standing issue was somewhat mooted by the joinder of a state as
co-plaintiff. These statistics were obtained through a search of 1991 through 1994 Trade Cas.
(CCH) and an electronic search on 8/10/95 of Westlaw Allfeds library, search terms: "Clayton Act" & Acquisition! Merger! & DA (after 12/90). See Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dept
Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Stanley Works v. Newell Co., 1992-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 'l[ 70,008 (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 1992).
30. See Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 213, 225-28.
31. See U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 45 (discussing the failure to
bring cases clearly violating existing judicial standards); Krattenmaker & Pitofsky, supra note
2, at 213, 225-28 (describing tacit abandonment of already lenient merger enforcement guidelines). To be sure, judicial standards needed updating; the Supreme Court had not decided a
substantive merger case since 1978. The lack of up-to-date law was no justification for not
presenting the Court with cases that would have allowed modernization of merger law.
32. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957) (recognizing that the Clayton Act protects against incipiency effects).
33. Cf. Joseph F. Bradley, Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 ANTImusr L.J. 683, 689-90 (1995) (describing how effective merger enforcement avoids costly
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diminished public and private enforcement led to a clear underdeterrence of mergers violating core antitrust standards.34
An effective policy toward private merger enforcement requires
a global or systems approach. Such an approach would concentrate
on the operation of the enforcement system as a whole, attempting
to assure a viable private enforcement remedy, as Congress surely
intended. This article shows how the courts may achieve these
objectives within the statutory framework Congress created.

II.

FOUNDATIONS OF COHERENT POLICY

Underlying antitrust policy, including private merger enforcement, is a limited set of basic principles derived from the antitrust
statutes, legislative history, and judicial decisions. These principles
consist of key enforcement goals and the incentive-shaping procedures that implement these goals. In developing a coherent policy
toward private merger enforcement, it is necessary to make the
principles explicit because cases and commentary often lose sight of
them - whether by simple neglect, subtle distortion, or opaque
formalistic doctrine.
A. Enforcement Goals
Three crucial goals motivate private enforcement, most particularly merger enforcement, and each contains an essential public interest component. First, private enforcement strengthens public
enforcement because it creates private remedies that augment public remedies - the dual enforcement goal. Second, though antitrust
enforcement has both compensation and deterrence goals, deterrence is the primary goal of private merger enforcement - the deterrence goal. Third, private enforcement vindicates the same
substantive goals as public enforcement - the substantive uniformity goal. Although these objectives may appear noncontroversial,
disagreement on the scope of antitrust procedures often rests on
neglect or implicit rejection of one or more of these basic premises.
and complex proceedings under the Sherman Act, thereby enhancing legal predictability,
promoting transactional freedom within unconcentrated markets, and reducing the need for
disruptive takeovers to discipline managers because competition does the job).
34. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTINo 0FF1CE, supra note 1, at 47-52 {describing how fewer
resources and changed policies hindered merger enforcement); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals
for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. LJ. 195, 196-98
(1992) (explaining that weak antitrust enforcement was a "contributing factor" to the unprecedented merger wave of 1980s).
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1. Dual Enforcement
The dual enforcement goal, which recognizes that private enforcement augments public enforcement, is reflected in the statutes,
legislative history, and consistent judicial articulations. The antitrust statutes contain exceptionally powerful private remedies, comparable in scope and effect to the remedies available under public
enforcement. The statutes thereby create a parallel enforcement
system, complete with punitive sanctions, enforcement funding, and
enabling processes. Thus, the statutes contain the striking penalty
of treble damages, attorney's fees by right for successful plaintiffs,
expansive venue provisions, and other powerful procedures.35
Comparison of public and private remedies makes the statutory
plan transparent. The trebling of damages is the private analogue
to the public penalty of imprisonment and :fine.36 The awarding of
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff is the analogue to the public
funding of the Attorney General. Expanded venue and injunction
remedies apply without distinction in both public and private actions. 37 Moreover, Congress expanded these remedies in 1976 by
extending mandatory attorney's fees for prevailing plaintiffs to private injunction actions, including merger cases.38
Legislative history also reflects an intent to strengthen public
enforcement through private suits - an intent particularly apparent in the Clayton Act and the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act.39
The House Report on the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act - the
most recent legislation on private antitrust actions - explained
that private actions "reflect the national policy of encouraging private parties ... to help enforce the antitrust laws. "40
35. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (treble damages and attorney's fees); 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1994)
(prima facie evidence); 15 U.S.C. § 25 {1994) (expanded venue).
36. Although some have argued that trebling simply reflects discounting for the difficulty
of detecting a hidden offense, RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST
549-53, 555-59 {2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1984), the ability to conceal is not a condition for trebling, which is mandatory. Thus, trebling adds a punitive amount, as the courts have noted.
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 {1977) (citing legislative histories of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act that discuss how treble damages meet
punitive purposes as well as other goals).
37. 15 u.s.c. §§ 15, 22, 26 (1994).
38. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 302
(3), 90 Stat. 1383, 1396 {codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1994)).
39. 15 u.s.c. § 1311 (1994).
40. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 {1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2572, 2589; see also S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1976); 21 CoNG. REc. 3146
(1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar) (asserting that a private remedy would be "a very efficient
measure •.. in suppressing [antitrust violations]"); Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An
Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 845-50 {1977); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-30 (1989).
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Finally, the courts have repeatedly emphasized that private antitrust enforcement is designed "not merely to provide private relief,
but ... to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust
laws." 41 To that end, the antitrust statutes designate antitrust plaintiffs as" 'private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws,"42
and thereby to maintain "an ever-present threat" against antitrust
wrongdoers. 43 In private merger enforcement, these aspirations can
be realized only if there are viable private enforcers, able and motivated to bring merger actions.
2.

The Deterrence Goal

Although private antitrust enforcement has both deterrence and
compensation goals, deterrence is primary in private merger enforcement. To be sure, Supreme Court decisions in nonmerger
cases differ in their relative emphasis on deterrence and compensation depending on the specific context of the case, but even here,
the Court often emphasizes the deterrence aspect.44 Although
some decisions have emphasized the compensation goal,45 in most
of its decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized the key importance of deterrence. 46
41. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969),
cited with approval in califomia v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990).
42. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
43. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); see
also Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 214 (1990) (stating that § 4 of the Clayton
Act "must promote the vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws"); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983); Blue Shield
v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979)
(stating that private action "encourages private challenges to antitrust violations"); Pfizer Inc.
v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
44. See, e.g., American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 572 (1982) (holding that imposing liability for nonprofit standard-setting association deters such conduct in future); Pfizer, Inc., 434 U.S. at 314-15 (extending the right to seek treble
damages to foreign plaintiffs due to the enhanced deterrent effect); Perma Life Mufflers, 392
U.S. at 138-39 (rejecting the equal fault doctrine as a defense to private suit).
45. In Brunswick, the Supreme Court said that "the treble-damages provision • • • is
designed primarily as a remedy." 429 U.S. at 485-86. Yet even in that case, which was a suit
for damages, the Court acknowledged that "treble damages also play an important role in
penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing," 429 U.S. at 485, and the Supreme Court
has cited the case to support the notion that the antitrust laws seek both deterrence and
compensation. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989).
46. See, e.g., Utilicorp United, Inc., 491 U.S. at 226 (promoting "twin antitrust goals of
ensuring recompense for injured parties and encouraging the diligent prosection of antitrust
claims") (White, J., dissenting); ARC Am Corp., 490 U.S. at 102 (stating that the purposes of
federal antitrust law are "deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation
of victims"); Blue Shield, 451 U.S. at 472; Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-46; Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Fortner Enter. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); see also H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 40,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2589 (stating that national policy should encourage private
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Deterrence is paramount in private merger enforcement because the action is typically filed before the merger occurs and the
remedy sought is an injunction to bar the merger. Thus, there is no
present injury to be compensated but only a future injury to be prevented. For this reason, the injunction remedy in private merger
enforcement functions wholly as a deterrent.47
3. Substantive Uniformity

The substantive policy goals of antitrust enforcement remain the
same whether enforcement is public or private.48 Strange as it may
appear, this principle is sometimes challenged in the interpretation
of the antitrust injury doctrine. As we have seen, that doctrine requires that the claimed private injury be within the anticompetitive
rationale of the statutory violation. The problem of substantive
uniformity arises because some would hold that an anticompetitive
rationale sufficient to establish antitrust injury requires proof of a
direct causal link between plaintiff's injury and the output restriction of a monopoly or cartel that has entered its exploitive stage.49
But this formulation, which registers only the immediate and shortrun allocative effects of anticompetitive behavior, omits the vital
long-run goals of preserving competitive processes and market
structures and promoting dynamic efficiency. To be sure, one way
of attempting to achieve both short-run and long-run goals would
be to penalize only immediately exploitive behavior or conduct
antitrust suits both to compensate victims and to punish and deter violations). See generally
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 40, at 845-46.
47. The Brunswick decision, which declared that the private action was designed primarily as a remedy, is not contrary because there the plaintiff sought damages from a past merger
rather than an injunction to prevent a future merger. 429 U.S. at 485-86. Thus, the Court's
dictum was not addressed to the merger injunction suit, which is the subject of this article and
which constitutes almost the whole of private merger enforcement. In addition, as discussed
supra in note 45, the Court now interprets Brunswick as upholding the importance of both
compensation and deterrence.
48. To be sure, antitrust goals have changed in recent years, at least in emphasis. See
generally Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020 {1987). My point is simply that the
correctly formulated goals of public enforcement also articulate the goals of private
enforcement.
49. See, e.g., Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (7th Cir.
1986) {finding that termination of dealer for price cutting in resale price fixing violation was
not within anticompetitive rationale); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust
Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1160 {1982) ("[P]laintiff's injury is
part of or flows directly from the allocative efficiency loss of monopoly."). See generally
Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 V AND. L. REv. 1539
{1989); Wtlliam M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652
{1983); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv.
1445 {1985).

14

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:1

closely linked to such demonstrably exploitive behavior.so But this
is not the path our antitrust enforcement system has taken - or
indeed that of any other developed antitrust regime.st Thus,
though exploitive or monopoly pricing stemming from collusion or
predation provides an important indicator of antitrust violation, the
law is not confined to final stage intervention to prevent cartel or
monopoly price exploitation.
Antitrust law also protects the competitive mechanisms by
which free markets achieve the goals of higher output and consumer welfare. Thus, particularly in merger enforcement, antitrust
law strives to maintain competitive market structures that preclude
collusive and predatory conduct. While ultimately antitrust anticipates that injuries to competitive conditions will raise prices and
lower output, the essence of illegality for many antitrust violations,
including merger violations, lies in the injury to competitive conditions themselves. In these cases, antitrust accepts the identified restraint of trade as a proxy by which an ultimate pricing or other
output effect is deemed likely.s2 As then-Judge Breyer recently explained, antitrust law protects the competitive process in order to
achieve "low, economically efficient prices, efficient production
methods, and innovation. "53

50. The viability of such an approach requires the heroic assumption that the probability
and magnitude of the eventual penalty would achieve the desired optimum and that all economic actors would reach common and accurate assessments of these magnitudes - which
assumes unbounded rationality contrary to the prescription in Eastman Kodak. See Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470-72 (1992). See generally Stephen
McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 261,
268-69 (1993) (arguing that legal sanctions are inherently imprecise due to incomplete information); Eric Rasmusen, How Optimal Penalties Change with the Amount of Harm, 15 INTL.
REv. L. & EcoN. 101 (1995).
51. See D.G. GoYDER, EC COMPETITION LAw 11-12 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that the EC
protects process of competition); Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COM·
PETITION LAW IN JAPAN 87 (1993) (stating that the antimonopoly law restricts anticompetitive market structure).
52. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 505-11
(1988) (finding unlawful deliberate biasing of a standard-setting body in order to injure rival); FTC v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1986) (holding disruption of
market information flow to be unlawful even absent proof of higher price or reduced output);
American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570-72 (1982)
(finding illegal biasing of a standard-setting body); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961) (holding that trade association's arbitrary
refusal to certify rival product violated Sherman Act without showing of specific public
harm).
53. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New Eng., Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir. 1988); see also
7 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANITIRUST LAW 'l[ 1052 (1980); Bradley, supra
note 48, at 1023; Wtlliam K. Jones, Concerted Refusals to Deal and the Producer Interest in
Antitrust, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 73, 88-90 (1989).
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Thus, conduct is anticompetitive under the antitrust laws not
only when it is directly exploitive and output reducing but also
when it damages the long-run competitive conditions by which antitrust seeks to achieve superior performance in pricing, production,
and innovation. This is most especially true of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which regulates market structure - by definition a
long-run market condition. Consistent with this view, the Clayton
Act forbids mergers that "may" injure competition and typically involves enforcement action before economic effects are visible and
before the merger has occurred. As the Supreme Court stated recently in Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
"it has long been settled that excessive concentration, and the oligopolistic price coordination it portends, may be the injury to competition the [merger] Act prohibits."54
Most assuredly, private antitrust enforcement raises issues for
judicial management, and these are discussed below. What the policy uniformity principle holds, however, is that procedural controls
cannot shrink the substantive policies enforceable by private suit.
To hold otherwise would cripple the private action as an instrument
of substantive policy, distort the will of Congress, and reduce our
ability to maintain dynamically competitive markets.55 Thus, the
meaning of competition is invariant as between public and private
cases.
B. Standing and Incentive Management

To achieve its goals, private antitrust enforcement relies on the
efforts of private litigants. But private enforcers, driven by their
own self-interest, may deviate from antitrust goals, and the strong
penalties and litigation advantages available to private litigants
magnify the mischief such litigation may cause. In order to reduce
deviations between private incentives and public goals, the courts
have created standing rules designed to prevent both overdeterrence and underdeterrence of antitrust violations.56 I shall argue
54. 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2591 (1993) (citing United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963)).
55. See JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, l'RivATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
67-69 (1988) (competition provides market participants indispensable feedback on econmnic
performance); Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J.
EcoN. 366, 366 (1983) (competitive markets "reduce[] managerial slack"); see also Joseph F.
Bradley, Massive Industrial Size, Classical Economics, and the Search for Humanistic Value,
24 STAN. L. REv. 1155, 1174-78 (1972) (book review) (discussing the teaching function of
competition).
56. The antitrust statutes are virtually open-ended in their description of injured persons
who may sue. The antitrust remedies are available to any person whose business or property
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that at bottom these rules, most especially the antitrust injury doctrine, are incentive managing devices to assure that private enforcers promote public competition goals.
To prevent overdeterrence, the courts limit the magnitude and
uncertainty of recovery and have evolved a special standing rule
called antitrust injury to bar plaintiffs from pursuing private actions
incompatible with antitrust goals. General standing rules, such as
limitations on duplicate recovery and complex damage apportionment, do not apply to merger injunction actions, where damages are
not involved.57 It is thus the antitrust injury requirement that provides the key limitation on standing in merger cases.
To prevent underdeterrence, the courts apply a pragmatic doctrine of "effective private enforcement," which limits the preclusive
thrust of standing rules to assure that viable private enforcers remain available to vindicate antitrust goals. In merger cases, effective private enforcement requires injunction actions to achieve
effective deterrence. Together, the two principles - antitrust injury and effective private enforcement - provide a guiding standard for shaping standing procedures in private antitrust cases.
1. Antitrust Injury

The antitrust injury doctrine addresses the problem of the
wrongly motivated private litigant by scrutinizing the plaintiff's injury to determine whether the self-interest the plaintiff seeks to vindicate is consistent with antitrust goals. Although it might appear
that any recovery against an antitrust violator would promote antitrust goals, the courts have barred such recoveries when the plaintiff's injury is unconnected with the antitrust wrong.
The antitrust injury requirement is typically expressed in terms
of whether the injury is of the type that the antitrust laws aim to
prevent.58 That formulation, however, is deceptively simple and
subject to manipulation, particularly as applied to a merger law
\vith the broad public purpose of preserving future competitive conis injured or threatened with injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
15 U.S.C. § 15 {1994). It would be difficult to fonnulate a remedy at any higher level of
generality. The legislative history of the Clayton Act provides little illumination beyond an
intent to provide an effective remedy to consumers and small competitors who must battle
large producers. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 40, at 845-46; Hovenkamp, supra note
40, at 27-31. Necessarily, therefore, it was left to the courts to shape a body of procedural law
to guide private antitrust enforcement.
57. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6 {1986); Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 {1972).
58. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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ditions, implemented by a remedial statute that gives any person
the right to sue "against threatened loss or damage."59 Whether an
injury is within the rationale of a substantive statute with such a
broad purpose requires a judicial characterization that is far from
inevitable.60 Indeed, in each of the Supreme Court's antitrust injury decisions discussed below it is possible to recharacterize the
injury to reach the opposite result. A deeper rationale, however,
can provide a coherent explanation for the decisions.
Thus, I shall argue that the antitrust injury requirement is at
heart a principle of incentive compatibility. It examines whether
the plaintiff's litigation incentives, objectively viewed in terms of
the injuries sustained or threatened, are compatible with antitrust
goals.61 Expression of the antitrust injury principle in incentive
compatibility terms provides a transparent and operational meaning for this otherwise opaque doctrine.62
The antitrust injury doctrine stems from the 1977 merger decision of the Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-059. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994): "Any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief .•. against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ...."
60. Cases under other public interest statutes illustrate the flexibility of the injury characterization. Thus, in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors v.
City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2300-03 (1993), the lower court found that white contractors sustained no injury from minority set asides because they could not show that they
would otherwise have obtained the contracts, while the Supreme Court found injury through
loss of the opportunity to compete. Similarly, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to an affirmative
action program without a showing that the plaintiff would otherwise have been admitted to
medical school. These examples demonstrate that the injury precondition for maintaining a
suit under public interest statutes is highly manipulable. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SuP. Cr. REv. 37, 41-42. The antitrust injury requirement is subject to the same
elasticity of interpretation. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 49, at 1541-42, 1556; see also
Jean Wegman Bums, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanham Act Standing, 42 UCLA L. REv.
47, 94 & n.204 (1994) (citing other commentators).
61. The antitrust injury doctrine thus addresses the principal-agent problem of public interest litigation in antitrust law. The government acts as the principal and establishes inducements in the form of treble damages, attorney's fees, and other litigation advantages to
induce its agents, capable private enforcers, to bring antitrust cases that serve the public
interest. The agents, motivated by their own private interest, augmented by the generous
reward system of private antitrust enforcement, are motivated to bring suits even when they
do not promote the principal's interest in competition. Anticipating such deviations, the
principal - acting through the courts - establishes the antitrust injury test to screen out
enforcers with incentives adverse to the principal, thereby reducing agency risk. But as we
shall see in Part III, analysis of the agency problem of private enforcement is incomplete and
does not consider the multistage nature of the interaction between the government and private enforcers.
62. It is possible to criticize the antitrust injury doctrine as an unjustified narrowing of the
substantive statute and contrary to congressional intent. See John J. Flynn, Which Past Is
Prolog? The Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 879, 902-04, 91011 (1990). The doctrine, however, is now well-settled in Supreme Court jurisprudence. My
goal here is to place that jurisprudence on a more sound basis by making the standing inquiry
operational and consistent with the foundational principles of private antitrust enforcement.

18

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1

Mat, Inc., 63 decided after the number of private antitrust actions

had tripled over an eleven-year period.64 The plaintiff claimed injury from a merger that had prevented the failure of one of plaintiff's rivals, and thereby increased competition in the market.
Plaintiff's damages were the profits it would have made had its rival
failed. Rejecting the plaintiff's claim as "inimical to the purposes"
of the antitrust laws because it sought damages for losses from continued competition, the Court formulated the principle of antitrust
injury.65 The plaintiff must show more than an injury causally
linked to an antitrust violation. The Court also stated that
"[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."66 Subsequent
courts rephrased the doctrine more simply - as a requirement that
the injury be within the rationale of the violation.67
The Court's formulation of the antitrust injury principle in
Brunswick might on first consideration appear to be no more than a
rendering of the statutory language of the Clayton Act, which requires that a plaintiff claiming damages "be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 68
But the Clayton Act language scarcely compelled the Brunswick
holding that the plaintiff must be injured by effects themselves anticompetitive and in close nexus with the violation.
In fact, the Brunswick decision expressed the germ of the incentive compatibility idea in its explanation that the antitrust laws were
not merely indifferent to the injury claimed but would be undermined if the plaintiffs were to· be awarded damages for the profits
they would have earned from reduced competition. To hold the
defendant liable for any loss "causally linked" to the defendant's
illegal presence in the market "divorces antitrust recovery from the
purposes of the antitrust laws. "69 These expressions suggest that
antitrust damages can be awarded only to a private litigant with
63. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
64. Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction
and Framework, in PRlvATE AmTrn.uST LmoATION: NEw EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 4 tbl.
1.1 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) [hereinafter PRIVATE AmTrn.uST LmoATION].
65. 429 U.S. at 488.
66. 429 U.S. at 489.
67. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 [hereinafter ARCO]
(1990); see also 2 PmLLIP E. AREEDA & liERBERT HoVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 'lI 362a
(rev. ed. 1995).
68. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1994).
69. 429 U.S. at 487.
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economic motivation consistent with the competitive aspirations of
the law. Certainly, as the Court viewed the facts, Brunswick revealed a direct incentive incompatibility between plaintiff's litigation interest and the goals of the merger statute because the
plaintiff sought to recover damages from increased competition.
The incentive compatibility principle implicit in Brunswick received clear expression in the Court's most recent antitrust injury
decision, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. 70 In ARCO,
as in Brunswick, the plaintiff claimed injury from the procompetitive effects of a violation. Using language of incentive compatibility, the Court explained that the antitrust injury requirement
is satisfied when a plaintiff is within " 'an identifiable class of persons whose self interest would normally motivate them to vindicate
the public interest in antitrust enforcement.' "71 Contrary to that
dictum, the ARCO plaintiff claimed injury from a vertical maximum price fixing agreement that limited the ability of its rivals to
raise prices. The plaintiff, which was not a party to the agreement,
thus was attempting to claim damages not from reduced competition but from intensified rivalry.72 The ARCO plaintiff therefore
sustained no antitrust injury because
[a] competitor is not injured by the anticompetitive effects of vertical,
maximum price-fixing ... and does not have any incentive to vindicate the legitimate interests of a rival's dealer.... In short, a competitor will be injured and hence motivated to sue only when a vertical,
maximum-price-fixing arrangement has a pro-competitive impact on
the market. Therefore, providing the competitor a cause of action
would not protect the rights of dealers and consumers under the antitrust laws."73

Such a plaintiff was therefore not qualified "to perform the office of
a private attorney general." 74 Incentive compatibility thus provides
an operational and straightforward meaning for antitrust injury.75
70. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
71. 495 U.S. at 345 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983)).
72. Moreover, the Court determined that the rule against maximum price fixing under
which plaintiff sued was intended to preserve the competitive freedom of the manufacturer's
own dealers and to protect consumers from disguised minimum price fixing. It was not
designed to shield a rival dealer in competition with the manufacturer's own dealers,
threatened by low, but nonpredatory, prices. 495 U.S. at 335-41.
73. 495 U.S. at 345.
74. 495 U.S. at 345 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542); see also Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TExAs L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1984), cited in Brunswick
Corp., 429 U.S. at 345.
75. The incentive interpretation readily accounts for other leading antitrust injury cases.
Thus, in Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), consumers sustained antitrust injury
when a group health plan refused to reimburse them for treatment by psychologists despite
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The Supreme Court's Cargill decision, which applied the antitrust injury principle to merger injunction suits, is also explainable
in incentive compatibility terms. The Court in Cargill denied standing because the competitor-plaintiff claimed injury from lower but
nonpredatory prices resulting from a cost-reducing merger, which is
to say from "increased competition." Thus, the plaintiff's litigation
incentives were incompatible with the antitrust goal of maintaining
competition and low prices in consumer markets.76
Functionally, therefore, the antitrust injury doctrine narrows the
potential reach of the broad statutory language of the Clayton Act
to screen out cases in which the plaintiff's motivation, objectively
viewed in terms of its economic interests, fails to promote antitrust
the fact that the object of the boycott by the group health plan was not to injure consumers
but to disadvantage psychologists who competed with the M.D. members of the plan. The
consumers suffered antitrust injury because their injury was "inextricably intertwined" with
the injury to the psychologists, 457 U.S. at 484. In incentive compatibility terms, the consumer's self-ipterest in being reimbursed for psychological services under the group health
plan was fully compatible with the interests of the targeted psychologists to compete free
from boycott disadvantages. Thus, in incentive terms, the consumers' injury was compatible
with antitrust goals.
By contrast, in Associated General Contractors, the Supreme Court rejected the standing
of a union to challenge an agreement between employers that would have restrained competition in the building construction market. The Court doubted that the plaintiff union had
sustained antitrust injury because it was unclear that the union's members would be hurt and
indeed they might benefit from an agreement that raised prices and reduced competition in
the product market. Thus, the union's litigation incentive was not clearly compatible with the
antitrust goal of protecting competition and competitive pricing in the product market. The
Supreme Court's denial of standing was based on other grounds as well, but its application of
the antitrust injury principle was consistent with the incentive interpretation. 459 U.S. at
539-45.
76. As noted earlier, the Court stated that it would be "anomalous" to read the Clayton
Act to allow an injunction suit against a threatened injury for which it could not obtain damages if the injury actually occurred. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 112
(1986). The Cargill dissenters feared that this cryptic passage might be read to require proof
of a postmerger Sherman Act violation. 479 U.S. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But such
a reading would be contrary to the Court's later decision in California v. American Stores
Co., 495 U.S. 271, 281-82 (1990), finding the antitrust injury requirement "unquestionably
satisfied" by proof that a merger would substantially increase concentration and oligopoly
conditions, without inquiry whether this would justify independent Sherman Act recovery.
Thus, the brief Cargill dictum should not be read to require proof of a Sherman Act violation
but simply a threat of injury from the anticompetitive effects the Clayton Act aims to prevent
- for example, oligopolistic price coordination.
Indeed, a contrary reading of the Cargill dictum - holding that only proof of actual
injury would suffice for standing - might jeopardize the ability of State Attorneys General
to challenge mergers in the federal courts. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the states may
bring parens patriae actions only for injury to natural persons under the Sherman Act. HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(l) (1994).
Thus, if a merger threatened to cause future damage that violated the Clayton Act, but not
necessarily the Sherman Act, states would be barred from suit. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 21, STATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT 14-17 (1995). But such a conclusion would undermine almost the whole of state merger enforcement. Thus, the anomaly
language of Cargill must be read cautiously and with attention to specific context. See Pennsylvania v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) <JI 70,224, at 70,088-89
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (rejecting preclusive reading of Cargill).
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goals. So understood, the antitrust injury doctrine complements the
concept of plaintiff as a private attorney general or agent for the
public interest. That is to say, the antitrust injury doctrine screens
the economic interests of the plaintiff to assure that a disabling conflict of interest or other motivation inconsistent with competition
does not hamper plaintiff's capacity to serve the public interest.7 7
A coherent system of private antitrust enforcement, however, requires more than the antitrust injury principle.
2.

Effective Private Enforcement

The courts apply a pragmatic policy of "effective private enforcement" as a counterweight to the antitrust injury doctrine and
as a protection against underdeterrence. In recent years, as the
modern doctrines of standing and antitrust injury have evolved, the
Supreme Court has made the policy more explicit, stating that effective private enforcement requires an effective class of private enforcers and, in merger cases, injunction actions that achieve
divestiture remedies.
Thus, effective private enforcement requires that one or more
classes of private litigants be motivated and capable of challenging
antitrust violations. The Court has articulated this requirement in
both indirect purchaser and antitrust injury decisions. In lllinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 78 California v. ARC America Corp., 79 and Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 80 the Court, holding that only direct
purchasers from a price-fixing conspiracy may sue, explained that
enforcement was concentrated on a single class of enforcers to assure that there be a class of plaintiffs with "sufficient incentive to
sue."81 In Associated General Contractors v. California State Coun77. The antitrust injury doctrine is thus similar to the process interpretation of the state
action doctrine. According to that interpretation, financially interested persons are not entitled to antitrust immunity under the state action doctrine because such persons cannot be
entrusted to act as disinterested and politically accountable agents for the state. See Einer
Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1991). Similarly,
under the antitrust injury principle, private antitrust plaintiffs cannot be entrusted with the
authority of private attorneys general when instituting burdensome and costly antitrust litigation if their economic interests are not compatible with public enforcement goals. As we
shall see, just as active supervision by the state overcomes the objection to regulatory action
by interested state officials, judicial supervision can overcome the problems of incompatible
litigation incentives in merger suits.
78. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
79. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
80. 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
81. 490 U.S. at 104; see also Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983).
·
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cil of Carpenters, 82 the Court, denying standing to the plaintiff
union that failed to meet several of the enumerated standing criteria, including antitrust injury, noted that denial of standing was not
likely "to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied. "83 In its recent ARCO decision, the Court held that
competitors had not sustained antitrust injury in a maximumpricefixing case only after finding that two other classes of litigants
remained available to "vindicate the public interest in antitrust
enforcement."84
The controlling principle that emerges from these cases is the
need to assure effective private enforcement. Whether a single
class of enforcers will suffice depends on the type of antitrust violation and the remedy sought. In Illinois Brick, the Court found that
a single class of enforcers - direct purchasers able to recover the
entire cartel overcharge - would constitute an effective enforcing
class,85 but a merger injunction case requires a different analysis.
First, there are no damages to be concentrated in a single litigant
class because damages have not yet occurred when a merger suit is
brought. Second, free-rider effects reduce litigation motivation,
even within a single litigant class, because other class members may
benefit, but the absence of damages discourages class actions.86 Finally, no single class of litigants will have incentive to sue in all
types of cases.87 Thus, effective merger enforcement requires more
than one class of enforcers.
3. Injunctions

Injunctions are the standard remedy in merger enforcement
cases because postmerger damage suits provide insufficient deterrence, and the flexible remedies and judicial controls of injunction
actions ideally serve the preventive purpose of the merger law.
Merger law is preventive due to the imperfect ability of the Sherman Act to constrain anticompetitive conduct in highly concen82. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
83. 459 U.S. at 542.
84. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 345 (1989) (quoting Asso·
ciated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542).
85. 431 U.S. at 729.
86. See infra text accompanying note 140. I found no private merger case that was
brought as a class action.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46. For example, competitors may be affected
unequally by a merger, and takeover targets will have no incentive to challenge friendly
mergers.
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trated markets.88 For that reason, merger enforcement aims to stop
mergers "in their incipiency" before they have worked competitive
harm - a purpose manifest in the legislative history of the Clayton
Act and reaffirmed in the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act.89
Economic analysis supports the congressional premise that injunction actions are necessary for effective merger enforcement.
Such analysis concludes that ex ante injunction remedies are desirable when ex post damage remedies alone provide insufficient deterrence, whether by reason of low probability of suit, widely
dispersed victims, difficulties of proof, uncertainties in the legal
standard, or inadequacy of future damage recoveries to offset realized illicit gains.90 As the previous discussion has made clear, most
of these conditions hold for mergers.91
Nevertheless, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have taken
the position that merger injunction actions are inherently inferior to
damage actions.92 They argue that injunction actions create acute
holdup problems hecause each plaintiff can threaten to block the
acquisition unless paid the merger's full transactional value, a sum
likely to exceed any threatened injury to the plaintiff.93 In addition,
merger plaintiffs other than consumers cannot bargain effectively
with the acquiring firm to reach a desirable social result because
88. Shennan Act damage remedies are not available for tacit interdependence and are
less than fully effective against collusion, which may involve subtle facilitating practices or
hidden agreement. Although predatory conduct appears more amenable to damage enforcement, proof of predation, especially predatory pricing, must overcome deliberately underinclusive liability rules. See, e.g., Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113
s. Ct. 2578, 2586 (1993).
89. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962) (amended Clayton Act);
H.R. REP. No. 1343, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2596, 2597
(Antitrust Improvements Act); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess 1 (1914) (original Clayton
Act).
90. See Charles D. Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 AM. EcoN. REv. 888 (1990); Steven Shaven, Liability
for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). An important corollary
of this analysis is that when both ex ante and ex post remedies are applicable, the ex ante
standard should be set below what would be the social optimum if ex post liability did not
exist. See Kolstad et al., supra, at 889. The pennissive nature of current merger regulation
would appear to satisfy this requirement.
91. Thus, difficulties of proof and uncertain legal standards reduce the probability of ex
post damages. Transaction costs impede organization of dispersed victims of collusive pricing
from maintaining suits when they cannot proceed on the strength of a prior government
adjudication. Treble damages do not adjust for these difficulties when the time value of
money and other costs are considered. In fact, treble damages turn out to be closer to single
damages when current losses, litigation costs, and future recovery are discounted to present
value. See Joseph F. Bradley, Critical Factual Assumptions Underlying Public Policy, in PRIVATE ANnTRUST LmGATION, supra note 64, 252-54; Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust
"Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 Omo ST. LJ. 115 (1993).
92. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 49.
93. Id. at 1169.
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they have not sustained the type of injury the statute seeks to prevent.94 These arguments, however, neglect the realities of merger
enforcement and fail to consider systemwide effects.
To begin with, the holdup argument is exaggerated. Plaintiffs
cannot credibly threaten to block most unlawful mergers because
the typical injunction does not prohibit the merger; rather it
restructures the merger transaction to remove antitrust risks.9s This
reduces the amount of any holdup fee to the cost of restructuring.
Equity supervision and other procedural mechanisms, discussed below, can minimize remaining holdup and delay costs. Although
consumers generally have more compatible enforcement incentives
than other types of litigants, they lack capability as merger litigants
and have rarely brought suit.96
Second, even if consumers were willing to sue, the immediate
consumer interest in lower prices does not reflect the totality of antitrust concerns in merger enforcement. Merger policy also seeks to
prevent probable future collusion and predation that threaten no
immediate loss to consumers, to promote dynamic efficiency and
innovation,97 to maintain the disciplining effect of competitive markets, and to preserve alternative centers of decisionmaking. 9s
Finally, the holdup argument proves too much. Consumers also
have incentives to exact holdup payments that exceed their injury,
especially in class actions brought by self-appointed lawyers. Thus,
the holdup argument is really an argument against injunctions. As
we have seen, however, the incipiency standard of the merger law
can be vindicated only by injunction actions.99 Although the
holdup problem remains - for all types of merger litigants - its
prevention requires not the elimination of merger injunction actions but effective judicial supervision and procedural mechanisms.
In its recent American Stores100 decision, the Supreme Court
recognized the key importance of vigorous private merger enforce94. Id. at 1160-64.
95. Cf. Clifford H. Aronson & James A. Keyte, Innovative Solutions to Merger Challenges
by the DOJ and FTC, ANrrrRusr, Summer 1992, at 26 (increasing willingness of enforcement
authorities to allow merger relief short of divestiture).
96. See discussion infra text accompanying note 141.
97. See Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559 §§ 0.1-0.2 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter

Merger Guidelines].
98. Joseph F. Bradley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 'Of YALE
L.J. 1, 40-42 & n.164 (1977); cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984) {discussing independent centers of decisionmaking).
99. See supra section II.B.3.
100. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
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ment through injunction actions. 101 Upholding the availability of
the divestiture remedy in a private merger suit, the Court declared
that the injunction remedy - as well as other provisions of the
Clayton Act manifest a clear intent to encourage vigorous private litigation against
anticompetitive mergers. Section 7 itself creates a relatively expansive definition of antitrust liability . . . . Private enforcement of the
Act was in no sense an afterthought; it was an integral part of the
congressional plan for protecting competition .... [within] a statutory
scheme that favors private enforcement, subjects mergers to searching
scrutiny, and regards divestiture as the remedy best suited to redress
the ills of an anticompetitive merger.102

American Stores and other recent Supreme Court decisions evidence an awareness that standing and antitrust injury are components within a larger private enforcement system and that no single
doctrine can be pursued in isolation. For example, a single-minded
attempt to root out any trace of incentive incompatibility could
eliminate all capable and motivated antitrust plaintiffs. Thus, in order to assure that private enforcement remains an effective supplement to public enforcement, the courts in applying the antitrust
injury principle must balance incentive compatibility gain against
enforcement loss. The failure of courts to engage in such balancing
in recent private merger cases is perhaps the single most important
reason for the threatened breakdown in private merger
enforcement.

III. A

SYSTEMS APPROACH TO

PruvATE MERGER

ENFORCEMENT

Coherent private merger enforcement requires a unified or systems approach. A systems approach would view the goals and procedures of private merger enforcement as a single mechanism
designed to provide an effective supplement to public enforcement.
The critical test for determining whether private enforcement meets
this objective is whether in the absence of government challenge
against a merger that violates core judicial standards, legally qualified litigants with the capability and motivation to mount an effective merger challenge exist. Because private merger enforcement
currently fails to meet this minimum condition, there is a need to
restore its viability. To do this, we must modify the private enforce101. But see Aronson & Keyte, supra note 95, at 27 (stating that divestiture is not imposed frequently).
102. 495 U.S. at 284-85 (citations omitted).
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ment system to assure that the most capable and informed litigants
are able to pursue the most seriously anticompetitive mergers with
the least divergence between the private and public interest.
A.

Criteria for Effective Enforcement

Effective private antitrust enforcement depends on four critical
factors: (i) enforcement capability, (ii) gravity of the antitrust violation, (iii) incentive compatibility between the enforcer's interest
and the public interest, and (iv) availability of equity or other corrective procedures to modify incompatible litigation incentives. In
an ideal world, we would maximize each factor, but that is, of
course, impossible. Indeed, the tendency to focus on a single factor
in isolation from others threatens the viability of private merger enforcement. Instead, the global objective of achieving effective private enforcement requires a pragmatic balancing of all four
criteria.103 But first, we must understand why each factor is
indispensable.
1. Enforcement Capability

Effective private merger enforcement depends on plaintiffs who
have the financial resources, knowledge of the industry, legal sophistication, and motivation to mount a powerful case with speed
and precision. The need for such litigation capability is critical in
injunction cases because of the short time frame allowed for obtaining preliminary relief, which may be as little as fifteen days,104
and the absence of a treble damage incentive. Unless plaintiffs gain
preliminary relief before the merger takes place, the chances for
effective injunctive relief are remote. The target's assets have been
melded into the acquiring firm, and the best that can be achieved is
a divestiture of already-scrambled assets to some third firm, a
remedy that has not typically been effective in restoring premerger
competitive conditions.105 Thus, enforcement capability is the first
indispensable condition for an effective system of private
enforcement.
103. Cf. Burns, supra note 60, at 90-93 (suggesting a similar approach to antitrust standing based on seriousness of violation, indispensability of plaintiff, and judicial ability to manage litigation by a less-than-ideal plaintiff).
104. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(b)(l)(B) (1994) (15 days for cash tender offers, 30 days for other mergers).
105. See Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513, 1517
(S.D. Ind. 1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, REGULATION, Nov.Dec. 1981, at 25; Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 43, 53-61 (1969).
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Gravity of Violation

The second requirement for effective enforcement is that private enforcers must be able to challenge the most egregious merger
violations. Public enforcers consider the gravity of the violation in
exercising enforcement discretion and are able to concentrate public resources on the most serious antitrust violations. Similarly, in
shaping procedural rules to control private actions, courts should
also consider this factor as an indicator of the social harm from the
violation.
Indeed, in its antitrust injury decisions, the Supreme Court appears to have implicitly considered the seriousness of the violation.
In the Court's key decisions creating and extending the antitrust
injury principle, the marginal nature of the antitrust violation is, to
say the least, a striking coincidence. Thus, in the Brunswick decision, which first enunciated the antitrust injury principle, the substantive violation was a discredited deep-pocket theory.106 In the
recent ARCO decision, which denied standing in a nonmerger case,
the substantive violation was maximum vertical price fixing - a
theory that, as the Court itself noted, is now rejected by most commentators.107 In Cargill, the challenged merger caused only moderate concentration, and theories of competitive injury were weak. 108
Had the Court been convinced in these cases that the challenged
transaction was strongly anticompetitive, it conceivably could have
upheld standing, given the elasticity of the antitrust injury
doctrine.109 By contrast, in Blue Shield v. McCready,110 which upheld standing in expansive terms, the substantive violation was a
professional boycott of rival health providers that was injurious to
106. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977); cf.
Bradley, supra note 98, at 31-33.
107. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 343 n.13 (providing
detailed analysis); see The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REv.
129, 324 (1990) (stating that ARCO "all but overruled" decisions holding maximum price
fixing per se unlawful).
108. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116-17, 119 & n.15 (1986).
109. For example, in Brunswick, the Court might have found that plaintiff had survived
through competitive merit and that its resulting monopoly, free from disruption by an unlawful merger, was the appropriate reward for competitive success. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 49, at 1157 & n.7. In Cargill, the Court might have found, as Salop suggests, that
the defendant was engaged in a strategic price squeeze, forcing up the plaintiff's input prices
while lowering prices in the plaintiff's downstream market See Steven C. Salop, New Economic Theories of Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRusr LJ. 57, 58 (1987). In ARCO,
the Court might have found that other enforcers were not reasonably available because consumers would have no incentive to challenge maximum vertical price fixing, and the manufacturer's own single-brand dealers would be inhibited by fears of incurring the ill will of
their sole supplier. See generally Bums, supra note 60, at 94 & n.204 (citing commentators).
110. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
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consumers and obviously a serious violation.11 1 These cases suggest
that the Court implicitly recognizes and considers the gravity of the
violation.
In merger cases, the gravity of violation determination is relatively straightforward. Authorities agree that horizontal mergers
raise the most serious competitive risks; Congress also held this
view in adopting the modem antimerger law. 112 Thus, in an early
private merger injunction case, the Second Circuit, exercising equity discretion, upheld a denial of an injunction against a
nonhorizontal merger. 113 After that decision, antitrust lawyers concluded that an injunction in a private suit against a nonhorizontal
merger was generally unobtainable.114
A standard for assessing gravity of the violation is readily available in the Department of Justice and FTC Merger Guidelines,11s
which contain structural indicia for appraising anticompetitive risk
created by mergers. 116 This guides the Department's exercise of enforcement discretion and can be useful in making gravity determinations in private cases. Thus, consistent \vith the tenor of Supreme
Court decisions and the Merger Guidelines, the gravity of the antitrust violation should be considered explicitly in shaping an effective system of private merger enforcement and in determining
appropriate equity relief.117
3. Incentive Compatibility
Effective antitrust enforcement also requires an essential compatibility between the plaintiff's private interest in attacking the
merger and the public interest in competition. Critics of merger
suits by competitors and takeover targets often exaggerate the conflict between the incentives of merger plaintiffs and antitrust
goals.us Nevertheless, private enforcement clearly raises incentive
compatibility risks. A competitor might challenge a merger be111. 457 U.S. at 483.
112. See Bradley, supra note 98, at 41-42 (stating that horizontal mergers between competitors or potential competitors were the object of greatest congressional concern).
113. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974).
114. Cf. ABA ANIITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1, THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
OF SECTION 7 OF THE CIAYTON Ac:r 32-36 (1977).
115. Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1.
116. Id. § 2 (identifying market concentration, entry barriers, and similar structural
factors).
117. Cf. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (allowing for equity balancing in issuing merger divestiture remedy).
118. See infra section IV.A.
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cause it fears that the merged fiim will become a more efficient
rival; a takeover target might try to block a merger because its managers fear loss of their jobs. As discussed in Part II, the antitrust
injury principle addresses this issue by screening the plaintiff's economic interest for its consistency with antitrust goals, and that inquiry is based essentially on an incentive compatibility rationale.119
The antitrust injury principle alone, however, cannot assure incentive compatibility without risk of undermining effective private
merger enforcement. To rely solely on antitrust injury to assure incentive compatibility is to assume that courts can divide merger litigants into two neatly bifurcated groups - bad litigants with
incompatible incentives and good litigants with compatible incentives. Litigants cannot be so neatly separated into those with compatible and those with incompatible incentives. To be sure, cases of
clear incompatibility can be identified, as in Brunswick, in which
the plaintiff claimed injury from increased competition caused by a
merger.120 It does not follow, however, that in other cases the
plaintiff's incentives are necessarily compatible. Assured compatibility with antitrust goals arises only when the plaintiff can prove
actual anticompetitive conduct or a specific intent by the defendant
to engage in such conduct. Such cases will be rare because litigants
typically bring suit before the merger is consummated and hence
before postmerger conduct has occurred.121
As a result, many cases will involve issues of uncertain compatibility, as the plaintiff's incentives will be hidden from judicial scrutiny at the time of suit. In such cases, the plaintiff will allege a
future injury that is within the anticompetitive rationale of the
merger law but will lack clear and definitive proof that the injury
will occur, apart from the anticompetitive structure of the postmerger market. If courts deny antitrust standing to litigants of uncertain incentive compatibility, they effectively bar some
competitors and takeover targets with compatible incentives as
merger litigants. On the other hand, if courts allow unregulated
pursuit of merger claims by ·all merger litigants who assert anticompetitive injury, they allow )Vasteful and disruptive litigation.
Abandonment of the myth that courts can effectively divide all
merger plaintiffs into good and bad litigants allows for policies that
119. See supra text accompanying note 77.
120. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl·O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1979).
121. Even if the litigation continues into the immediate postmerger period, anticompetitive conduct injurious to the plaintiff appears most unlikely in the face of ongoing litigation
and expected judicial scru~iny.
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promote socially productive private merger enforcement. Instead
of limiting the incentive compatibility inquiry to a single-stage determination of whether the plaintiff sustains antitrust injury, the
courts should follow a two-stage process. The first stage would use
the antitrust injury principle as a threshold screen to eliminate
plaintiffs with clear and apparent incentive incompatibility. In the
second stage, courts would apply procedural controls and mechanisms to discourage plaintiffs with hidden incentive incompatibility
from pursuing merger litigation and to prevent litigation abuse by
any plaintiffs not so discouraged. 122 The availability of the secondstage procedure allows the first-stage procedure to be less demanding than the current antitrust injury analysis because the second
stage operates as an additional constraint and offers protection
against suits by incentive-incompatible plaintiffs. A brief overview
of the second-stage equity procedure will facilitate an understanding of my proposed approach.

4. Equity Controls and Mechanisms
Antitrust courts should use their equity powers to assure that
the litigation conduct of merger plaintiffs promotes antitrust goals.
Courts need not accept flawed litigation incentives as immutable.
Instead, antitrust courts can utilize a powerful array of procedural
mechanisms to control and regulate the skewed incentives of plaintiffs who pass the antitrust injury screen - a possibility largely ignored by previous discussions of standing and antitrust injury.
Stating the mechanism design problem in exaggerated terms will
serve to clarify our understanding. The plaintiff knows whether the
merger is lawful or unlawful - for example, whether it promotes
increased efficiency or injures competition - but the plaintiff's decision to sue does not reliably signal its knowledge because some
plaintiffs seek to block lawful mergers and mergers that cannot
threaten them with anticompetitive injury. The antitrust injury
principle screens out cases of clear incentive incompatibility, but it
cannot by itself eliminate all incentive problems without undermining private merger enforcement.
Thus, despite application of the antitrust injury screen, the risk
remains that plaintiffs whose incentives are hidden from judicial
122. Expressed in principal-agent tenns, the second stage recognizes that in regulating
private merger enforcement, the government as principal need not restrict its supervision to a
single, one-time only response to the private enforcement agent's suit - an in-or-out determination of antitrust injury. Instead, the interaction between principal and agent can be
continuing and interactive, responsive to the case at hand.

October 1995]

Antitrust Standing

31

scrutiny will bring merger suits incompatible with antitrust goals.
Such plaintiffs may (i) engage in strategic litigation, filing suits without intrinsic merit in order to block or delay a merger; (ii) induce
wrong outcomes by causing courts to misidentify lawful mergers as
unlawful; (iii) enter into anticompetitive or collusive settlements
that do not promote and may harm competition; (iv) fail to brief
the court on the complexities of merger relief, leading to inappropriate relief; and (v) defer merger challenge until after the acquired
assets have been integrated into the postmerger firm when divestiture becomes costly and often impractica1.123
What previous analysis has ignored, however, is that the merger
court, sitting in equity, has extensive powers - both actual and potential - to prevent litigation abuse by merger plaintiffs.124 Two
basic mechanisms are available through the court's supervisory
powers. First, the court can use litigation management controls to
regulate the plaintiff's litigation conduct. Second, the court can
utilize costs and rewards, which operate as separating mechanisms
to discourage plaintiffs with incompatible incentives from pursuing
merger litigation.1zs
123. An additional risk in private merger litigation is that it might upset international
coordination of antitrust enforcement. A recent cooperation agreement between the United
States and the European Economic Community bound the contracting parties to notify and
coordinate enforcement actions, including merger proceedings, when they affect important
interests of the other party. Agreement on the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept.
23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30 I.L.M. 1487, reprinted in 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1534, at 382 (Sept. 26, 1991). The agreement does not prevent suits by private plaintiffs,
which could cause jurisdictional and comity conflict.
Contemplating possible jurisdictional conflict, however, the agreement allows EEC officials to ask their U.S. counterparts to file an amicus brief in a private case and vice versa. See
61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. at 377. Indeed, the United States can file an amicus brief in
any case in which it perceives a conflict problem; defendants, eager to enlist federal agencies
to intervene on their behalf, will surely notify federal authorities of any potential conflict. Of
course, ultimate resolution of the issue - whether by denying the injunction or shaping relief
to avoid conflict - would be up to the courts, but on a matter of foreign relations, the
government's views are likely to be persuasive. Finally, most cases involve no jurisdictional
conflict. See 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. at 375 (only 11 % of significant mergers in 1991
involved EEC-located firms).
124. See generally llA CHARLEs A. WRimrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2947-48 (1995) (detailing judicial discretion in issuing preliminary injunction and
imposing conditions); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HAR.v.
L. REv. 525, 526 (1978) (stating that absence of standards for preliminary injunctions increases court's discretion).
Although courts recite several specific factors to be considered in preliminary injunction
cases - for example, threatened harm to plaintiff, impact of the injunction on defendant,
likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest in antitrust enforcement - these
are not rigid requirements but balancing factors in exercising equitable discretion. See llA
WRIGIIT ET AL., supra, § 2948; 1 ABA AN'llTRUST SECTION, AN'llTRuST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 365-69 (3d ed. 1992) (describing the factors courts should consider in merger cases).
125. A separating mechanism is a commitment by one party that forces the other party to
reveal its type. Thus, an auction house that requires a $10,000 guaranteed deposit to engage
in bidding forces impecunious bidders to reveal themselves.
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a. Litigation Management Controls. Courts have extensive
powers to prevent delaying tactics that obstruct mergers and to supervise litigation to assure that it promotes the public interest.
Merger cases require skilled judicial management because such
suits can upset the delicate timing and financing of a merger and
because issuance of a preliminary injunction is often dispositive.
Available judicial controls to achieve these objectives include: (i)
expedited hearings, which can significantly reduce delay and litigation costs by shortening preliminary injunction proceedings to only
a few weeks;126 (ii) hold-separate orders, which allow the merger to
go forward with the acquired assets held separate until the antitrust
issues are resolved, thereby allowing the bidder to acquire the target and the target's shareholders to sell their shares, while preserving the court's ability to achieve effective divestiture relief;127 (iii)
possible appointment of an equity trustee to hold the target's shares
during the pendency of the merger litigation, which functions in
similar fashion to the hold-separate order, with the added benefit of
preventing the target from using anticompetitive litigation tactics;128 (iv) amicus participation by federal or state enforcement
agencies to advise the court on the government's views, particularly
on remedial issues - advice that when offered has been highly influential in the courts;129 (v) the /aches doctrine, which bars unreasonable delay in filing and prosecuting merger challenges;130 (vi)
"curative relief" proposals by which merger defendants agree to
divest themselves of particular assets raising competitive risks,
thereby rendering the balance of the acquisition lawful and frustrating suits by plaintiffs whose real objection is to block the merger's
126. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co v. Cargill Inc., 498 F.2d 851 {2d Cir.) (granting preliminary injunction 17 days after filing of complaint), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974);
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll 65,848 (N.D. Okla.) (denying preliminary injunction 22 days after complaint filed), affd., 1984-1 Trade Car. (CCH) 'll 65,896
(10th Cir. 1984); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973) (granting
preliminary injunction relief 9 days after filing); see also Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (deciding complex merger challenge in 5 months); cf.
Texas Teller-Machine Case Resolved by Law Professor, in 6 ALTERNATIVES TO nm HmH
CoST OF LmGATION 161 (1988) (describing complex antitrust case involving electronic funds
transfer network tried in a few weeks, based on focused attention of counsel and arbitrator).
127. See, e.g., FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. PepsiCo.,
Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1
Trade Cas. {CCH) 'l[ 74,873, at 95,875 (M.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. G. Heileman Brewing
Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. International Tel. & Tel Corp., 306
F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'll
68,244 (E.D. Mo. 1956), affd., 370 U.S. 294 {1962).
128. See, e.g., United States v. BNS, Inc., 848 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1988).
129. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 54-60.
130. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 297-98 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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pro-competitive aspects;131 and (vii) judicial balancing of the equities to determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction, allowing consideration of public interest factors, including strategic
litigation, incentive incompatibility, and gravity of the antitrust
violation.132

b. Separating Mechanisms. The separating mechanism addresses the problem of the plaintiff with hidden incentives - the
plaintiff who claims probable future injury from the merger but
cannot present clear proof that such injuries will actually occur.
The separating mechanism uses costs and rewards that induce the
actor to reveal whether its incentives are compatible or incompatible with antitrust goals. Such mechanisms reduce the ability of
wrongly motivated plaintiffs to pursue anticompetitive suits but do
not suppress the litigation effort of plaintiffs with compatible
incentives.
Separating mechanisms available in merger injunction actions
include: (i) Rule 11 sanctions against litigants and their attorneys
where the suit lacks a legal basis or the plaintiff uses improper litigation tactics;133 (ii) litigation bonds, authorized by both the Clayton Act and Rule 65(c), requiring the plaintiff to post a bond to
compensate defendant for losses from an injunction improvidently
granted, which imposes costs on plaintiffs who bring nonmeritori131. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI
68,607, at 61,200 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (approving joint venture contingent upon divestiture of
certain assets); United States v. Waste Management Inc., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI 68,481,
at 60,650 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (approving acquisition conditioned on divestiture of assets in
limited geographic area); Aronson & Keyte, supra note 95, at 28 (stating tbat alternative
relief includes licensing of key assets or technology and regulation of conduct). See generally
1 ABA ANTITRUST SEcnoN, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENI'S, supra note 124, at 344-51
nn.24-26.
132. See 1 ABA ANTITRUST SEcnoN, supra note 124, at 365-69. See generally Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 258, n.6 (2d Cir.) (construing an
equity remedy as "flexible and capable of 'nice adjustments and reconciliation between public interest and private needs'" (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944))),
cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
133. FED. R. Crv. P. 11; see, e.g., Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243,
253-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (ordering plaintiff to pay defendant's attorney's fees for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry tbat would have revealed no antitrust injury), modified, 821 F.2d
121 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); Ford Piano Supply Co v. Steinway &
Sons, 1990-91 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI 68,920, at 62,934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (imposing sanction
after all complaints were dismissed due to insufficient inquiry); Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx
Corp., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) «JI 67,915, at 57,592-94 (D.D.C. 1988) (imposing sanction
where reasonable inquiry would have revealed alleged anticompetitive practice did not exist), a!fd., 875 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1989), modified sub nom. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). But compare FED. R. Crv. P. ll(c), which was recently amended
to make tbe penalty discretionary rather tban mandatory.
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ous suits;134 and (iii) the existing statutory remedy of attorney's fees
for prevailing plaintiffs, which creates a large differential in expected reward as between meritorious and nonmeritorious
plaintiffs.135
Moreover, courts can strengthen separating procedures by increasing the amount of litigation bonds above their current modest
levels, issuing preliminary injunctions conditioned on plaintiff's
agreement to make advance public disclosure of proposed settlement terms, thereby discouraging collusive settlements and recognizing voluntary undertakings by plaintiffs that demonstrate procompetitive motivation as a public interest factor bearing on the
issuance of a preliminary injunction - for example, adoption by a
takeover target of governance procedures that separate control of
the litigation from continued managerial tenure.136
Thus, effective private merger enforcement does not require
draconian standing rules that bar private merger litigants who cannot demonstrate actual injury under a Sherman Act standard. Instead, courts can effectively constrain private enforcement using
existing or judicially augmented equity controls and mechanisms.
The choice of mechanisms depends, of course, on the particular
facts, including most importantly, the competitive relationship of
the potential merger enforcer to the merging firms, whether as a
competitor, takeover target, supplier, or customer. Hence, it is critical to determine which of these possible plaintiffs have the capability and motivation to serve as effective enforcers of merger law.
B. Possible Merger Enforcers

Possible merger enforcers include purely private litigants, of
which there are several types, and state attorneys general suing in a
quasi-governmental representative capacity. Because the two
groups present different issues, they are discussed in separate
sections.
134. FEo. R. CIV. P. 65(c); Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. OMNI Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407,
1422-23 (11th Cir. 1987) (imposing $150,000 bond on order enjoining tying arrangement);
Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986)
(issuing $250,000 bond on injunction against takeover attempt); Grumman Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.) (imposing $5 million bond on preliminary injunction),
affd., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307
(D. Conn.) (requiring $10,000 bond on injunction against voting stock in merger target), affd.,
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
136. See infra text accompanying notes 367-69.
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1. Private Enforcers

Purely private enforcers fall into five groups - takeover
targets, competitors, consumers, suppliers, and business customers.
Competitors and takeover targets are ideal litigants in terms of
litigation capability because they are likely to have the skill, knowledge of the industry, financial resources, legal sophistication, and
motivation to mount a powerful case with the speed and precision
necessary in merger injunctions. Indeed, such litigants may possess
litigation capability superior to the government itself. The relatively modest litigation staff the government can field in a typical
case, subject to a high turnover rate at junior levels, is not comparable to the litigation capability of a well-financed target or competitor, with expert knowledge of the industry, the most seasoned and
distinguished counsel, the most noted economic experts, and
whatever litigation support it needs. This is particularly true under
the hydraulic pressures of merger injunction litigation, when a case
that would normally require months, if not years, of preparation
must be presented within weeks.
The superior capability and motivation of competitors and takeover targets as litigants is borne out by statistical data; these data
show that over a fourteen-year period, 1977 to 1990, competitors
and takeover targets brought fifty-four out of sixty-six reported private merger injunction cases, or eighty-two percent of such cases,
and obtained thirteen of the fourteen preliminary injunctions
granted in such cases.137 A further indicator of the litigation capability of competitors and takeover targets appears in a recent study
of the relative success rates of private litigants and the federal antitrust agencies in cases actually litigated. Over a roughly comparable period, 1982-1992, private litigants in merger cases succeeded in
sixty-two percent of the cases tried, a figure subst~tially equivalent
to the Federal Trade Commission's success rate and far exceeding
the Justice Department's twenty-seven percent success rate. 138 The
merit of the private merger cases is further indicated by a study of
detailed economic findings in the somewhat smaller number of
cases in which findings appeared, showing the presence of highly
137. See app. (merger statistics); see also ABA ANTITRUST SEcnON, supra note 1, at 1112. The measuring period ends in 1990 because that year marked the end of the merger wave
of the 1980s.
138. See Malcolm B. Coate, Merger Analysis in the Courts, in MANAGERIAL & DECISION
EcoN. 3-4 (1995) (defining success as obtaining preliminary injunction or full trial on the
merits).

.
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oligopolistic market structures and collusive risks and a low likelihood of efficiencies.139
Litigation capability, however, is a double-edged sword. Due to
their superior capabilities, competitors and takeover targets are the
litigants who can most seriously obstruct mergers by strategic litigation. Moreover, such litigants raise the worst incentive compatibility problems because target firms may oppose mergers to preserve
the jobs of their managers, and competitors may seek to block
mergers because they fear their efficiency consequences.
Consumers are the least capable litigants in merger injunction
cases. No individual consumer is likely to have a large enough
stake to justify investment in the litigation, and a class action poses
severe organizational problems within the few weeks or days available to challenge the merger. Moreover, success in merger litigation does not lead to damages because the monetary inducements
that typically drive consumer class actions are absent.140 In addition, neither consumers nor their lawyers are likely to have the detailed knowledge of the industry held by business litigants who are
directly engaged in the relevant market. The statistics support this
low assessment of consumer litigation capability: over the fourteenyear period studied there were only two reported consumer suits,
neither of which obtained an injunction.141
Consumers appear to have strong incentive compatibility advantages because their desire for competitive prices accords with antitrust goals. Consumer incentives, however, are not perfectly
aligned with merger goals. Consumers want to buy at low prices
now, without regard to the effect such prices have on competitive
conditions necessary to sustain productivity and low prices in the
future. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in 1916, the antitrust laws
aim to protect the long-run interests of consumers and not always
139. Id. at 4-5 (showing that average Herfindahl index approached 4000, high entry barriers were present in 78% of private cases as compared with only 42% of Justice Department
cases, efficiencies were present in only 11 % of the private cases as compared with larger
percentages in the government cases, and an overall index of the evidentiary strength of the
cases found private cases to be stronger than either FI'C or Justice Department cases). The
study of evidentiary findings necessarily excluded cases in which findings were not entered.

Id.
140. To be sure, the successful merger plaintiff can recover attorney's fees, but these are
unlikely to motivate counsel when there is no pool of damages in which counsel can share
and which can be used to justify a generous fee award. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 677-84
(1986).
141. See app. (merger statistics).
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their short-run desire for "an immediate fall in prices. "142 This is
especially true of merger enforcement, which seeks to preserve
competitive market structures over the long run and often produces
no immediate gains for consumers. Moreover, suits by consumers
are typically class actions, brought by lawyers who seek to earn
fees, with considerable room for slippage between that objective
and the public interest.143 In sum, consumers have compatible, but
not perfectly compatible, enforcement incentives. Consumers,
however, lack the capability and motivation to be· effective enforcers of the merger law.144
Suppliers and businesss customers of merging firms fall into an
intermediate category. They are likely to be more capable litigants
than consumers but less capable than competitors and target firms.
In addition, suppliers often face standing difficulties based on the
directness of the injury when their losses result from a breakdown
in competition in the end product market rather than in the upstream input market to which they sell.145 Neither suppliers nor
customers necessarily possess detailed knowledge about the industry because they are sellers or buyers, not direct participants in the
market.
Suppliers and business customers also occupy an intermediate
position in terms of incentive compatibility. They would not, of
course, welcome a merger that creates monopolistic conditions in
the market from which they must buy or to which they must sell,
but their motivation to sue is often limited. First, their purchases or
sales to the threatened market may only be a small fraction of their ·
total sales or purchases. Second, their decision to sue creates a
free-rider problem because their action would benefit other buyers
and sellers who bear none of the costs. Third, even if the supplier
or customer believed the merger would reduce its earnings sufficiently to justify litigation, it would have to weigh these concerns
against the loss of goodwill likely to result from a suit against a
customer or supplier.
In fact, suppliers and business customers have played only a minor role in private merger litigation. Over the fourteen-year period
142. United States v. Com Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal
dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
143. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Mn. L. REv. 215 (1983).
144. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir.)
("Consumers are unlikely to face the prospect of suffering a sufficient amount of damage to
justify the cost of seeking a pre-acquisition injunction."), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
145. See 1 ABA ANrrrn.usT SEcnoN, supra note 124, at 364.
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from 1977 through 1990, customers and suppliers brought only four
reported cases and failed to obtain any preliminary injunctions.1 46
Thus, suppliers and customers cannot fulfill the role of effective private enforcer of the merger law.
Our survey of purely private enforcers leads to the conclusion
that the only effective private merger enforcers are competitors and
takeover targets and that without their effort there would have
been virtually no private enforcement of the merger law.
2. States Suing as Parens Patriae

A final possible private litigant is the state suing in a quasigovernmental or representative capacity as parens patriae on behalf
of consumers or for injury to its general economy.141 Can the states
fulfill the role of effective private enforcer of the merger law, removing the need for other private litigants in merger cases? This
question assumes increasing importance as the standing of other
private litigants becomes more precarious.14 s
Despite the importance of their enforcement effort in recent
years, the states cannot by themselves vindicate the dual enforcement principle. They lack the enforcement capability to replace all
other private merger plaintiffs in an effective manner; their incentives, while generally superior to those of competitors and takeover
targets, are subject to their own distorting influences; and the states
- under whatever legal mantle they act - remain agencies of government, not aggrieved private persons applying the self-help remedy embodied in dual enforcement.
The durability of the present state enforcement effort is not assured, due to drastic fluctuations in state enforcement over the
years. State enforcement, active in the early years of the Sherman
Act, virtually ceased over a fifty year period, reviving only in the
mid-1980s.14 9 State merger enforcement is confined to a relatively
few merger-enforcing states and is dependent on the views of
changing state attorneys general and state budgetary support in a
time of increasing financial stringency. The narrowness of state
146. See app. (merger statistics). Since 1990, the number of customer cases has increased,
but customers have been singularly unsuccessful in gaining standing, succeeding in only one
out of six cases during 1991-1995. See supra note 29 (search description).
147. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972). A state may also bring
merger injunction suits as a purchaser in the restrained product market, but it then acts as a
purely private litigant.
148. See supra text accompanying note 29.
149. See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed Federal!
State Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047, 1053-56 (1990).
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economic interests and local political concerns that may be incompatible with national antitrust goals can distort the incentives of
state enforcers. Moreover, the need to conserve limited state enforcement resources and to avoid federal-state conflict has drawn
the states into an ever more intimate partnership with federal antitrust authorities - a governmental, not a private, enforcement
role. Thus, it would be a startling interpretation of congressional
intent in creating the dual enforcement system to hold that the only
entity with standing to maintain a private merger suit is an agency
of government itself.
Resources and personnel limit state merger enforcement.
Merger cases are the most resource-intensive antitrust litigation.150
Within a matter of weeks, sometimes even days, the plaintiff must
marshall a sophisticated antitrust case involving proof of complex
economic facts, including market definition, market power, and
oligopolistic conduct - an awesome task, even for a large team of
lawyers and economists representing a billion-dollar corporation.
Yet most states have only three to five antitrust lawyers, others no
more than one or two, and some states none at all.151 In addition,
almost none of the states has a staff economist,152 and the tight time
limits of merger litigation tend to hamper the effective multi-state
coordination that occurs in other types of state antitrust
litigation.153
Financial pressures also inhibit state merger capability and
growing budgetary limitations on state finances may intensify these
pressures. Many state legislatures expect antitrust enforcement to
150. Roundtab/e Discussion with Enforcement Officials, 63 ANrrrRuST L.J. 951, 968
(1995) (statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice); Telephone Interview with Robert M. Langer, former Connecticut Assistant Attorney General and Head of the Antitrust-Consumer Protection Department
and former Chair of NAAG Antitrust Task Force (July 31, 1995).
151. Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General and Head of Antitrust Department, and Chair of the NAAG Antitrust Task Force (Aug.
3, 1995).
152. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 150, at 968 (statement of Laurel A. Price, Chair,
NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force); Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra
note 151. Absence of in-house economic expertise has been ameliorated in recent years
through access to federal agency economists and financial support from a treble damage recovery. Telephone interview with Kevin O'Connor, supra note 151. But there is no assurance that such resources will continue to be available in a time of growing budgetary
stringency.
153. Telephone Interview with Robert M. Langer, supra note 150. Other factors hampering effective coordination include differences in enforcement philosophies, economic impact,
and antitrust expertise as between the states. ABA ANrrrRuST SEcnoN, supra note 76, at
70-71. See generally Lande, supra note 149, at 1064, 1085 (discussing how states lack resources and expertise).
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be self-supporting.154 Unlike treble-damage claims and civil penalties in Sherman Act cases, merger injunction cases make no contribution to state revenues apart from a possible attorney's fee
award. 155 Federal support for state antitrust enforcement under the
Federal Crime Control Act,156 which subsidized state antitrust enforcement beginning in the 1970s,157 is no longer available.158
While the lack of direct :financial subsidy is offset to some extent by
in-kind help, such as federal training and expert economic assistance,159 future federal support is by no means assured in a time of
severe budgetary reduction and differing political views as to the
merits of state merger enforcement.160
Reflecting these influences, state merger enforcement has been
limited. Probably no more than eight or ten states are strongly engaged in merger enforcement.161 As recently as 1985, in several
states merger enforcement did not exist.162 States have taken a
more active enforcement role only in the last few years, and they
became a major enforcement factor only in the 199Qs.163 The viabil154. See Susan Beth Fanner, Introduction to 18 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON.,
1, 4 (1988). In at least 14 states, penalties and damages go into a revolving fund to support
antitrust enforcement. Id.
155. Even if the attorney's fee award is computed at the prevailing private compensation
rate, it will not approximate the return from a significant treble damage award.
156. State Antitrust Grant Program Amendment to Crime Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3739
(1978).
.
157. See Fanner, supra note 154, at 3.
158. Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra note 151.
159. See ABA Spring Meeting Scrutinizes Redirected Antitrust Enforcement, 66 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1659, at 411, 413 (Apr. 14, 1994) (statement of Laurel A.
Price); Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra note 151.
160. See Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, State and Federal Antitrust Enforce·
ment in the United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9 CoNN. J. INTL. L. 501, 534 (1994) (dis·
cussing the "destructive potential" of competition between state and federal antitrust
enforcement agencies). Significantly, Donald Flexner was Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division during the Reagan administration.
161. Telephone Interview with Robert M. Langer, supra note 150; see Lande, supra note
149, at 1050, 1056-59 (revealing that over a 10-year period, 1980-1990, seven states conducted
most of the merger enforcement activity). More recent data, collected since 1990, combined
with earlier data, show that only 10 states have been involved in more than one reported
merger case (including consent decrees) from 1980 through 1994: California, Connecticut,
MassacJtusetts, Maine, Minnesota, North carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Washington. See supra note 29 (search description).
162. See Lande, supra note 149, at 1054-55, 1085 (noting that during a 50-year period,
1930-1980, states filed only 4 merger cases, and none of these occurred from 1930 through
1960, and that most states have never brought a merger case).
163. Over the 14-year period, 1977-1990, there were only 7 reported state-instituted
merger decisions in the federal courts out of a total of 66 reported private merger cases. See
app. As recently as 1990, leading antitrust practitioners considered a merger suit by a state to
be an unlikely occurrence. See, e.g., Edwin M. Zimmennan, Section 7 and the Evolving Role
of Economics, 35 ANTITRUST Buu.. 447, 460 (1990). By contrast, between 1990 and 1994, the
states brought 11 out of 27 reported private merger cases.
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ity of state merger enforcement depends on the views of changing
attorneys general in the relatively few active enforcing states.164
Consumers in other states, comprising large regions of the country,
remain unprotected by effective state merger enforcement.
The states have been very selective in their enforcement efforts,
concentrating on cases having local consumer impact in a few highly
visible consumer markets or adverse employment effects on vital
local industries.165 Budgetary constraints, both state and federal,
could reduce state enforcement efforts in the future or focus it even
more exclusively on purely local transactions. 166 Indeed, the states
themselves have recognized their inability to sustain private merger
enforcement alone and have urged Congress to amend the Clayton
Act to broaden the standing of competitors, takeover targets, and
other business litigants in merger cases.167 Thus, the state enforcement effort is incomplete, leaving many mergers that have serious
anticompetitive impact outside the zone of state enforcement
infiuence.168
Further, the state's enforcement incentives are not always compatible with national antitrust goals. As we have seen, state enforcement is intensely local.169 The state is concerned with the
164. See ABA ANITIRUST SECTION, supra note 76, at 69-70 (suggesting that localized
political factors may influence enforcement decisions); Robert M. Langer, Commentary: The
Impact of Antitrust on Merger Activity in the 1980s - Suggestions for Change, 29 WASHBURN
L.J. 290, 290 (1990). In New York, one of the most active merger enforcing states, a change
of Attorney General and Governor led to a 65% decrease in the previous antitrust staff of 17
lawyers. Interview with Lloyd E. Constantine, former Assistant Attorney General in New
York and former head of NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force (Aug. 8, 1995).
165. See ABA ANITIRUST SECTION, supra note 76, at 70 & n.345, 80 (describing state
merger activity predominantly local); Michael H. Byowitz, Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint
Ventures, in BASIC ANITIRuST LAw 309 (1994) (stating that state merger enforcement is most
active in wholesale and retail businesses, including supermarkets, department stores, and
hospitals). My survey of reported state merger cases brought from 1991 through 1994
showed that only 3 out of 11 cases involved allegations not focused on purely local effects.
At present, at least 50% of state merger activity involves hospital mergers. Telephone Interview with Kevin J. O'Connor, supra note 151.
166. The Justice Department currently attempts to persuade state attorneys general to
limit their antitrust prosecutions to transactions that " 'do not have a national character.' "
See Bingaman Details Division Priorities in International Antitrust Enforcement, 65 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1637, at 568-69 (Oct. 28, 1993) (quoting Anne K. Bingaman,
Asst. Atty. Gen. in charge of antitrust).
167. See NAAG Resolution on Standing and Divesture in § 7 Cases, 54 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1372, at 1175 (June 30, 1988); cf. NAAG Task Force Report, 7 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) q[ 50,068, at 48,751 (Nov. 12, 1991) (statement of Robert M. Langer, former
Chair ofNAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force) (saying that competitors should have standing to challenge mergers without proof of predation); Lloyd E. Constantine, Speech to New
England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 2, 1990), in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 131, at 5 (Nov.
6, 1990) (discussing limited role of states in merger enforcement).
168. See generally Richard Blumenthal et al., Antitrust Review of Mergers by State Attorneys General: The New Cops on the Beat, 61 CoNN. B. J. 1 (1993).
169. See supra note 165.
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impact of the merger on economic interests within the state - its
workers, consumers, communities, and tax revenues. But these
objectives can be inconsistent with the national goal of competitive
markets. As a result, the states are motivated to oppose mergers
that cause losses to their own economies, without balancing gains
that may be realized outside the state.17° On the other hand, the
state may not oppose a merger that increases employment within
the state even when it reduces competition generally.171 The state
will have relatively little incentive to challenge mergers that cause
generalized national injury but have no particularized impact on the
state, such as mergers among manufacturers of nationally sold
products.172
Finally, it would be a startling reading of the antitrust statutes
and their legislative history to hold that the states alone comprise
the effective class of private merger litigants required by the dual
enforcement principle. Congress created a private antitrust action
to enable suits by consumers and, perhaps most of all, competitors
and potential competitors.173 The states did not play a part in this
private enforcement scheme. Congress viewed state antitrust enforcement as governmental: the states were parallel sovereigns enforcing state antitrust laws, many of which had existed before the
Sherman Act. 174 The Sherman Act would enable the federal government to enforce antitrust law in interstate commerce, thereby
supplementing state enforcement and closing any gap in public
enforcement.175
The role of the states in antitrust enforcement differs today but
remains essentially governmental. The governmental character of
current state antitrust enforcement arises not from a separate intra170. State attorneys general have expressed concern about loss of jobs and local facilities
within the state - local losses that do not necessarily injure competitive interests. See ABA
ANTIIRUST SEcnON, supra note 76, at 70 & n.345; Blumenthal et al., supra note 168, at 12-13
(stating that state enforcers may take job protection into account when deciding among cases
that "make sense" on traditional economic grounds); Lande, supra note 149, at 1068 (same).
171. Indeed, state merger enforcement may be a zero-sum game in that a merger embraced in one state because it strengthens a local enterprise may be "vilified" in another state
because it raises prices or reduces local employment. ABA ANTIIRUST SEcnoN, supra note
76, at 70-71.
172. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 168, at 10 (stating that local factors almost always
influence a decision to prosecute a merger violation); Lande, supra note 149, at 1082 (discussing how states rarely challenge mergers unless they have a disproportionate intrastate
impact).
173. See 21 CoNo. REc. 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); Hovenkamp, supra
note 40, at 23-27.
174. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of
the Firm: An Historical Perspective, 59 ANTIIRuST LJ. 75 (1990).
175. See ABA ANTIIRUST SEcnoN, 1 State Antitrust Practice and Statutes 19-20 (1990).
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state enforcement sphere but from the state's inescapable status as
a governmental entity and the resulting need for close federal-state
collaboration to avoid transaction-deterring intergovernmental confiict.176 Such collaboration now includes institutionalized liaisons
between federal and state enforcement authorities, federal training
of state personnel, joint federal-state filings of merger suits, proposals for deputization of state personnel as acting U.S. attorneys to
assist in federal prosecutions, and federal plans to divide merger
enforcement responsibilities with the states.177 While such collaboration conserves enforcement resources and helps to avoid federalstate conflict, it undermines the states' role as independent victimdriven enforcers of the antitrust laws that can functionally replace
purely private enforcers.
The legislative history of the antitrust statutes further negates
the conclusion that the state parens patriae suit satisfies the dual
enforcement requirement. When Congress originally enacted the
private antitrust remedies, the federal courts had not yet accepted
the antitrust parens patriae action.178 But we need not speculate on
whether the state parens patriae action, recognized by the Supreme
Court in 1945,179 displaces suits by other private litigants. In 1976,
Congress codified the parens patriae action and made clear that the
federal authorization, far from displacing the rights of other private
litigants, sought to provide an alternative procedural means to vindicate substantive antitrust claims.1so Indeed, the 1976 legislation,
which authorized the states to bring Sherman Act damage claims on
behalf of consumers,181 specifically excluded the states from representing any business entity because such entities "are able ... to
fend for themselves" 182 and to pursue their antitrust remedies inde176. Such conflict may arise from differing enforcement criteria reflected in separate
state and federal merger guidelines, differences between regional and national enforcement
goals, and differing degrees of antitrust expertise. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note
76, at 66-70, 72, 78.
177. Some commentators would go further and require a fixed division of responsibility
between federal and state antitrust authorities mandated by enforcement agency guidelines
or statutory enactment. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 76, at 83-85.
178. Private remedies were contained in the original Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
209, 210 {1890). The Supreme Court first recognized the state parens patriae antitrust action
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 {1945).
179. 324 U.S. at 450.
180. See Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 218-19 {1990); Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 n.14 (1977).
181. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 15c{a){l)
{1994).
182. H.R. REP. No. 499, supra note 40, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2579.
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pendently.1s3 Thus, in authorizing the state parens patriae action,
Congress assumed the continued presence of other private enforcers, most especially business entities.184 It follows that the state
parens patriae action neither satisfies the dual enforcement mandate nor precludes the courts from recognizing that suits by takeover targets and competitors are necessary for effective private
enforcement of the merger law.
C. Effective Private Enforcers

A review of the advantages and disadvantages of private merger
enforcers shows that purely private litigants - apart from target
firms and competitors - have been ineffective as merger litigants
and that the states standing alone cannot fulfill the role of effective
private enforcers of the merger law. Thus, the only effective private
enforcers are takeover targets and competitors. Yet, we have seen
that these are precisely the litigants whose credentials are most vigorously challenged under the antitrust injury doctrine. Indeed,
some lower courts, echoing commentators, have asserted that the
litigation incentives of competitors are inherently perverse and
those of target firms oblivious to the public interest.
Thus, we appear to confront a dilemma. Stated in exaggerated
terms, competitors and targets know whether a merger is unlawful
and have the resources and expertise to prove illegality in court, but
these merger litigants also have distorted incentives that lead them
to misrepresent lawful and beneficial mergers as anticompetitive.
The flaw in current thinking about standing and antitrust injury is to
conclude that the dilemma is incurable and that the courts must
therefore bar competitor and target suits. Such a conclusion, however, repudiates the dual enforcement principle and risks serious
underenforcement of the merger law. Instead, courts should follow
a more constructive approach, screening out cases of clear incentive
incompatibility through the antitrust injury principle and eliminating remaining incentive incompatibility through equity and other
incentive management controls.
Some may object to any revitalization of private merger enforcement because it will authorize suits by some litigants with
183. Id. at 9-10, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2577.
184. The 1976 statute does not, by its tenns, bar the states from representing business
entities in Clayton Act merger cases, the statute having been adopted in response to a judicial ruling hostile to state parens patriae actions in Shennan Act damages cases. But it would
be strikingly inconsistent to conclude that the states can represent business entities in merger
cases when the states are forbidden to represent them in Shennan Act cases because such
entities are able to fend for themselves.
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flawed incentives. But to admit to such an objection is to pursue
the illusion of purity of litigation motivation. Litigants in antitrust
cases, like other economic actors, seek to benefit themselves, not to
promote social welfare. Most assuredly, therefore, competitors and
target firms will use merger litigation to pursue their own selfinterest but so will all other litigants; no litigant's personal agenda
will correspond fully with the social agenda.
Nor are federal agencies ideal enforcers, as public choice theory
teaches and as we have seen in connection with state enforcement.
Government enforcers have bureaucratic and political agendas that
motivate their actions in ways that are quite distinct from concerns
for social welfare.185 Congress itself recognized the tension between bureaucratic agendas and the public interest when authorizing the state parens patriae action: it required the state to pay
defendant's attorney's fees in actions filed for oppressive
reasons.186
Certainly, federal merger enforcement has experienced drastic
swings from one extreme tp the other - from zealous enforcement
in the 1960s to high permissiveness in the 1980s. Political agendas
raise special risks in antitrust law for enforcement policy may become the captive of changing economic ideologies or the unintended victim of drastic government-wide budgetary constraints. If
the public interest is defined as coinciding with judicial interpretations of antitrust statutes, then the alignment between the public
interest and government enforcement policy is far from perfect. Indeed, the 1980s witnessed an unwillingness by federal antitrust
agencies to enforce significant areas of antitrust law because enforcers disagreed with judicial precedent. In some instances, purely
political considerations influence government merger enforcement
policy- as the Nixon tapes revealed.187 Indeed, a chief merit of a
dual enforcement system is its ability to offset such occasional ideological or political bias.1ss

185. See SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBUC
PouCY IN THE ANTITRUST DMSION 171 (1977) (noting a strong tendency to prosecute cas~s
that can be won easily even when not of economic significance).
186. 15 u.s.c. § 15c(d)(2) (1994).
187. ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SuLUVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST 847-50 (1989) (describing how the Nixon tapes show politically motivated interference
by the White House with federal merger enforcement).
188. See generally Coffee, supra note 143, at 227 (stating that private enforcement helps
assure "stability of legal norms by preventing abrupt transitions in enforcement policy that
have not been sanctioned by the legislature").
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It is true of course that antitrust litigants must meet the antitrust
injury test the courts have required as a condition for evoking the
powerful antitrust remedies. But the statutory standard requires
only that the plaintiff's threatened injury occur "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 189 Nothing in that language
prohibits, and common sense requires, that courts apply the statutory test to vindicate the congressional purpose of an effective system of private enforcement.19° As we shall see, courts have an
ample basis for finding threatened antitrust injury in suits by competitors and takeover targets.
Thus, the illusion of unattainable enforcement ideals should not
deter us from our earlier conclusion that an effective system of private merger enforcement requires that courts permit the most
litigation-capable plaintiffs to challenge the most seriously anticompetitive mergers, subject to appropriate equity and other controls.
It remains to apply these enforcement criteria to competitors and
takeover targets - the two classes of litigants who alone can provide an effective supplement to public enforcement.
IV.

COMPETITORS

Competitors should have standing to challenge egregiously unlawful mergers because they are highly capable litigants, because
Congress sought to protect their freedom to compete without risk
of predatory injury from market powerful firms created by anticompetitive mergers, and because effective private enforcement of section 7 does not appear possible without their participation.
Although suits by competitors may raise incentive compatibility
risks, competitors' incentives are not systematically and perversely
opposed to the public interest in competition. Instead, courts
189. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1994).
190. Courts follow such a common-sense approach to private enforcement in other contexts. Thus, they allow patent licensees to challenge the validity of patents even when the
licensees have expressly agreed not.to do so (and presumably have been compensated for so
agreeing) because only they may have the economic incentive to test patent validity. See,
e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Rival bidders and target firms have standing
to sue under the securities laws for misstatements of material facts even though Congress
intended these provisions for the protection of investors because bidders and targets are the
only litigants capable of policing the SEC filings. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,
719-21, 722 n.27 (2d Cir. 1971), cerl denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); see also Electronic Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969); Burlington Indus., Inc.
Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.N.C. 1987). Perhaps most striking of all, injured competitors may bring false advertising suits under the Lanham Act without any showing of consumer injury, despite the fact that the false advertising law has output perfecting and
consumer welfare goals similar to the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Bums, supra note 60,
at 64-69.

v.
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should evaluate competitors' incentives realistically, screening out
those with clearly incompatible incentives and controlling and modifying the incentives of other competitors through equity mechanisms, thereby facilitating challenges by competitors of the most
seriously anticompetitive mergers. Under these circumstances,
competitors can be highly effective enforcers of the merger law.

A. Enforcement Capability
As compared with other business litigants, competitors are generally the best-placed firms to pursue merger litigation. The special
advantages a competitor has as a merger litigant by virtue of its
knowledge and proximity to the market were well summarized in
Judge Fullam's recent opinion in Tasty Baking Co.:191
[C]ompetitors - with specialized knowledge of their market - may
recognize that an acquisition will enable the acquiring company to
harm competition by harming the remaining competitors; with this
special knowledge that enables rapid action, together with their access
to resources needed to prosecute an antitrust action, competitorplaintiffs well may assure that "a plaintiff adequately represents the
interests of 'victims' of the antitrust violation" and that "in fashioning
relief fiudges] appropriately address and remedy the actual violation
rather than simply correct an incidental injury."192
Although competitors do not have the immediate insight of the
target firm, whose assets will form a part of the merged entity, competitors frequently have enforcement advantages over targets, who
will not wish to challenge a friendly merger and typically will be
unable to challenge an unfriendly merger beyond the preliminary
injunction stage. An unfriendly merger challenge cannot survive a
denial of a preliminary injunction because after the bidder acquires
the target the first order of business of the new board of directors,
now under the bidder's control, will no doubt be to dismiss the antitrust suit. A competitor suffers no such disability.
Competitors also have litigation advantages over customers and
suppliers because they need not be concerned about maintaining a
continuing business relationship with the merging firms. Moreover,
a competitor with a major stake in the impacted market will have
greater motivation to prevent restraints of trade injurious to it than
191. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
192. 653 F. Supp. at 1256; see Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d
404, 407-08 (1st Cir. 1985) ("We cannot conceive of a more appropriate plaintiff to challenge
.•. [a predatory] merger."); cf. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 278, 279 &
n.4, 292 n.21, 294-95 (1990) (adopting Cia. Petro/era's view as to availability of divestiture
remedy in private merger cases and its interpretation of the legislative history of the merger
injunction provision of Clayton Act).

48

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 94:1

will a supplier or customer whose sales or purchases within the restrained market may constitute only a fraction of the total operations in that market. Finally, competitors with first-hand
knowledge of the industry are best qualified to evaluate an efficiencies defense.
Historically, competitors are the most numerous private merger
litigants, and their relative importance has increased in recent
years.193 Competitors obtained six of eleven preliminary injunctions granted against mergers between 1977 and 1990, with targets
obtaining almost all of the balance. Competitors have been the
most important class of merger litigants, and together with targets,
they have brought eighty-two percent of the reported private cases
during the above fourteen-year period.194

B. Incentive Compatibility and Threatened Injury

The objection to competitor standing in merger cases is based
on an absence of threatened injury or incentive incompatibility. In
Cargill, the Solicitor General asserted that competitors who attack
mergers on predatory pricing grounds have perverse incentives:
that competitors will challenge only efficient mergers that
"threaten" them with lower prices and vigorous competition.19s
Some commentators have joined the negative chorus, asserting that
competitors in antitrust cases are almost always wrongly motivated;196 that even if some competitor cases have merit, they should
nevertheless be barred because of their infrequency and the difficulties courts face in analyzing modem theories of anticompetitive
injury to competitors;197 and that "[t]he identity of the plaintiff is all
193. Competitors brought 31 of the 66 private merger cases reported during the period
1977-1990 and 19 of the 34 cases reported during the more recent 1984-1990 period. See app.
Although these data reflect only reported cases, a comprehensive study of case filings over an
11-year period also showed that competitors were the most numerous type of private merger
plaintiff. See also Salop & White, supra note 64, at 9 (stating that competitors are the most
numerous type of private merger plaintiff).
194. See app.
195. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-12, Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of
Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (No. 88-473).
196. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 247, 256-59 (1985). But see Bradley, supra note 91, at 257-63 (asserting
that cost-benefit analysis using empirical data indicates value of private antitrust suits, including competitor suits); James C. Miller III, Comments on Baumol and Ordover, 28 J.L. &
EcoN. 267 (1985) (stating that academic fears are exaggerated in view of declining case filings and reduced substantive liability). See generally Salop & White, supra note 64 (explicating 1985 Georgetown study of private antitrust litigation).
197. See Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551, 554-60, 567-76 (1991). Professors Snyder and
Kauper's negative conclusions on competitor suits were based on their appraisal of the merits
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the court needs to know." 198 These statements present an oversimplified and incomplete account of collusive behavior and the dynamics of business rivalry, however.
In fact, competitors may rationally'fear injury from mergers that
create high concentrations of economic power. Although rivals
may be able to reap short-run benefits from a collusive merger, the
rivals' advantage is precarious. The dominant firm or group of
firms has an incentive not only to collude but also to prevent outsiders who did not contribute to the collusive investment from sharing
the gains and to exclude rivals who threaten to undermine the collusion.199 Thus, market-concentrating mergers can make the competitive firm a potential target for cartel punishment or market
elimination through exclusionary and predatory strategies.zoo Indeed, coalescing merger standards, consistent With developments in
economic theory, indicate that anticompetitive mergers will be precisely those that create the exclusionary or predatory capability to
of 74 cases docketed in 5 district courts within a 2350 case sample used in the Georgetown
private litigation study, covering the period 1973 to 1983. Applying the standards of recent
economic analysis of exclusionary transactions to files that were often fragmentary, they
found the cases largely lacked merit. But perhaps it is not totally surprising that files in cases,
most of which were brought in the quite different antitrust climate of the early- to mid-1970s,
see id. at 599-603, should lack evidence to fit economic theories not yet articulated. In any
event, a study of more recent cases covering the period 1982 to 1992, most of which were
competitor cases, showed that private merger cases actually tried had a success rate of 62%,
comparable to the FfC's success rate, and much better than the Justice Department's success
rate of only 27% on approximately the same number of cases tried; moreover, the private
cases were based on strong evidence of probable anticompetitive effects - stronger in fact
than was present in the government cases. See Coate, supra note 138, at 3-4.
In addition, whatever the defects of filed cases, they do not inform us of the deterrence
effect of competitor suits - an issue not explored in the Georgetown data. See Bradley,
supra note 91, at 262 (stating that other empirical studies show important deterrence effects).
Finally, turning to recent economic theory, see infra text accompanying notes 204-05, it seems
premature to dismiss its legal utility when commentators are only beginning to craft detailed
legal approaches. See, e.g., Michael H. Riordan & Stephen C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical
Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 513 (1995). Professors Snyder and
Kauper also make insightful suggestions on the legal applications of the new theories. Snyder & Kauper, supra, at 563-64.
198. Easterbrook, supra note 74, at 36.
199. See KARL PRmRAM, CARTEL PROBLEMS 64-71 (1935) (stating that a struggle against
outsiders is essential to the protective goal of cartels); Leonard W. Weiss, Carte~. in 1 THE
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICI10NARY OF ECONOMICS 372, 373 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987)
(stating that the growth of fringe firms threatens a cartel and may evoke disciplinary action).
See generally R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Bidding Rings, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 579
(1992).
200. The terms "predatory" and "exclusionary" are often used interchangeably. See
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985). But a distinction between the two can sometimes be analytically helpful. Thus, I shall generally use "predation" to mean welfare reducing conduct by a dominant firm to drive out a smaller rival and
"exclusionary action" to describe a broader range of strategies that encompass both market
exclusion and raising rivals' costs as well as foreclosure of new entry.
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exclude rival firms or to raise their costs.2 01 It follows that the incentive incompatibility of competitors is exaggerated and that such
firms, confronted with market exclusion or higher costs, may realistically be threatened with injury from collusive mergers.
To be sure, we normally assume that competitors will benefit
from collusion in their market, choosing either to follow the oligopoly consensus or to deviate only to the point where they do not
provoke punishment. But the existence of exclusionary capability
limits the firm's independence and adds strategic uncertainty to its
other risks. The firm must henceforth constrain its actions in deference to the predatory power of its rivals. No doubt some would say
that is a small price to pay for a rigged market, but why should the
independent-minded firm be barred from challenging the creation
of exclusionary market power in its market when plausible conditions exist in which unconstrained independence will benefit the
firm more in the long run and when possible litigation abuses can
be controlled by the procedures and mechanisms suggested below?
Thus, the Cargill decision wisely rejected a broad assault on
competitor standing and instead denied standing based on a specific
failure of proof. The plaintiff, though claiming injury from predatory pricing, had neither alleged nor proved predation, and the
structure of the market made claims of predatory pricing implausible. Cargill did not hold that competitors were unqualified as a
class, nor did the Court follow the urging of the amicus briefs of the
Solicitor General and the Business Roundtable to bar competitor
suits in predatory pricing cases.2 02 Most significantly, the Court did
not decide whether the plaintiff might have sustained antitrust injury from other predatory or collusive effects of the merger.2 03 Accordingly, the Court refused to rule whether the market power
created by a merger might place smaller rivals at a disadvantage by
means other than predatory pricing. Cargill, therefore, does not
foreclose an evolution of standing doctrine to permit rivals to challenge mergers that threaten them with injury arising out of highly
concentrated markets and oligopolistic conditions.
201. Thus, the 1992 Merger Guidelines, reflecting modem economic views, identify collusive mergers as those where detection and punishment of deviating firms serve to enforce the
collusion. As discussed below, the punishment of deviant firms is anticompetitive conduct
that may harm competitors. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1, and infra text accompanying notes 230-52.
202. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-12, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (No. 85-473); Brief for the Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, 9-10, Cargill (No. 85-473).
203. Cargil~ 479 U.S. at 114 n.9.
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The Economics of Competitor Injury

Competitors face possible injury from anticompetitive mergers
as probable targets of exclusionary strategies by colluding or market dominant firms. Exclusionary strategies may encompass cartel
punishment or dominant firm predation.
1.

Cartel Punishment

Cartel theory teaches that effective collusion requires the ability
to punish or exclude deviants and new entrants who would undermine the cartel. Colluding firms 'confront a classic prisoner's dilemma. Despite the mutual advantage of strict adherence to the
collusive agreement, individually maximizing firms will deviate and
thereby destroy the collusion unless the colluding firms have a feasible means to identify and punish cheatmg.2 04 Thus, the power to
punish deviating rivals is essential to effective collusion. The punishment of rivals requires the ability to raise their costs or to place
them at other harmful disadvantage - in short the ability to exercise exclusionary market power. Exclusionary market power involves the power to exclude rivals or to reduce their output and
thereby raise prices.205 Typically, the exclusionary mechanism will
involve the withholding of a necessary input or the denial of access
to an essential downstream outlet.
Consequently, when we identify the market conditions under
which the dominant firm or dominant group of firms possess exclusionary market power, we also identify the conditions under which
effective collusion is likely.2 0 6 This leads to the striking result that
under cartel theory analysis, the issues of collusive risk and exclusionary capability become one and the same. The cartel theory of
collusion is now well-accepted and has been incorporated in the
Justice Department's Merger Guidelines: mergers that reduce competition are precisely those where firms, having reached profitable
terms of "coordinated interaction," have "an ability to detect and
204. See Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E. Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizantal
Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 415, 417-24 (Richard Schmalensee
& Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
205. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & STEPHEN C. SALOP, You KEEP ON KNocKING BUT You
CAN'T COME IN: EVALUATING RESTRicnONS ON ACCESS TO INPUT JOINT VENTURES 26 &
n.33 (University of Chicago Center for the Study of the Economy and the State Working
Paper No. 111, 1995); Joseph F. Bradley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 1521, 1532-34 (1982); Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market
Power in Antitrust Law, 16 GEo. L.J. 241, 249-50 (1987).
206. In addition to an enforcement system, a cartel requires agreed terms of coordination, but coordination is probable if an effective enforcement system exists. See Merger
Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1.
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punish deviations,"207 and for that purpose, a credible threat of
punishment can be as effective as actual punishment.
Although some fringe firms may thrive for a time under a regime of collusive prices, no permanent sanctuaries exist for potential targets of exclusionary strategies. When a cartel group has
exclusionary capability, the fringe firm faces an ever present risk of
market exclusion. The risk can be particularly acute for the maverick firm - the firm with low costs, high excess or divertible capacity, superior innovation, an ability to disguise output increases, or
other factors that make it a "disruptive" or competitive influence in
the market.2os The maverick firm is at risk because its conduct
threatens to disrupt the cartel and because its elimination may allow a larger increase in prices than eliminating other rivals.209
To be sure, exclusionary capabilities may not be exercised. The
exclusionary target may gain more by remaining within the cartel
than by deviating. The maverick firm, for example, in addition to
the cartel profit earned by an average firm, stands to gain both an
efficiency rent to the extent it has lower costs and a bargaining rent
from threatened defection. On the other hand, defection may remain attractive to the maverick and other firms because of the even
greater profit it can earn from undercutting the cartel due to lags in
detection and punishment. Thus, the positive probability remains
that pro-competitive conduct by a competitor may provoke an exclusionary response that threatens injury to the target and restricts
its independence. In challenging a merger that would give its rivals
exclusionary market power in its home market or in a market it
realistically seeks to enter, the potential target of cartel punishment
acts under incentives compatible with antitrust goals and thereby
suffers antitrust injury.210
207. Id.
208. See id. § 2.12. Another factor likely to make a firm a disruptive influence is its small
size. See Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D. Libecap, Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oi~ 3 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 1 (1987) (stating that price cutting in
defiance of a regional crude oil cartel in the 1930s primarily involved small producers in low
cost fields while larger producers adhered to the cartel price); Merger Enforcement Guide·
lines Under Canada's Competition Act Adopted by the Director of Investigation and Research,
60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1513 § 4.8 (Apr. 25, 1991) (asserting that small
firms exercise a disproportionately large influence on competition).
209. Of course, this situation also increases the maverick's bargaining power within the
collusive group. But that increased bargaining power also heightens the cartel's incentive to
exclude the maverick and avoid sharing its profits.
210. Threatened injury from cartel punishment stands in sharp contrast to the claim made
in ARCO that a competitor-plaintiff in a nonmerger case sustained antitrust injury based
simply on "broad allegations of harm to the 'market' as an abstract entity." Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338-40 & n.8 (1990). In a cartel punishment
case, the threatened injury results from the likelihood that the competitive firm will itself
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Dominant Firm Predation

Competitors also face threatened injury from mergers that create dominant firms. The dominant firm case is an extension of the
cartel punishment case.211 Indeed, dominant firms have even
greater incentive to use exclusionary strategies against smaller rivals than a collusive group because the benefits from predation increase with the market share of the predator.2 12 The conclusion
that dominant firm mergers threaten injury to competitors draws
support from economic theory, empirical studies, the views of business strategists, and the· under-inclusiveness of Sherman Act rules
against predation.
Earlier economic views questioned the rationality of predation
because it cost the predator more than the prey. These views, however, require modification under the critique of modem theory.
The old approach, which was essentially a single market, static analysis, has given way to a strategic analysis in which reputation effects
and signaling strategies based on information asymmetry between
the predator and the prey show that predation can be both profitable and feasible. 213 Although the Supreme Court has questioned
the plausibility of predatory pricing in cases where market structures were only moderately concentrated,214 it has vigorously upbecome the target of predatory moves. As a result, the Supreme Court did not question the
standing of a plaintiff who claimed injury from cartel-punishment tactics by a dominant collusive group in its recent Brook decision. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993); see also Volvo N. Am. v. Men's Intl. Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988), discussed infra text accompanying notes 244-48.
211. The Merger Guidelines describe the dominant firm case in terms of the "[u]nilateral
[e]ffects" of a merger, where the merged firm "find[s] it profitable to alter [its] behavior
unilaterally ... by elevating price and suppressing output." Merger Guidelines, supra note 97,
§ 2.2.
212. See Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 204, at 537, 567.
213. Thus, pricing predation is rational under modified "long purse" models, where the
predator's strategy is to reduce the prey's assets or profits in order to cut off its access to
bank credit, see Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, A Theory of Predation Based on
Agency Problems in Financial Contracting, 80 AM. EcoN. REV. 93 (1990); Ordover &
Saloner, supra note 212, at 548-50, reputation models, where the predator prices below cost
in one market in order to establish a reputation as a predator in other markets, see Malcolm
R. Bums, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. Por.. EcoN. 266
(1986); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 550-56; Balder Von Hohenbalken & Douglas
S. West, Empirical tests for predatory reputation, 19 CAN. J. EcoN. 160 (1986), signaling models, where a predator operating in a market of incomplete information, fixes its price and
output level to mislead rivals into believing that the market is unprofitable, inducing exit and
preventing new entry, Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 556-61; Garth Saloner, Predation, mergers, and incomplete information, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 165 (1987).
214. See Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wtlliamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993)
(discussing the implausibility of a predatory pricing scheme orchestrated by a jointly acting
oligopoly); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (same).
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held enforcement against nonprice predation and exclusionary
practices.21s
Nonprice predation provides a more plausible and legally acceptable setting for predatory conduct because it is not subject to
the objection that the predatory strategy may impose higher costs
on the predator than the prey. Nonprice predation includes raising
rivals' costs or reducing the demand for the rival product by such
stratagems as exclusive dealing; foreclosure of essential inputs; driving up common input costs;216 refusing to engage in mutually profitable joint marketing;217 predatory system design, which makes
components produced by rivals incompatible with the system; predatory product innovation, which prevents or reduces the demand
for the rival's product but is otherwise nonoptimal;21 s predatory
vertical restraints, with which a dominant upstream producer induces the exit of a more efficient rival by extending its market
power to the downstream market and then engages in exclusive
dealing;219 and penalty contracts, which are long-term contracts
designed to deter entry or to capture economic rent from a lower
cost producer entered into by a monopolistic supplier and its
customers.220
Empirical evidence also documents the reality of both price and
nonprice predatory strategies. Studies of business behavior and
case experience reveal unmistakable instances of attempted and
consummated predation.221 A particularly striking example appears in a recent study of the early years of the American Tobacco
215. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (citing
modem theory in tying lock-in case); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985) (holding that refusal to deal by dominant firm may be characterized as
exclusionary).
216. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965) (holding
that labor union and large mine operators conspired to fix labor costs of smaller operators).
217. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610-11.
218. See Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of Fungible Goods, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1646-52 (1987).
219. See Oliver Hart & Jean 1irole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, in
BROOKINGS p APERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 205, 206 (1990); Janusz A.
Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. EcoN. REv. 127 (1990). But see
Snyder & Kauper, supra note 197, at 591-96 (challenging economic analysis of vertical arrangements as speculative).
220. See Joseph F. Bradley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing
Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1993).
221. See F.M. SCHERER & DAYID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET SmucruRE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 339-46 (1990); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 545-46; B.S.
Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 129, 137-42 (1972);
see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589-95; United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296,
299-301 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
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Company that reveals repeated instances of predatory pricing by
the dominant firm to reduce the acquisition price of rivals, both
directly and through reputation effects.2 22 Moreover, business
strategists treat predatory strategies as real phenomena.223
Thus, modem economic theory shows that dominant firm predation is rational and plausible; empirical evidence confirms the existence of predatory conduct, as theory predicts; and business people
make decisions based on predatory strategies. At the same time,
Sherman Act suits to recover for predatory injury face great obstacles due to the difficulty courts have encountered in devising legal
rules to distinguish between predation and welfare-increasing competition.224 These :findings underscore the importance of maintaining vigorous merger enforcement to prevent the market
concentration that makes predatory strategies feasible. 22s Because
competitors are the only private litigants with the incentive to oppose mergers that create predatory and exclusionary capability,
they should have standing to challenge such mergers - subject to
appropriate equity controls.
222. Bums, supra note 213. Unlike earlier empirical studies of predation, which are essentially ad hoc case studies that rely on impressionistic readings of case records and are
often cited by courts, see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 58990 (1986) (citing Roland H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4
ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 105 (1971), and John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958)), Bums undertakes a mathematically
sophisticated scientifically based study using a multiple regression model. Thus, his findings
give powerful support to predation. Bums, supra note 213, at 267; see also Yun Joo Jung et
al., On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry
Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game, 25 RAND J. EcoN. 72 (1994) (providing experimental
evidence that showed incentive in markets with incomplete information to engage in predation in order to deter entry); Von Hohenbalken & West, supra note 213, at 176-77 (providing
an empirical study of entry and exit in Edmonton supermarkets that confirmed predatory
reputation hypothesis, showing deterred entry in new markets).
223. MICHAEL E. PORTER, CoMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 482-536 (1985); MICHAEL E.
PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 88-107 (1980).
224. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 n.17 (1986); Zenith Radio, 415 U.S. at 594; see also Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.
a. 2578 (1993) (stating sustained below-cost pricing insufficient to prove predation without
proof of recoupment).
225. Objections can be made about the persuasive force of modern predatory conduct
theory and its empirical support. See generally Franklin M. Fisher, Organizing Industrial Organization: Reflections on the Handbook of Industrial Organization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS (1991). Moreover, the Supreme Court still
cites outdated theory without recognizing recent modifications. See, e.g., Cargill, 419 U.S. at
122 n.17. But antitrust analysis must follow consensus approaches, and the modern theory of
strategic behavior is clearly central to the contemporary theory of the firm. Reflecting such .
consensus is the use of modern economic theory in the 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note
97, adopted by a Republican administration and adhered to by a successor Democratic administration, as well as in the recently adopted Canadian Merger Guidelines. See Merger
Enforcement Guidelines Under Canada's Competition Ac~ supra note 208. Finally, even if
residual doubts about modern theory limit Sherman Act applications, use of modern theory
is justified under the prophylactic goals of the merger law.
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D. Proposed Approach: Antitrust Injury Screen
An effective policy for competitor merger suits requires a twostage approach. In stage one, the courts would apply an antitrust
injury screen to eliminate cases that raise no significant threat of
exclusionary injury to rivals. In stage two, discussed in the next section, the courts would apply equity controls and mechanisms to discourage suits by plaintiffs with hidden incentive incompatibility and
to assure that prosecution of the merger suit promotes antitrust
goals. The second stage is vital because the threshold antitrust injury screen cannot identify every case of incentive incompatibility
unless given a draconian interpretation that would threaten to bar
all competitor suits. Thus, the stage-two procedure operates as a
necessary corrective mechanism to prevent anticompetitive prosecution of incentive incompatible suits that escape the stage-one
screen.
The stage-one inquiry rests on existing standing doctrine, but, as
applied to competitors, that doctrine is neither settled nor fully rationalized with enforcement goals. Indeed, since Cargill, the lower
courts have followed three distinctive approaches in competitor
cases. First, under the "Sherman Act" approach, the plaintiff must
prove either actual predatory acts that threaten the plaintiff with
injury or the defendant's specific intent to engage in such acts. Second, under the "exclusionary capability" approach, the plaintiff can
establish standing by showing that the merger creates structural
conditions and specific market mechanisms that would expose competitors to significant risks of either predatory exclusion or costraising tactics that threaten to reduce their output. Third, under the
"threatened market dominance" approach, the plaintiff need only
prove that the merger creates a market structure likely to lead to
single-firm market dominance. Analysis will show that a combination of the second and third approaches is necessary for effective
private merger enforcement.
1. Sherman Act Approach

The first approach requires proof of specific predatory acts
based on the defendant's past conduct or a present intent to engage
in predation following the merger - conduct that would suffice to
show a violation of the Sherman Act. The Fifth Circuit followed
this approach in Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak,226 which held
that in the absence of specific proof of predatory conduct, the plain226. 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
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tiff had no standing to challenge a merger that would create a dominant position in the upstream supply market. The court believed
that the Cargill decision compelled it to reject the "facially sensible
proposition" that a competitor has standing to challenge a merger
that results' in a monopoly.227 The dissenting Justices in Cargill had
expressed similar fears.228 As we have seen, however, neither the
facts nor the language of Cargill compels such an expansive
reading.
To hold that competitors have standing to challenge a merger
only upon specific proof of predatory conduct would make the
Clayton Act redundant for competitors. Proof of specific predation, whether based on past conduct or present intent, is enjoinable
under the Sherman Act. To require the same showing for a Clayton
Act violation would defeat the Act's underlying policy to stop
mergers before they become Sherman Act violations. Among other
adverse effects, a Sherman Act standard would bar suits where the
merger creates market power that did not previously exist because,
absent previous market power, there could be no past history of
predation, and well-advised firms would avoid any expressions of
predatory intent. Thus, the first approach is untenable.
2.

Exclusionary Capability

The second approach would find the antitrust injury requirement satisfied when the merger creates economic conditions that
expose competitors or clearly identified potential competitors to
significant risks of market exclusion or reduced output from costraising stratagems. Such risks arise when a collusive group or a single dominant firm has exclusionary capability. By exclusionary capability, I mean the ability to exclude rivals or clearly identified
potential rivals or to reduce their output significantly by raising
their costs, thereby threatening to reduce economic welfare. Proof
of exclusionary capability requires identification of the structural
conditions and specific mechanisms that make exclusionary practices or cost-raising strategies feasible. 229 As we have seen, under
the Merger Guidelines, this will be substantially the same analysis as
227. 842 F.2d at 100. Similar conclusions have been reached in several other lower court
cases. See, e.g., Treasurer, Inc. v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 682 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.J.), affd.
mem, 853 F.2d 921 {3d Cir. 1988).
228.

Cargil~

479 U.S. at 123 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

229. Cf. 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 373d2 (explaining that the Cargill
standard requires proof of "market conditions that make predation economically feasible").
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the inquiry into whether the merger creates collusive risks that
threaten substantial injury to competition.23o
The cartel theory of collusion is well accepted by economists
and has been incorporated into the 1992 Merger Guidelines. Economists generally agree that the economic conditions under which
effective collusion is likely include (1) high concentration; (2) high
sunk costs and other entry barriers; (3) excess capacity in the collusive group; (4) ability to raise rivals' costs, for example, constrained
sources of supply or customer access that can be foreclosed by exclusive dealing contracts; (5) hostage exchange methods, such as
joint ventures, that enable cartel participants to punish deviants; (6)
segmented markets that enable the collusive group to target punishing price reductions on limited markets; (7) information asymmetries between an informed collusive group and outside rivals, which
enhance the market power of the disciplining group;231 (8) agreements that directly punish price reductions, such as meetingcompetition and most-favored nation clauses, or that exclude or disadvantage potential entrants, such as take-or-pay-for clauses and
penalty contracts;232 or (9) special vulnerability of the predatory
target to exclusionary and cost-raising tactics.233
Similarly, under the Merger Guidelines, acquisitions that reduce
competition are precisely those where firms, having reached profitable terms of "coordinated interaction" have "an ability to detect
and punish deviations,"234 and deviations will be deterred "where
230. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,
479 U.S. 104 (1986), Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) do not bar
courts from adopting a predatory capability approach to competitor standing. In Cargill, the
Court found that the market did not have the anticompetitive structure necessary to support
predatory pricing, and thus the merger could have created no predatory capability. 479 U.S.
at 119 n.15. Similarly, in ARCO and in Matsushita, both of which arose under the Sherman
Act, the facts failed to show predatory capability. ARCO, 495 U.S. at 336-39; Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 587-88.
231. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp.1250, 1262-71 (E.D. Pa.1987);
PAUL KLEMPERER, COMPETITION WHEN CONSUMERS HAVE SWITCHING COSTS: AN OVERVIEW {Centre for Royal Economic Society 1992); Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 295, 308-09 (1987); Richard J.
Gilbert, Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION, supra note 204, at 475; Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching
Costs, 102 Q.J. EcoN. 375, 377, 386-87 {1987); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 591.
232. See Ayres, supra note 231, at 316-18; Brodley & Ma, supra note 220.
233. See Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 213 {describing the susceptibility of capital
constrained firm dependent on outside financing to predatory tactics); Judith A. Chevalier,
Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from the Supermarket Industry, 85 AM. EcoN. REV. 415 {1995) (same).
234. Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, § 2.1.
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the threat of punishment is credible. "235 In enumerating the criteria
for determining whether these conditions are present, the guidelines incorporate several of the specific factors enumerated
above.23 6 Thus, the examination required under the Merger Guidelines is essentially the same as that called for under the second
approach.
A possible refinement of the second approach would limit
standing to competitors who can show economic characteristics that
make them a particular target for cartel punishment or predatory
exclusion. Firms with such characteristics, often called "maverick
firms," may have low costs, excess or divertible capacity, an aggressive expansionary business strategy, or a past record or reputation
as a price cutter or disruptive market in:fluence.237 Confinement of
competitor standing to maverick firms would reduce the feared possibility that an underperforming competitor might launch antitrust
litigation to foil an efficiency-producing merger; it would still enable suit by the smaller firms that have been among the most competitive elements in collusive markets.238
Nevertheless, to limit competitor standing to maverick firms
would threaten effective private enforcement. Such a limitation introduces a complex issue of the plaintiff's economic performance
and gives defendants a weapon to frustrate competitor suits. It
would enable defendants to conduct searching discovery into plaintiff's costs and business strategies, putting sensitive business data at
risk and turning the case into an inquisition into plaintiff's own
business operations.239 Proof of general market conditions that facilitate exclusionary strategies should suffice to establish exclusionary or predatory capability. Equity supervision and judicial
controls on litigation abuse, rather than confinement of standing to
maverick firms, provide the better approach to the problem of
wrongly motivated competitor suits in markets where exclusionary
strategies are likely.
The second approach also applies to potential entrants when
mergers threaten to block entry into a highly concentrated market.
To be sure, the identification of potential entrants is fraught with
235. Id. § 2.12.
236. Id. §§ 2, 2.12.
237. See id. § 2.12 (emphasizing competitive threat posed by maverick firms, which constitute an "unusually disruptive and competitive influence").
238. See supra note 208.
239. Although the plaintiff could, on its own initiative, introduce evidence of its maverick
character and specific risks of inducing cartel punishment or exclusionary tactics, thereby
placing the issue in controversy, courts should not require it to make such a showing.
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difficulty, requiring a showing that an entrant is in close proximity
to the market, has the capability and incentive to enter, and possesses entry advantages over other firms. 240 Exclusionary capability
against potential entrants typically involves the power to withhold
an indispensable input, the control of which the merger consolidates within a single firm or small group of jointly acting firms.241
These conditions will not often occur, but strikingly, when they are
present, suit by a potential entrant may present a less acute incentive incompatibility problem than suit by an existing rival. The incentive incompatibility risk is reduced because, apart from a pure
strike suit, the outside firm has no incentive to block a merger unless it actually intends to enter the market - a competitionimproving step.242 Thus, particularly when other qualified litigants
are not available - for example, because no competitors remain in
the market, suits by potential entrants can serve a vital private enforcement need.243
240. See Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Under the Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL.
L. REv. 376 (1983); see also Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1169 § 4.1, at S-8 (Supp. 1984). See generally 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP,
supra note 67, lj[ 374.
241. See, e.g., Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y.
1994), decision supplemented by 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) lj[ 70,917 (Mar. 6, 1995) discussed
infra text accompanying note 252; cf. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commn. v. National
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987)
(holding that football stadium foreclosed from bidding by NFL rule restraining location of
teams had standing to sue NFL).
242. Of course, an inefficient potential entrant might in theory seek to stop an efficient
merger in order to maintain its prospect for future entry. But it seems implausible that an
outside firm would seek to enter a market in which a future consolidation of assets would
place its entry investment at risk.
243. A similar analysis supports the standing of an unsuccessful bidder in a takeover.
Although the cases are split on the issue, compare Santa Cruz Medical Clinic v. Dominican
Santa Cruz Hospital, 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) lj[ 70,915 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1944) (standing
granted) with Axis, S.P.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823
(1989) (standing denied), and the commentators are largely negative, see 2 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 373e, standing for unsuccessful bidders promotes antitrust
goals when (1) the merger creates intensely oligopolistic conditions; (2) high entry barriers
preclude de novo entry; and (3) other likely challengers are not available.
Conditions warranting standing were present in Axis, 870 F.2d at 1106, where the merger
between two of only four competitors in the market, created a postmerger firm with a 50%
market share in a three-firm market. The merger foreclosed the only available means by
which plaintiff could compete in the market because patent barriers blocked de novo entry.
In the absence of the challenged merger, plaintiff would surely have entered the market
because the target was for sale, the plaintiff had matched the defendant's bid, and there was
no other likely purchaser, the plaintiff being the only producer not already in the U.S. market. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's incentives were entirely compatible with antitrust goals because the plaintiff stood to profit from increased competition, and there was no
other available private litigant. Thus, the plaintiff suffered antitrust injury and should have
been accorded standing. The court's contrary conclusion illustrates the danger of applying a
formalistic standing doctrine without sufficient reflection on underlying policies.
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Three recent lower court cases uphol4ffig competitor standing
illustrate how the second approach can be applied. The first case
involves exclusionary cartel restraints, the second involves predatory capability by a dominant firm, and the third involves exclusionary foreclosure of new entry. In Volvo,244 the Second Circuit held
that participants in a cartel had standing tp challenge exclusionary
cartel restrictions that hampered their ability to compete with other
cartel members. The challenged cartel rules prevented the plaintiffs, who were producers of tennis events, from sponsoring separate
tennis matches in competition with league-sponsored events. Rejecting the defendants' argument that competitors could only benefit from membership in a cartel, the court explained that even
though a rule "presumably operates to the cartel's aggregate benefit, the restraint may operate to the detriment of an individual
member."245 Individual members may have different costs or other
characteristics that make competition attractive. Under these conditions "the [cartel] member's interest coincides with the public interest in vigorous competition . . . [satisfying] the antitrust injury
requirement. "246
The Volvo decision thus supports competitor standing in merger
cases when market conditions facilitate exclusionary practices by
cartel members. In Volvo, these conditions included denial of access to an essential input, that of league-sponsored players; hostage
exchange dependencies based on the need for continuing cooperation from the other members of the tennis league; and other rules
that raised the costs of deviating rivals.247 The plaintiffs were likely
targets for cartel discipline or market exclusion because they were
seeking to compete in innovative ways and to expand the number
of tennis matches offered to the public.248
In Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 249 the court upheld
the standing of a competitor to challenge a merger based on evi244. Volvo N. Am. v. Men's Intl. Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988).
245. 857 F.2d at 67.
246. 857 F.2d at67-68 (citations omitted); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-08 (1984) (asserting that restrictions by sports league on individual
competitors' freedom to compete can be anticompetitive); 2 AREEnA & Ho'VENKAMP, supra
note 67, 'H 340.2f to -.2g.
247. 857 F.2d at 60-62.
248. See 851 F.2d at 58-60. The fact that the Volvo case involved actual restraints within a
presently operating cartel does not bar its application to merger cases. If a competitor has
standing to challenge exclusionary cartel practices under the Shennan Act, then under the
incipiency standard of the Clayton Act, it should be able to challenge a merger that creates
the exclusionary capability to engage in such practices.
249. Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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dence of exclusionary capability by a dominant firm. The merger
threatened the plaintiff with antitrust injury because exclusionary
conduct was feasible in the impacted baking industry and would
benefit the market dominant defendant. Evidence of exclusionary
capability rested on proof of market dominance, high entry barriers, excess capacity in the dominant firm, and other market characteristics that made predatory tactics feasible, including customer
leverage through control of dominant brands, localized markets
that enabled existing producers to target exclusionary moves, and
similar structural features. 250 Although proof of past predation in
other markets and proof of intent to monopolize the present market buttressed the showing of exclusionary capability in Tasty Baking, the court's finding that the plaintiff-competitor was threatened
with antitrust injury essentially rested on proof of exclusionary
capability.251
In Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Department Stores Co.,252 the
court upheld the standing of a potential department-store entrant
to challenge a merger that would have foreclosed entry into a
highly concentrated market. The plaintiff's status as a potential entrant into the Rochester, N.Y. regional market was clear because
plaintiff, which owned a chain of department stores elsewhere in
the Northeast, was engaged in a general expansion of locations in
western New York and had ten stores in nearby Buffalo. The
merger clearly threatened to foreclose the plaintiff's entry into the
Rochester market because the merged firm would control all presently available space in the four major regional shopping malls critical for effective department-store competition. Thus, the case
provides an apt illustration of potential entrant standing where the
merged firm has the capability to bar effective entry by a clearly
identifiable potential entrant into a highly concentrated market.

3.

Threatened Market Dominance

The third approach, a simplified version of the second, would
give competitors standing to challenge mergers when the merger
250. 653 F. Supp. at 1260-70. Other factors included (1) constrained access to customers
due to limited retail shelf space and an unwillingness by retailers to carry more than three or
four brands; (2) large cash resources, allowing credible predatory threats; and (3) a capacity
to absorb the market share of rivals who leave the market. 653 F. Supp. at 1273-75.
251. Similar results were reached in White Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F.
Supp.1009, 1027, 1032 (N.D. Ohio), injunction vacated, 619 F. Supp.1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985),
affd., 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986), and Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
252. 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), decision supplemented by 1995-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) <JI 70-917 (Mar. 6, 1995).
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creates a market structure that results in single-firm market dominance. The third approach simplifies the issue of antitrust injury
when the market structure meets two essential preconditions, high
concentration and significant entry barriers - conditions explicitly
recognized in the Cargill case as necessary for predatory pricing.
The presence of these conditions permits a presumption of both
collusive and exclusionary risk. The presumption is justified because both collusion and exclusionary conduct are most likely in
markets dominated by a single firm, where organizational costs are
low, and benefits need not be shared with outside firms. 253
The simplified presumption the third approach permits roughly
follows the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, which draw a
distinction between horizontal mergers in highly concentrated markets and those in less concentrated markets.254 The guidelines presume that in highly concentrated markets a significant merger is
"likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise,"
while in less concentrated markets, mergers are suspect only when
other factors indicate significant risks of collusive action and cartel
enforcement capability.255
Economy of enforcement leads to a preference for the third approach when structural conditions strongly indicate the probable violation of section 7. Using the definition of predatory capability
outlined in Cargill, suspect market structures for dominant firms
can be defined in terms of a postmerger market share of at least
sixty percent and the presence of significant entry barriers.2 56 If a
plaintiff has established that these two conditions are present and
that the merger would significantly increase concentration, it has
made a sufficient showing of threatened injury under the Clayton
Act.257
253. See

E. WILUAMsoN, MARKE-rs AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI245-46 (1975) (explaining that dominant finns more easily maintain
collusion because they need not write a contract specifying terms of coordination but need
only work out punishment system); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 212, at 567 (explaining
that benefits of predation increase with market share).
254. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 97, §§ 1.51, 2.0.
255. Id.
256. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119 n.15 (1986).
257. In Cargil~ the Court also noted a third condition: the excess capacity sufficient to
serve the market after the victim is excluded. 479 U.S. at 119-20 n.15. This condition was a
realistic constraint in Cargil~ where the alleged predator would have a postmerger market
capacity share of only 28%, but it becomes Jess important as the dominant firm achieves
preponderant market control. Except in economic booms, markets generally have some excess capacity, presumably capacity sufficient to allow a dominant firm to serve the supply
gaps that the exit of small fringe rivals creates. Thus, as applied to dominant firm mergers,
the use of an excess capacity precondition weakens the simplicity and predictability of the
OLIVER
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The third approach thus permits a finding of antitrust injury
where the risks of predation or exclusionary conduct are highest,
and the probability of efficiencies loss is least because the firms are
already of large market size.258 These are in fact the mergers that
require the most careful scrutiny and also those where private challenge by competitors can best supplement public enforcement.
The Second Circuit decision in R. C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever
N. V. 259 essentially followed the third approach. The court held that
a plaintiff-competitor satisfied the antitrust injury requirement by
proving that a merger would increase the market share of the leading firm from fifty-two to eighty-four percent, leaving the market
with only two significant competitors. Despite this high market
concentration that resulted in an extraordinary postmerger twofirm market share of ninety-seven percent,26° the district court
ruled that the plaintiff had suffered no antitrust injury because it
had offered no proof of past predation or present predatory intent.
Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held that a market share "indicative of substantial market power . . . constitutes
sufficient evidence, in and of itself, of antitrust injury to a competitor to create a genuine issue for trial." 261 The Second Circuit found
no inconsistency with Cargill, where the postmerger market share
of twenty-one percent was too low to support an inference of
threatened predation.262
The Bigelow decision thus permits an inference of both anticompetitive risk and threatened predatory injury when the merger
would create a dominant firm in a market with high entry barriers.
Under these extreme structural conditions, the same evidence that
supports a prima facie presumption of injury to competition from
acquisition of "substantial monopoly power" permits a finding of
dominant firm predatory or exclusionary capability that threatens
injury to a competitor.263 Thus, the Second Circuit held that, at
third approach. Although it remains possible that an excess capacity constraint hampers
predatory capability, courts should place the burden of proof on the dominant firm.
258. See Alan A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777,
778·91 {1989).
259. 867 F.2d 102 {2d Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989).
260. 867 F.2d at 111.
261. 867 F.2d at 111. The court made no explicit entry barrier findings, probably because
such barriers were self-evident in a merger between the two leading brands of highly advertised consumer products that created a two-firm market share of 97%.
262. 867 F.2d at 109-10.
263. The court suggested that predatory injury might occur "inter alia, [by] reducing [the
plaintiff's] access to supermarket shelf space for its products." 867 F.2d at 111. But this
example was simply one of several possible examples the plaintiff had offered to show how
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least on the issue of standing to seek a preliminary injunction, the
plaintiff need not show the precise mechanism of future predatory
injury from a merger that effectively creates a market dominating
firm.264
The Supreme Court's recent ARCO ruling,26s discussed earlier,
which denied standing to a competitor who sought to challenge a
vertical maximum price fixing agreement, does not bar the third
approach. The antitrust injury issue in ARCO differed from that
presented in a horizontal merger because the alleged antitrust violation challenged in ARCO - vertical maximum price fixing was designed to protect a manufacturer's own dealers from competitive domination by their supplier but not rival dealers such as the
ARCO plaintiffs, who remained independent actors in the market.
By contrast, as Cargill recognized,266 Congress did not intend the
merger statute to preclude protecting competitor-plaintiffs' ability
to compete free of threatened injury from predatory restraints by
market dominating firms. Moreover, in ARCO, the Court found
that other classes of private enforcers were available to enforce the
much criticized rule against vertical maximum price fixing whereas
in a merger case the competitor-plaintiff will typically be the only
available private enforcer.267 Thus, ARCO does not foreclose the
third approach to competitor standing nor undermine the persuasive force of Bigelow. 26s
In the first stage of antitrust injury analysis, therefore, courts
should follow a combination of the exclusionary capability and
threatened market dominance approaches. Where the merger leads
to market concentration falling short of single firm dominance,
courts should use the exclusionary capability approach, finding
the dominant finn might use the monopoly power created by the merger to injure the plaintiff and was not a proven fact. There was no finding that the dominant finn was likely to use
any specific predatory tactic.
264. 867 F.2d at 111.
265. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
266. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1986).
267. In addition, in ARCO, serious incentive incompatibility was present because the
plaintiff claimed injury from increased competition in a market where the participants lacked
market power. See USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F. Supp. 1296, 1304-06
(C.D. Cal. 1983), revd., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988), revd., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). By contrast
under the third approach, the plaintiff claims injury from a merger that would create a
market-dominant finn with presumed predatory capability.
268. But see Remington Prods. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 755 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D.
Conn. 1991) (declining to follow Bigelow in light of ARCO where plaintiff had failed to prove
specific predatory practices); William H. Page & Roger D. Blair, Controlling the Competitor
Plaintiff in Antitrust Litigation, 91 MICH. L REv. 111, 117-18 (1991) (questioning whether
Bigelow presumption survives ARCO).
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threatened exclusionary injury when the merger creates market
conditions that enable a single firm or small group of jointly acting
firms to exclude rivals or to raise their costs significantly in ways
that reduce economic welfare. Where the merger leads to singlefirm market dominance with high entry barriers, courts should find
threatened predatory injury based on those facts alone, subject to
the affirmative defense of lack of excess capacity. Either finding
would satisfy the first-tier requirement for standing. But, of course,
the plaintiff would remain subject to the formidable constraints of
the second-stage procedure.
4. Illustration: Aspen Skiing Co.
The facts in Aspen Skiing Co.269 provide a vivid illustration of
the proposed first-stage antitrust injury analysis. In Aspen, the
Supreme Court upheld findings that a market dominant firm had
engaged in predatory conduct against a smaller rival in violation of
the Sherman Act. Although the defendant had achieved its dominant position through merger, the plaintiff did not challenge the
merger, which had occurred many years before. Suppose, however,
that the plaintiff had sought to enjoin the acquisition when it occurred. Would the plaintiff have been able to demonstrate antitrust
injury?
The development of the Aspen skiing area was the work of
three separate investment groups. The three groups cooperated in
offering a multi-area ski pass, which had great consumer appeal,
enhancing the variety of a ski vacation. Subsequently, two of the
three groups merged, combining three of the four ski facilities in
Aspen and leaving plaintiff as the sole remaining competitor with
about twenty percent of the market. For a few years cooperation
continued, but eventually, the defendant sought to minimize the
plaintiff's share of revenues and ultimately to exclude it entirely
from the multi-area arrangement. This left the plaintiff with no effective way to offer skiers access to the variety of skiing facilities
that customers preferred, and plaintiff's share of ski revenues fell
drastically. The Supreme Court upheld a Sherman Act damage
judgement, ruling that defendant's conduct reduced competition,
lacked business justification, and injured both the plaintiff and
consumers.270
269. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
270. See 472 U.S. at 610-11.
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Suppose that at the time of the original Aspen acquisition, the
plaintiff had sought an injunction to prevent the merger. Defendant would no doubt have argued that the plaintiff sustained no antitrust injury. The judicial nlling on standing would then have
depended on which of the three approaches discussed above the
court followed. Under the first approach, which requires proof of
past predation or present intent to engage in predation, the court
would almost surely have found an absence of antitrust injury. The
defendant, which owned ski facilities in other geographic areas, had
apparently not engaged in predatory acts elsewhere.211 In Aspen
itself, predation became possible only after the merger, when the
defendant obtained market dominance. No doubt the defendant
would have argued that plaintiff only stood to gain from the collusive effects of the merger.
Under the second approach, plaintiff could have made a strong
argument that the merger would give the defendant exclusionary
capability, threatening the plaintiff with future injury, but the issue
would not have been free from doubt. Tending to show exclusionary capability are: the merger would have created a market dominant firm in a market with high entry barriers and high sunk costs;
entry required governmental approvals, which were difficult to obtain due to environmental concerns; defendant could have raised
plaintiff's costs by denying access to three of the four ski facilities;
defendant apparently had excess capacity, giving it an incentive to
either exclude plaintiff or to reduce its market share; a hostage exchange mechanism existed enabling the defendant to punish the
plaintiff because the existing multi-area pass by necessity required
the defendant's continuing cooperation on a variety of procedural
matters; and plaintiff was particularly vulnerable to such exclusionary and cost-raising tactics because continued participation in the
joint pass arrangement was necessary for access to weekly destination skiers in a market too geographically remote to attract day
skiers.272
On the other hand, the product was not homogeneous as the
mountains differed in skiing characteristics and facilities, and viewing the issue prospectively, various counterstrategies by plaintiff appeared possible to offset the effects of exclusion from the multi-area
arrangement.273 In addition, future predation might have appeared
271. See 472 U.S. at 589-93, 610-11.
272. 472 U.S. at 588, 592, 594.
273. In fact, plaintiff attempted several countermeasures to create its own multi-area arrangement, but all failed. For example, when plaintiff tried to issue cash vouchers redeem-
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implausible in view of Aspen's need to compete with other national
ski destinations in offering multi-area ski passes. These offsetting
factors appear insufficient to rebut the strong elements indicating
exclusionary capability, but a multifactor analysis applied in advance of the merger transaction can never be fully predictive.
Under the third, or, threatened market dominance approach,
plaintiff would clearly have standing. The merger created a firm
with an eighty percent market share and an HHI concentration ratio of 6800 in a market with very high entry barriers, and there appeared no basis for finding the dominant firm lacked excess
capacity to serve an increased market share. The court would thus
presume threatened antitrust injury from the clear prima facie
showing of market dominance resulting from the merger. Defendant of course could attempt to disprove the threat to competition
but not by attacking the plaintiff's standing to challenge the
merger.
The subsequent history of the Aspen dispute as reflected in the
plaintiff's drastic loss of market share2 74 would have justified a
competitor's concern that a merger creating a market dominant
firm may eventually threaten it with predatory injury and ultimately
destroy its ability to compete effectively. In such cases, the competitor should not have to wait until it is actually injured or excluded
from the market to seek redress. The Aspen illustration shows how
the courts can prevent antitrust abuse, promote effective merger
enforcement, and maintain competitive markets by recognizing a
competitor's standing to challenge mergers that create high concentrations of market power.

E. Equity Controls and Mechanisms
Although the indictment against competitor suits is overdrawn,
competitor suits do present incentive problems. At the same time,
such suits also serve indispensable enforcement purposes, and without them, no viable private enforcement of the merger law can occur. The proposed two-stage enforcement procedure addresses the
dilemma directly. After the first-stage inquiry has eliminated competitor plaintiffs with clear incentive incompatibility, the court
able at local banks for local purchases, defendant refused to honor the vouchers. Similarly,
defendant refused to sell ski tickets to plaintiff. Plaintiff was thus reduced to issuing traveler's checks for skiers to use at other facilities, obviously a more costly alternative. 472 U.S.
at 593-94.
274. After abolition of the four-area ticket, plaintiff became basically "a day ski area in a
destination resort," and accordingly, plaintiff's market share fell by almost 50% in the following four years. 472 U.S. at 594-95.
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would then move to the second-stage analysis. In stage two, the
court would apply procedural controls to prevent litigation abuse
by plaintiffs who challenge mergers in markets where predatory capabilities exist and injurious predatory strategies are plausible.
The incentive compatibility problem of competitor suits arises
from risks of strategic litigation that can upset the timing of a
merger, collusive or anticompetitive settlements that compromise
public interest goals, the lesser problems of wrong outcomes caused
by the need for speedy resolution, and ineffective relief due to possible delayed filing or insufficient briefing on remedial issues. Existing procedures can effectively manage most, if not all, of these
risks. Suggested improved procedures can control the remaining
problems, of which the risk of collusive settlement is perhaps
paramount.
1. Existing Procedures
Effective procedures to prevent competitor abuse in merger litigation include: (1) expedited hearings, which can shorten preliminary injunction proceedings to a few weeks; (2) hold-separate
orders, which allow mergers to go forward with the acquired assets
held separately thereby assuring continued independence of the target until the antitrust issues are resolved; (3) curative relief orders,
by which defendants agree to divest particular assets raising competitive risks, thereby allowing the merger to proceed while frustrating suits by competitors intent on blocking the merger's procompetitive aspects; (4) amicus participation by state or federal enforcement agencies advising the court on the government's views,
particularly on issues of effective relief; (5) the /aches doctrine,
which bars unreasonable delay in filing and prosecuting merger
suits; (6) litigation bonds, requiring the plaintiff to compensate the
defendant for losses from injunctions improvidently granted, which
penalize strategic plaintiffs, who face a high probability of bond forfeiture;275 (7) Rule 11 sanctions, which impose penalties on counsel
and parties who file nonmeritorious suits;276 and (8) judicial exercise of equitable discretion in issuing preliminary injunctions.
275. But the failure of the courts to set bonds at sufficiently high levels has limited the
disciplining effect of this procedure. See infra note 277.
276. Rule 11 sanctions apparently have not been imposed in merger cases but have been
exacted in several antitrust cases, see supra note 133, and there is at least some concern that
the Rule may inhibit antitrust suits. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Rule 11 and Federal Antitrust
Litigation, 61 TuL. L. REv. 1033 (1993).
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2. Improved Procedures

Although the existing procedures appear sufficient to contain
most risks of litigation abuse, the courts can strengthen these procedures in at least three ways. First, courts may increase the size of
litigation bonds to deter strategic litigation more effectively. Second, courts may discourage collusive settlements by requiring public disclosure of proposed settlements or by encouraging the
plaintiff's voluntary undertaking to make such disclosure. Third,
courts may encourage other voluntary undertakings by merger
plaintiffs that reduce risks of litigation abuse, such as an agreement
for fee-shifting for suits found to be frivolous or without
foundation.

a. Litigation Bonds. Courts can raise the costs of strategic litigation by increasing the size of litigation bonds. Bonds in merger
cases appear modest, far below the possible costs an improvident
injunction could inflict on the defendant.277 In setting bonds, the
courts properly take into account the plaintiff's ability to pay in
order to assure that the bond requirement does not bar suit altogether.278 But in many cases, bonds could be much higher than
their often de minimis level without preventing suit by plaintiffs
with compatible incentives. This conclusion follows because the
bond requirement operates differentially, making expected costs
much higher for incentive incompatible plaintiffs, who face a high
probability of bond forfeiture, than for the plaintiff whose incentives accord with antitrust goals.279 Thus, the bond operates as a
separating mechanism, discouraging suits by plaintiffs with incompatible incentives, but not by those with compatible incentives.
277. See, e.g., Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.) (requiring $5
million bond for acquisition of $844 million target), affd., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.) (requiring $10,000 bond in
acquisition of $18 million company), affd., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
278. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979); 7
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE q[ 65.09 (2d ed. 1994).
279. Expected costs depend on the probability, as well as the magnitude, of a loss, and
the two types of plaintiffs face different probabilities of loss. The incentive incompatible
plaintiff who attempts to block a pro-competitive merger faces a higher probability of bond
forfeiture than the incentive compatible plaintiff who challenges an anticompetitive merger.
Of course, even a small risk of paying a financially crippling bond will deter normally risk
averse managers. The judicial objective should therefore be to set the bond at the highest
level that will not discourage the plaintiff with compatible incentives from challenging a
highly coilusive merger, taking into account the moderate forfeiture risk if plaintiff misjudges
the merger's illegality.
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b. Disclosure of Settlement. To discourage collusive and anticompetitive settlements, the court can condition a preliminary injunction on plaintiff's agreement to report and publicly disclose the
terms of any settlement, with notice to enforcement agencies. Suits
by competitors raise risks of anticompetitive settlement because
business rivals can use settlement agreements to mask restraints of
trade and because plaintiffs may settle suits collusively, compromising the deterrence goal and the public interest purpose of the private merger suit.280
Although courts have no explicitly stated authority to disapprove settlements in cases that do not involve class actions,281 a settlement disclosure condition appears well within the equity court's
inherent powers to protect the integrity of its procedures and to
assure that an injunction will serve the public interest.282 In view of
the risk that an anticompetitive settlement may abort the public interest, it appears appropriate for a court to impose a settlement disclosure condition. The court is only requiring that the plaintiff
agree to a "sunshine" requirement to make public disclosure of settlement terms. The condition is imposed in connection with an extraordinary remedy that would halt an ongoing merger. Such an
order should burden no good faith litigant, and it addresses a serious problem in public interest litigation. Moreover, precedent exists for granting a preliminary injunction in a private merger case
conditioned on the plaintiff's agreement to conduct an expedited
hearing.2 83 Thus, it seems no large step to conclude that a preliminary injunction conditioned on settlement disclosure is within the
judicial power.284
280. Abusive and collusive settlements are the bane of private attorney general enforcement in class action cases for damages even when settlements require judicial approval. See
generally Coffee, supra note 143.
281. See Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 895-96 (5th Cir. 1977)
(stating that an approval of a settlement was not appropriate in a non-class action case).
282. An equity court has clear authority to impose conditions on issuance of a preliminary injunction. Meyers v. Block, 120 U.S. 206, 214 (1887) (ordering an injunction bond);
Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1882). Such conditions may either require or prohibit
specified conduct. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939) (requiring payment of tariff); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (prohibiting voting of stock); modified, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), revd.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977). Moreover, the court's conditioning power significantly increases when the
relief is "in furtherance of the public interest." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440
(1944); Inland Steel, 306 U.S. at 157. Although Congress could limit the equity court's conditioning power, this limitation would require the "clearest legislative direction." Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engrs. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1960).
283. Sun Newspapers, Inc. v. Omaha World-Herald Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) q[
65,522 (D. Neb.), modified, 713 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983).
284. Critics might object that a settlement disclosure condition invades the rights of parties to settle or dismiss lawsuits. See Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989)
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c. Voluntary Undertakings by Plaintiff. A voluntary undertaking by a competitor-plaintiff of a course of action that forecloses
possible litigation abuse provides a powerful incentive improving
mechanism. For example, a plaintiff who seeks a preliminary injunction might voluntarily commit itself (1) to pay the defendant's
attorney's fees upon finding a lack of any reasonable basis for the
suit, or (2) to notify the court and the public of the terms of any
settlement. By such an undertaking the plaintiff can place itself in
exactly the same position it would be in if the court issued a conditional injunction requiring such terms.285 But why would the plaintiff ever make such a commitment, and should it be a factor in the
court's decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction?
The competitor-plaintiff's good fajth is likely to be under attack
in almost every private merger case, particularly after the ARCO
case, which made explicit the close connection between the plaintiff's incentives and antitrust injury.286 'fypically, the merger defendant will move to dismiss for lack of antitrust injury, and even
when the court denies the motion, the issue of motivation will lin(stating that courts may not condition the rights of parties to dismiss). But a settlement
disclosure condition does not limit that right. The parties remain free to settle secretly if they
do not seek a preliminary injunction or to settle with public notice if they obtain a preliminary injunction. What they may not do is both to obtain a preliminary injunction and settle
secretly. In the words of the Supreme Court, the preliminary injunction condition is "the
price of relief when the injunctive powers of the court are invoked." Locomotive Engrs., 363
U.S. at 531-32.
A settlement disclosure condition is not contrary to the recent decision in United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which the D.C. Circuit ruled that a lower
court had abused its discretion in refusing to approve a proposed antitrust consent decree. In
Microsoft, the trial court reviewed the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by an executive
agency, a power the court possessed only as result of a specific statute and constrained by
constitutional limitations on the separation of powers. The court held that the trial court's
role was to assure that the decree did not "on its face ••. make a mockery of judicial power."
56 F.3d at 1462. More specifically, the court might examine the clarity of the decree, the
workability of the compliance terms the court would administer, and any claims of adverse
impact by third parties. 56 F.3d at 1461-62. By contrast, in a preliminary injunction proceeding, no executive agency is involved, and hence there is no separation of powers issue, the
district court has plenary jurisdiction, and the court is required to weigh and balance public
interest factors in determining whether to exercise its broad equitable discretion to block an
ongoing transaction.
285. Assuming the court issues a preliminary injunction, it could incorporate the plaintiff's voluntary undertaking into its decree, based on the plaintiff's consent. The defendant
might complain, but the defendant would have difficulty articulating a coherent reason for
objecting to a plaintiff's stipulation to pay a defendant's attorney's fees or to a disclosure
provision that makes it more difficult to enter into an anticompetitive or collusive settlement.
Compliance with the attorney's fees undertaking could be assured by a bond, agreed to by
the plaintiff. To relieve the court from any administrative burdens, a plaintiff might establish
an independent mechanism, such as a neutral stakeholder or arbitrator under a binding instruction to pay out the bonded funds on the condition specified.
286. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 335-41 (1990).
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ger, coloring the court's decision on the preliminary injunction.287
Why not allow the plaintiff who survives the antitrust injury motion
to signal its good faith and incentive compatibility in a credible
manner by binding itself not to settle without either prior notice to
the court or even the court's approva1?288 Similarly, as discussed
more fully in the next section, why not allow the plaintiff to make a
commitment to pay the defendant's attorney's fees if a court or arbitrator later determines that the suit lacked significant merit?
That is to say, why not allow the plaintiff to propose its own separating mechanism to reveal that its incentives are compatible with
antitrust goals?289 The court could then consider the plaintiff's undertakings in determining whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest.

d. Attorney's Fee-shifting. A requirement that plaintiffs pay
the defendant's attorney's fees if the suit is frivolous or lacks foundation provides a further means to discourage anticompetitive suits.
Congress could, of course, impose such a requirement by statute,
but more strikingly, as mentioned in the last section, a competitorplaintiff might make such a commitment voluntarily in order to better convince the court to issue a preliminary injunction.
'21!,1. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
'21!,8. A possible objection to a settlement disclosure procedure - whether mandated or
voluntary - is that the court's settlement disclosure order might be unenforceable. The
problem is that the normal enforcement mechanism - dissolution of the injunction if the
condition is breached - would impose no penalty on parties intent on settling the case, and
some authorities have questioned whether a court retains judicial power to sanction litigants
after voluntary dismissal under Rule 41. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, § 1337, at 13132. The Supreme Court, however, has recently held that a court retains the power to impose
sanctions for Rule 11 violations and for contempt even after voluntary dismissal. Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). Clearly, the deliberate breach of a judicial
order on which the court conditioned preliminary relief that was highly favorable to the
plaintiff and equally burdensome to the defendant would raise issues of bad faith conduct
justifying Rule 11 and civil contempt sanctions.
In addition, the plaintiff could establish an independent enforcement mechanism by inducing an appropriate litigant to intervene in the litigation, such as a state attorney general or
a group of consumers. If the plaintiff then sought to settle secretly, the intervenor would
have standing to object. A public agency or consumer group in a meritorious case would
have incentive to intervene for this limited purpose because it need bear no significant litigation cost. Thus, the plaintiff would have established a credible enforcement mecharusm. I
am indebted to John Leubsdorf for this suggestion.
'21!,9. Such a voluntary undertaking amounts to performance bonding by the plaintiff of its
incentive compatibility. The FTC has used a similar mechanism in consent settlement cases
in which it doubts the feasibility of the proposed curative steps to be taken by the defendant.
Under this procedure, the FTC accepts the settlement only on the condition that should the
defendant not perform the agreed curative steps within a set time period, it will divest itself
of a more valuable "crown jewel" asset. See Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Infor.-

mation Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRusr LJ. 23, 26-27 (1993).
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An attorney's fee-shifting rule would modify the present system
of one-way fee-shifting in private antitrust cases under which the
defendant must pay the attorney's fees of a prevailing plaintiff, but
the plaintiff has no similar obligation to pay the defendant's attorney's fees. A fee-shifting rule could follow the pattern of several
federal statutes involving public interest type litigation, which has
come to be known as the Christiansburg rule.2 9° Under this approach, which has been adopted by a recent antitrust statute2 91 and
by the authorization of state parens patriae actions in the HartScott-Rodino Act,2 92 the plaintiff would pay the defendant's attorney's fees if the court finds the action to have been "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. "293
Application of the Christiansburg rule in private merger cases
would provide a powerful separating mechanism to discourage anticompetitive suits. At the same time, it would create relatively
small risk of inhibiting pro-competitive suits, particularly because
the rule would operate in conjunction with the one-sided right of
the antitrust plaintiff to recover statutory attorney's fees. Thus, the
wrongly motivated competitor would face a significant penalty risk
under the Christiansburg rule, while the competitor who brings a
pro-competitive suit would face a low penalty risk and a strong
probability of recovering its attorney's fees. 2 94
The Christiansburg rule appears superior to a litigation bond because it minimizes the risk that a well-motivated plaintiff will be
penalized for losing a meritorious case because the penalty is paid
only if the suit is frivolous. Moreover, even if we assume that the
wrongly motivated plaintiff gains more from blocking an efficient
merger than the pro-competitive plaintiff gains from blocking a col290. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (construing Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief
Act of 1980, § 609, 15 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1988); Jury Systems Improvement Act of 1978,
§ 6(a)(l), 28 U.S.C. § 1875(d)(2) (1988); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of
1976, § 19, 49 U.S.C. § 1686(e) (1988); cf. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, § 2, 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1988).
291. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 4304 (1988), amended
by National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a) (1994).
292. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d)(2) (1994) (awarding attorney's fees on showing of bad faith}.
293. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421.
294. Interestingly, this two-sided system of fee-shifting, which combines the pro-plaintiff
antitrust rule with the defendant-favoring Christiansburg rule in a world where good plaintiffs sometimes lose and bad plaintiffs sometimes win, produces a fee-shifting regime that
somewhat resembles the optimal fee-shifting rule proposed in a recent economic paper. See
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11 (Nov. 14,
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (proposing fee-shifting rule that depends
on the margin by which a party prevailed).
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lusive merger, the Christiansburg rule, possibly augmented by a
Rule 11 penalty that may exceed attorney's fees, would still provide
an effective separating mechanism. Although this may appear
counterintuitive, it is explained by the one-sided right of the prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees together with the low
probability that a court would impose a Christiansburg award or
Rule 11 penalty on a well-motivated plaintiff, which together offset
the greater return the wrongly motivated plaintiff anticipates in
blocking a merger.29s
3. Effectiveness of Proposed Procedures
Existing equity procedures give antitrust courts an impressive
array of controls by which to ensure that competitor plaintiffs promote antitrust goals in prosecuting merger suits. In addition, improved procedures would allow courts that remain <;:oncerned about
possible competitor abuse to achieve an added measure of protec295. More specifically, the higher benefit that the wrongly motivated plaintiff gains from
blocking an efficient merger is discounted not only by the low probability that this outcome
will occur but also by the substantial probability of a Christiansburg penalty. Similarly, in the
case of a collusive merger, the relatively lower benefit that the pro-competitive plaintiff gains
from blocking the merger is increased not only by the higher probability that this outcome
will occur but also by the mandatory attorney's fees award.
This result can be illustrated in a simple numerical example. Assume that there are two
types of plaintiffs, bad plaintiffs who only challenge procompetitive mergers and good plaintiffs who only challenge anticompetitive mergers. Naturally, the good plaintiffs will have a
higher probability of winning (60%) than the bad plaintiffs (20% ). Assume that the payoff to
the bad plaintiff from blocking an efficient merger is $200, while the payoff to the good
plaintiff from blocking a predatory merger is only $80; the plaintiff and defendant each pay
attorney's fees of $40; if the defendant loses, he must pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees under
the antitrust statutes.
The Christiansburg rule changes this unbalanced scheme of fee-shifting by requiring the
plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney's fees if the defendant wins and the court determines
that the suit was filed without proper basis. The latter condition is not easy to establish even
in a bad case and is also subject to an erroneous determination in a good case (if the plaintiff
loses). So to test the analysis, let us make the extreme assumption that in either type of cases
there is a 50% chance that a losing plaintiff will face Christiansburg liability for the defendant's attorney's fees. Under these conditions, the plaintiff's expected value of suing is its
expected payoff from winning less its costs from losing, which consist of (1) its own expected
attorney's fees and (2) its expected liability for paying the defendant's attorney's fees. This is
expressed in numerical terms as follows:

Bad Plaintiff
.2 x $200 - .8 x $40 - (.8 x .5) $40 = - $8

Good Plaintiff
.6 x $80 - .4 x $40 - (.4 x .5) $40 = $20
Thus, the bad plaintiff faces a negative return despite its much higher payoff from litigation success and is not motivated to sue. On the other hand, the good plaintiff remains motivated to sue despite its lower payoff. Of course, these outcomes are sensitive to the
assumptions used and do not consider the effect of an abandonment of the merger before
trial for reasons other than anticipated litigation outcomes, for example, delay costs. The
outcomes demonstrate, however, that within a plausible range of values the statutory feeshifting rule combined with a Christiansburg rule would operate as an effective separating
mechanism.
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tion. Similarly, well-motivated competitors who are concerned that
the court will perceive them as wrongly motivated can credibly signal their good faith through voluntary undertakings. By these
means, courts can effectively contain the risks of strategic litigation,
collusive settlements, and the lesser risks of wrong outcomes and
ineffective relief.

a. Strategic Litigation. Existing procedures, which include expedited hearings, hold-separate orders, curative relief orders, litigation bonds, the /aches doctrine, and the possibility of Rule 11
sanctions, reduce the problem of strategic suits filed to block or delay a lawful merger. Supplemental procedures, such as augmenting
the amount of the bond or procuring the plaintiff's voluntarily
agreement to an attorneys' fee-shifting arrangement if the court
holds that the suit is frivolous, might further diminish strategic risk.
b. Collusive Settlements. Existing procedures do not specifically address the risks of collusive and anticompetitive settlements.
Nevertheless, such risks should not be exaggerated. The defendant
can never be certain the plaintiff will settle short of effective relief,
and in any event, the defendant must bear settlement and litigation
costs that may have some independent deterrent effect on anticompetitive mergers. Furthermore, settlement would not bar government suit, which may become more probable if the plaintiff
develops strong evidence of anticompetitive effects.296 Although
the plaintiff and defendant are typically competitors who might settle the case by dividing markets or fixing prices, antitrust law itself
restrains settlements that actively reduce competition. Moreover,
antitrust courts can effectively discourage collusive settlements
through the additional procedures of conditioning the preliminary
injunction on advance public disclosure by the plaintiff of any settlement terms or recognizing a voluntary undertaking by the plaintiff to make such a disclosure.
c. Wrong Outcomes. Both hold-separate orders, which relieve time pressures because the merger is allowed to proceed, and
increased litigation bonds, which explicitly penalize the plaintiff
who induces a wrong outcome, mitigate the problem of wrong out296. A possible additional risk in anticompetitive settlements is losing the deterrent effect
of the litigation cost bond in discouraging ill-founded suits because the defendant will no
doubt release the bond as part of the settlement. But this risk is less severe than it may
appear because the existence of the bond necessarily reduces the benefits the plaintiff can
extract in the settlement.
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comes caused by compressed time schedules for preliminary injunction hearings. In addition, the problem appears exaggerated in
view of the concentrated legal resources typically assembled in preliminary injunction merger cases. What might take a smaller group
of lawyers months can be done perhaps with even greater effectiveness by a large team that is able to focus its efforts on a single
case.297
d. Ineffective Relief. The !aches doctrine, which can apply to
private merger cases,298 combined with the prejudice delay causes
in obtaining a preliminary injunction,299 both reduce the problem of
ineffective relief caused by the delayed challenge of a merger until
after assets have been intermingled. The Supreme Court's recent
ruling that private merger litigants can obtain divestiture relief300
mitigates the problem of insufficient briefing of the court on remedial issues, as it gives defendants every incentive to develop alternative remedies short of divestiture. Moreover, plaintiffs will also
have incentive and resources to evaluate relief proposals closely because once a defendant's liability has been established, the plaintiff's statutory right to recover attorney's fees is assured. Amicus
participation by government enforcement agencies may also provide effective briefing on the appropriate remedy.301 Finally, the
issue of relief will not often arise in view of the dispositive effect of
the preliminary injunction decision.

F. Gravity of Violation
Both first- and second-stage procedures focus the enforcement
capabilities of competitors on mergers that raise the most serious
competitive risks. The first-stage antitrust injury screen, whether
297. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
298. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 297-98 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
299. Certainly defendants appreciate this point because they typically consummate the
merger at the earliest opportunity to forestall preliminary relief. See, e.g., Phototron Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), temporary stay vacated by 56 U.S.L.W. 3682 (U.S.
Apr. 5) (vacating temporary stay when, unknown to the Supreme Court, the merger had
closed before temporary stay issued), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988).
300. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 278-96.
301. Although it is doubtful that enforcement agencies could be induced to assume a
greater role in private merger litigation generally, see ABA ANTITRUST SEcnON, supra note
114, at 19-22, the agencies may be more willing to comment on relief issues. See, e.g.,
Changes to 1WA/Travel Agent Settlement Resolve Division's Competitive Concerns, [Jan.June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1715, at 688-90 (June 1, 1995) (Justice Department files amicus curiae memorandum stating views on proposed class action settlement
while taking no views on the merits.). The restructuring of a competitive market presents an
issue in which the enforcement agencies should have a keen interest in participating.
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formulated in terms of predatory capability or market dominance,
registers severity of the violation. Proof of predatory capability requires a showing that a merger will give a small coalition of firms
the power to discipline or exclu_de rivals. As Cargill made clear in
rejecting the standing of a competitor claiming predatory injury
from a merger causing only moderate concentration, such proof is
likely to exist only when the merger creates highly concentrated
oligopolistic conditions.302 Proof that a merger would create a market dominant firm even more clearly registers violation severity.
Mergers creating single-firm market dominance raise the gravest
risks to competition, as almost all antitrust authorities recognize.
The second-stage procedure also focuses enforcement efforts on
the most aggravated violations. Assessment of violation severity is
an essential factor in the equity court's determination whether to
issue a transaction-disrupting preliminary injunction. Separating
mechanisms, such as litigation bonds and fee-shifting undertakings,
also serve to concentrate enforcement on the most serious violations. The fact that a plaintiff may face liability for delay costs
under a litigation bond or for attorney's fees under a fee-shifting
regime serves to discourage suits except where plaintiffs believe
they have high probability of winning. Thus, both first- and secondstage procedures focus the litigation-capable enforcement efforts of
competitors on the mergers of gravest public concern.
V.

TAKEOVER TARGETS

Target firms in takeover cases should also have standing to challenge unlawful mergers because such firms are uniquely knowledgeable and capable merger litigants; because the takeovers subject to
antitrust challenge usually unite direct competitors who face the
gravest antitrust risks; because the anticompetitive effects of a
merger threaten injury to constituent parts of the firm and benefit
shareholders only through violation of the law; because in striving
to retain its independence from extinction by an anticompetitive
merger, the target firm is vindicating a key statutory goal of the
modem merger law; and because when a merger has purely collusive effects such that all competitors gain, only the target remains as
a viable private litigant.

302. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119-20 n.15.
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A. Enforcement Capability
Of all possible merger litigants, it is the target firm that is likely
to be most capable of mounting an effective suit within the short
time limits of a contested takeover. The target possesses the most
intimate knowledge of the effects of the merger because it will become a part of the augmented firm whose market power threatens
to injure competition. The target will already have in its possession
many of the key documents needed. It will usually be the first firm,
other than the bidder, to know of the merger, and indeed the target
will probably have already studied the antitrust issues when considering the tender offer.303 Additionally, in critical cases it may be
the only available private litigant.304
The Second Circuit recently recognized the advantage of the
takeover target as a merger litigant and the necessity of target
standing for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws, stating that:
[P]rivate enforcement depends on the willingness of affected companies to enter the fray and risk substantial money, time, and effort in
lawsuits that have even more uncertainty of outcome than ordinary
litigation.... [N]on-target competitors claiming standing face the substantial barriers of proof erected by Cargill. Consumers are unlikely
to face the prospect of suffering a sufficient amount of damage to justify the cost of seeking a pre-acquisition injunction. The target of a
proposed takeover has the most immediate interest in preserving its
independence as a competitor in the market.305
In fact, targets have brought almost thirty-five percent of all private merger cases, or twenty-three of the sixty-six reported cases
instituted over the fourteen-year period, 1977 to 1990, and obtained
fifty percent of the preliminary injunctions granted.306 Targets have
proven to be capable litigants, successfully challenging, for example, Mobil Oil's attempt to acquire Marathon,307 LTV's attempt to
303. See 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 38lb (describing the target as the
most knowledgeable and perhaps the only motivated plaintiff); Baumol & Ordover, supra
note 196, at 258 (stating that a target's management is better informed than any other group
on the competitive effects of a merger).
304. Although I have stressed that competitors may have pro-competitive incentives in
challenging mergers, cases clearly arise in which no competitor is motivated to challenge a
collusive merger. Indeed, the target firm may be the last competitive holdout in a market
otherwise dominated by a few large firms.
305. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir.), cert
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
'
306. See app. These statistics encompass the merger and takeover wave of the 1980s,
which ended in 1990. See PAUL MILGRAM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION
& MANAGEMENT 483-85 (1992).
307. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), affd., 669 F.2d 378
(6th Cir.), reaffd., 669 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
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acquire Grumman,3os and the recent attempt by South Africa's second largest gold mining company to acquire the largest U.S. producer,309 all of which were enjoined. Thus, targets have the best
information, the strongest incentive, and generally the highest enforcement capability among private merger litigants.310
B. Incentive Compatibility and Antitrust Injury
The challenge to target firm standing is based on an absence of
antitrust injury and incentive incompatibility. Critics assert that a
takeover inflicts no injury on the target and benefits its shareholders by enabling them to sell their shares at a premium.311 Further,
even if in some sense the target is injured, the injury is not an antitrust injury because it is not caused by the anticompetitive effects of
the merger.312 Even apart from these problems, the target should
be denied standing because the real party in interest is not the target but its managers, who sue in the target's name and do so not to
vindicate antitrust wrongs but to keep their jobs.313 Thus, the litigation incentives of the target and its managers are fundamentally incompatible with antitrust goals.314 Each of these arguments,
however, is either mistaken or overdrawn, particularly as applied to
horizontal mergers - the focus of almost all takeover litigation.
The target firm may suffer injury even when shareholders appear to benefit because the welfare of the firm is not identical with
the short-term interest of a controlling group of shareholders intent
on selling theii shares and because in some cases shareholders
themselves are hurt. The injury sustained by the target is antitrust
injury when it stems in whole or in part from output reduction or
other anticompetitive effects in the restrained market. Although
the motives of managers may indeed deviate from antitrust goals,
equity controls and internal corporate mechanisms can modify distorted managerial incentives.
308. Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.), affd., 665 F.2d 10 {2d
Cir. 1981).
309. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
modified on other grounds, 871 F.2d 252 {2d Cir. 1989).
310. Moreover, in some of the largest mergers, the target may be the only viable private
litigant because competitors may lack enforcement incentives or be too small to mount an
effective merger challenge.
311. See Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1166-68.
312. See Burlington Indus. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 805 {M.D.N.C. 1987); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1166-68.
313. See Bumup & Sims, 688 F. Supp. at 1534.
314. 688 F. Supp. at 1534.
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More specifically, targets face antitrust injury from anticompetitive takeovers because such mergers threaten the target with: (1)
collusion-induced output reduction harmful to the target and its
constituents in both partial and full acquisitions of shares; (2) possible loss of trade secrets, confidential information, and other intellectual property injuring the target's competitive viability if the
merger is not consummated; and (3) termination of its corporate
existence in contravention of a merger law intended to preserve the
independence of firms threatened by anticompetitive acquisitions.
Thus, as explained below, the target's litigation incentives are fully
compatible with antitrust goals. The crux of the objection to takeover suits is not the target's incentives, but the incentives of its managers. Distorted managerial incentives, however, are best handled
by procedural and internal controls on managers, not disqualification of the target. The combined force of these considerations justifies the conclusion that takeover targets sustain antitrust injury
when they challenge horizontal mergers.
These are issues of first impression in the Supreme Court, which
has never decided a target merger case or expressed any view about
the application of the antitrust injury principle to takeover targets.
In a recent amicus brief, however, the Solicitor General questioned
whether the general antitrust injury standard promotes antitrust
goals in takeover cases or "whether some refinement of the standard would be appropriate."315 The Solicitor stressed the factual
difference between the Brunswick and Cargill cases, in which the
plaintiffs claimed injury from increased competition, and a target
suit, where the target firm seeks "to remain a viable and aggressive
competitor."316 Thus, antitrust injury in target merger cases raises
distinctive issues that require "careful consideration."317
1. Partial Acquisitions
The target sustains antitrust injury when a rival firm acquires a
controlling interest in the target through acquisition of less than all
of the target's shares. Such an acquisition threatens the target with
315. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical
Products, Inc., 114 S. Ct 491 (1993) (No. 92-1274) (dismissing cert. petition pursuant to stipulation). The Solicitor General urged denial of the writ of certiorari because the issue of
target standing had been sparsely litigated in the lower courts and because the number of
takeovers had declined in recent years. Brief for the United States, supra at 7-9. Of course,
one reason the issue of target standing may have been sparsely litigated in recent years is that
the difficulty of obtaining standing discourages target suits.
316. Brief for the United States, supra note 315, at 7-9.
317. Id. at 7 n.6.
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antitrust injury because the bidder's partial ownership of the target
impels the bidder to favor its own corporate interest in competition
with the target thereby weakening the target's competitive vitality.
Because the bidder receives only a fraction of the profit realized by
the target, the bidder has an incentive to transfer profit from the
partially owned target to its own fully owned profit center, for example, by shifting sales from the target, transferring valuable competitive know-how, or by blocking innovation or other strategies
beneficial to the target in its competition with the bidder.31s
The favoritism toward the bidder that a partial acquisition of
shares induces tends to undermine the target's competitive potential, threatening injury to its minority shareholders and its nonshareholder constituents. The injury the target and its stakeholders
sustain stems directly from the anticompetitive nature of the acquisition because a bidder not in competition with the target would
have no incentive to reduce the target's output and weaken its competitive strength. Moreover, even if the bidder competes with the
target, in a fully competitive market, a reduction in the target's output would not enable the bidder to increase its own profits because
under competitive conditions the bidder has no power to raise
prices. Hence, a partial acquisition threatens the target with injury
if, but only if, the merger creates collusive risks.
Established precedents recognize the anticompetitive risks arising from partial acquisitions by direct competitors.31 9 Thus, in its
recent Gold Fields320 decision, the Second Circuit upheld the target's standing to challenge a partial acquisition of controlling
shares. The bidder, the dominant South African gold producer,
sought to acquire a controlling interest in the leading U.S. producer. The target claimed antitrust injury because the bidder would
be likely to favor its own wholly owned South African production
over its partially owned U.S. subsidiary - an especially pernicious
result because the South African facility had higher costs. In up318. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1979)
(citing Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Conn), affd., 206
F.2d 738 {2d Cir. 1953)).
319. See Schaefer, 591 F.2d at 814; Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476
F.2d 687, 693-95 {2d Cir. 1973); Hamilton Watch, 206 F.2d at 738; Consolidated Gold Fields,
PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y.), modified sub nom. Consolidated
Gold Fields P.L.C. v. Minorco, S.A., 871F.2d252 (1988), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989);
Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 203, 211-14 (N.D. Tex.), modified, 741
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); see Brent W. Huber, Note, Target Corporations, Hostile Horizontal
Takeovers and Antitrust Injury Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act After Cargill, 66 IND. LJ.
625, 646 (1991).
320. 871 F.2d at 252.
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holding the target's standing to challenge the merger, the Second
Circuit easily found antitrust injury because the target stood to earn
less profit due to the ability of "outside corporate forces to cause it
to restrain its own competitiveness."321
1\vo objections may be made to this analysis. First, the bidder's
use of its controlling interest to cripple the target in competition
with the bidder unjustifiably assumes a breach of fiduciary duty to
the target's minority shareholders. Second, the target suffers no antitrust injury because any losses the target sustains from competitive restraints imposed by the bidder are outweighed by the benefits
the target receives as a partner in the collusion.
The first objection - unjustified assumption of breach of fiduciary duty - is unrealistic because it would assume perfect compliance with legal rules in the face of a palpable conflict of interest.
That assumption defies legal experience and basic premises of corporate law. The directors of the target, elected largely by the bidder, and frequently its officers or employees will at best have
divided loyalties, if they are not totally dominated by the parent.
Such directors cannot exercise the same independence as directors
without divided loyalties, as corporate law conflict-of-interest rules
and the Clayton Act's prohibition against interlocking directors
both recognize.322 Indeed, antitrust authorities uniformly acknowledge the dangers from acquisitions of substantial or controlling interests in direct competitors.323
The second objection - the target benefits from postmerger
collusion with the bidder - neglects both the parent's strong incentive to capture as much as possible of the collusive gain in its own
wholly owned entity and related issues of illegality. Thus, it appears
unlikely that the net benefit to the target and its constituents would
remain favorable when the price is elevated because the collusive
output reduction is likely to fall disproportionately on the target.
Antitrust courts need not and should not resolve that issue, however, because the determination of whether the target will benefit

321. 871 F.2d at 257. The case also involved a full acquisition of shares, discussed infra.
322. See Clayton Act, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1994) (prohibiting directors from serving on
boards of competing corporations where one company has capital surplus and profits that
exceed $1 million); ROBERT CHARI.Es CLARK, CORPORATE LAw §§ 4.1-.2 (1986).
323. See Schaefer, 591 F.2d at 814; Hamilton Watch, 206 F.2d at 738; Gold Fields, 698 F.
Supp. at 499-500; 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 53, 'll 1203c (describing the dangers as
board of directors' influence, sensitive information, employee morale, and reduced competitive incentive).
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falls peculiarly within the province of the target's directors in deciding whether to bring a merger suit.324
Moreover, in making its litigation decision, the target's board of
directors must face the issue of illegality. Whatever benefits the
target receives from the collusive effects of the merger are achieved
in violation of law. Although the target is not itself a law violator, it
may legitimately sue to prevent a violation of the Clayton Act that
is achieved through fundamental change in its ownership structure. 325 In addition, because the target will continue to exist as a
separate legal entity, the collusive price raises issues of continuing
conspiracy between the partially owned subsidiary and its parent,326
which a determination of merger legality would help to resolve.32 7
Thus, the objections to target standing in partial acquisitions are
untenable.
2.

Full Acquisitions

The target sustains antitrust injury in a full acquisition because
vital constituencies of the firm face threatened losses from mergerinduced output reduction. Injury to such constituencies may involve injury to the firm's workers who face diminished employment; its suppliers who face reduced demand; consumers who face
higher prices; and the communities in which the firm operates,
which face output-related reductions in spending, taxes, and employment. These injuries harm the target itself because under modem legal and economic views, the welfare of the firm includes the
interests of its nonshareholder constituents either directly or as encompassed in the long-run welfare of its shareholders and because
any immediate gains realized by selling shareholders stem from an
unlawful transaction.
The modem business firm is an ingenious network of long-term
contractual interests, which includes lenders, labor, managers, suppliers, customers, and supporting communities, as well as share324. See CLARK, supra note 322, §§ 3.4, 3.5; supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 698 (2d Cir.
1973); see also discussion infra note 337 and accompanying text.
326. See 2 AREEoA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, q[lj[ 1464e, 1467f (describing cases
divided on whether parent and partially owned subsidiary have conspiratorial capacity);
liARLAN M. BLAKE & ROBERT PrroFSKY, ANTIIRusr LAw 555-56 (1967).
327. If the merger is held unlawful and enjoined, conspiracy issues of course will not
arise. If the merger is held lawful based on a finding of absence of market power, future
collaboration between affiliated firms engaged in joint production will be lawful in most
cases. See generally HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTIIRusr PouCY § 5.2d (1994).
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holders.328 Although no single theory of the firm prevails, both
modem economics and recent legislative and judicial articulations
recognize the contractual nature and diverse constituencies of the
firm. 329 Indeed, the statutory law of a majority of states and common law decisions elsewhere recognize the nonshareholder constituencies that compose the corporate interest and the duty of
directors to serve that composite interest, at least when consistent
with the long run welfare of shareholders.33 0 Th.us, under the governing law of most states, the firm encompasses the welfare of its
constituents or stakeholders - all those who have invested human
and other capital contingent on the continued existence and health
of the enterprise. It follows that to the extent reduced output
caused by a collusive merger injures nonshareholder constituencies
and produces no offsetting gains, it injures the firm itself, most especially in a takeover.331

328. See MAsAlllKO A01a ET AL., THE FIRM' AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES (1990); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 446-48; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,
1990 DUKE LJ. 201, 236-38.
329. See AoKI, supra note 328; Coffee, supra note 328, at 446-48; Andrei Schleifer &
Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37-38 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). See generally Oliver
Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Co LUM. L. REv. 1757 (1989).
330. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989)
(permitting consideration of "impact on constituencies other than shareholders"); Charles
Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1991)
(state statutes accord with common law rule); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L.
REv. 187, 214-15 (1991); Millon, supra note 328, at 234 (referring to the common law rule
permitting consideration of other constituencies); Marleen A. O'Connor, Corporate Malaise
- Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3, 4, 279-93 (1991) (stakeholder statutes in over half of the states); cf. 1 AMERICAN LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02(b)(2) (1994) (explaining
that directors may take into account nonshareholder interests when they would not "significantly disfavor" long-term shareholder interests); Glen A. Graff, Target Standing Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 219, 239-40 (explaining that nonshareholder
interests may be taken into account in deciding to file antitrust suit).
331. Injuries to nonshareholder constituencies are particularly likely in takeover cases
because the buyout severs the shareholders' interests from those of the firm's other constituents. Under the normal conditions of an ongoing firm, maximization of the shareholders'
residual value maximizes the firm's total value. A takeover, however, breaks the unity of
interest between the selling shareholders and other constituents. The tendering shareholders
are no longer constrained repeat players who benefit from a reputation for fair dealing but
now have every incentive to expropriate the sunk costs of other constituencies. See Coffee,
supra note 328, at 447; Charles R. Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents and Hostile
Tender Offers, 16 AM. EcoN. REv. 155, 159-60 (1986); Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics
of Tune": A Radical Corporate Vision, 46 Bus. LAW. 377, 377-78 (1991); Schleifer & Summers, supra note 329, at 41-42. But cf. Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory,
Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REo. 119, 172 (1992) (claiming empirical evidence
does not support expropriation theory as cause for takeovers).
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A collusive merger, however, will typically have more than the
one-sided· effect of injuring nonshareholder constituents. The
merger will instead generally benefit the target's shareholders, or
some of them, who typically receive a premium for their shares.
Thus, the impact of the merger on the target's constituencies appears mixed, and it is surely conceivable that the gain to selling
shareholders may exceed the loss to other constituencies, including
nonselling shareholders. An antitrust court, however, cannot properly make that determination. Instead, under controlling corporate
law principles, the net effect of a takeover is an issue to be resolved
by the target's board of directors.332 Moreover, in making such a
determination the directors may properly disregard any gain to
shareholders arising from the collusive effects of the merger because such gains do not reflect an increase in the value of the firm,
if value is understood as lawful value.333
The lawful value of the firm is its total value apart from any
enhancement due to the antitrust violation. The gain to the target's
shareholders from the increased profits due to future collusion, express or tacit, cannot form any part of the firm's lawful value. This
is not to question that shareholders are entitled to the residual
profit of the firm, but that principle applies only to lawful profit,
and the collusive gain from a merger that violates the antitrust laws
is necessarily unlawful.334 Such a gain, stemming from future collusion or tacit interdependence made possible by the merger, consti-

332. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 & n.13,
45 (Del. 1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Tune, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150; Hansen,
supra note 330, at 1364-65 (explaining that the issue is for directors under business judgement rule). To be sure, once the corporation has undertaken a sale of control transaction or
a breakup of the corporate entity, the Delaware "enhanced scrutiny" test focuses the directors' duty on obtaining the best value for shareholders. Paramount Communications v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 48. But short of that step, the directors retain full authority to
consider the interests of other constituencies.
333. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that target's shareholders were "not entitled" to gain from tender violating merger law); Gulf & W.
Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 698 (1973) (holding that target's
shareholder had no right to proceed with unlawful tender as "requirement of lawfulness is
included by implication in every tender offer"); Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d at 1153 (holding that target's directors may consider illegality in evaluating tender
bid); AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, supra note 330, § 6.02(b)(1) (explaining that target's directors may consider "questions of illegality" in deciding whether to take defensive action).
334. Note that the premium is not unlawful in the sense that either the target or its shareholders have themselves violated the antitrust laws, but the premium nevertheless constitutes
gain from an unlawful transaction. In maximizing the firm's value, the directors are under a
legal duty to maximize profit only so far as the profits stem from lawful transactions. See
supra note 332.
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tutes a form of unjust enrichment from illegality.33s Suit by the
target to block an anticompetitive merger can therefore maximize
the lawful value of the firm, 336 and the authority to determine
whether it does, clearly rests with the target's directors, subject to
the business judgment rule.337
It does not follow that all shareholder gain from mergers that
violate the antitrust laws is illegal. If the acquiring firm is one of
several bidders, the margin of unlawful shareholder gain is simply
the difference between the anticompetitive bid of the acquiring firm
and the next highest lawful bid.338 If the acquiring firm is the only
current bidder, the unlawful antitrust gain is the difference between
the current unlawful bid and the highest future lawful bid discounted for delay. If a merger would increase the target's value for
reasons apart from the merger's own collusive effects, future bids
should be forthcoming that will enable the target to realize lawful
value enhancement without injury to competition. Thus, enjoining
the merger deprives shareholders only of the gain stemming from
the anticompetitive effects of the transaction.339
335. Cf. Grumman Corp., 665 F.2d at 16 (stating that the "shareholders are not entitled
to a gain obtained from a sale that presents a substantial likelihood of violating§ 7"); Huber,
supra note 319, at 648.
336. The distinction between the lawful and the unlawful value of the firm is consistent
with the antitrust damage rules that require corporate defendants to surrender profits gained
from collusion - trebled - to the plaintiff. This of course causes loss to the shareholders
though they are normally quite innocent of any antitrust violation. The more complete collusion created by a merger cannot give the shareholders greater entitlement to collusive profit.
337. See Michael Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MicH. L. REv. 110, 143 (1986) (stating
that the business judgement rule applies to suits by takeover targets). Indeed, the target's
directors may have a legal duty to oppose takeovers that harm the corporate interest. See
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-57 (Del. 1985). Similarly, once a company is up for
auction under the Revlon rule, the directors arguably have a duty to consider only bids that
do not violate the antitrust Jaws in obtaining the best price for shareholders. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). But cf. Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv.
1028 (1982) (suggesting change in corporate law to preclude all or most takeover litigation
because of manager conflict of interest).
338. Thus, takeover gains from reduced agency costs, tax benefits, postmerger synergies,
or other causes not connected with increased market power could be realized by merger with
another bidder.
339. In the unlikely event that an anticompetitive merger involves unique and otherwise
unattainable synergies, the directors should of course take such gains into account in weighing the net corporate effect; if the gains are sufficiently large to offset any competitive harm,
the directors may properly decline to bring suit. Indeed, under these conditions, the merger
may in fact be lawful. See 1 ABA ANTITRUST SECIION, supra note 124, at 319-22; Pitofsky,
supra note 34, at 206-27. Such cases, however, are likely to be infrequent because a merger
creating market power will rarely be necessary to achieve desired synergies, and operating
synergies are seldom present in takeovers. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 172-74 (3d ed. 1990) (stating that effi-
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Courts and commentators who oppose target standing frequently argue that antitrust injury is absent because any injuries
sustained by the target result simply from the change in control, not
from the anticompetitive effects of the merger; thus, the same injuries would occur even if the merger did not violate the antitrust
laws.340 As shown above, however, the injury to the target firm,
properly conceived as the lawful collective interest of its stakeholders, results directly from the merger-induced output reduction.
These injuries would not occur in a noncollusive merger.
Under these circumstances, the target's incentives in attempting
to prevent an anticompetitive merger harmonize with antitrust
goals. The output-related injury to nonshareholder constituents, including consumers, reflects the public interest in maintaining competition. To be sure, the target's managers may have private
incentives incompatible with antitrust goals, but managerial conflict
of interest should not defeat the target's standing when procedural
and internal corporate mechanisms are available to control such
conflict.341 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that apart
from consumers, the target's constituents would not have standing
to sue individually, and consumers lack the incentive to sue. Thus,
a holding that the target cannot sue to vindicate the rights of its
stakeholders might prevent any challenge to an output-reducing
merger - a result that, as Judge Newman recently noted, "would
substantially impair enforcement of the antitrust laws."342
3. Loss of Trade Secrets

Loss of trade secrets and similar intellectual property unprotected by patent or copyright laws provides an additional source of
antitrust injury when the bidder is a rival firm. In either a full or
partfal acquisition of shares, antitrust injury may occur if the bidder
gains control of the target, and the merger is later held unlawful or
divested in anticipation of such a holding. Although the target may
regain its independence under a divestiture order or consent settleciency reduced on average); Richard E. Caves, Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency:
Foresight vs. Hindsight, 7 INTI.. J. INDUS. 0Ro. 151 (1989).
340. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1156-70.
341. See Rosenzweig, supra note 337, at 144, 147-50 (arguing that takeover suits are desirable because they protect the target from illegal conduct when other litigants are not available and because manager conflict can be moderated by incentive mechanisms); infra text
accompanying notes 368-69.
342. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
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ment, during the period it is under bidder control, it is threatened
with the irreparable loss of its trade secrets.343 The question arises
whether the target's trade secrets can be protected by a holdseparate order, which prevents the scrambling of the target's assets
until antitrust issues are resolved, but such orders will not as a practical matter preserve trade secrets and other competitive information after control has passed to a rival firm.344 Thus, when a merger
between the bidder and target would be unlawful, the bidder's capture of the target's trade secrets both injures the target and also
reduces competition by inhibiting the target's ability to compete.
As we shall see, the bidder has an incentive to weaken the target in
this way only when the merger would injure competition.
Indeed, the transfer of trade secrets from target to bidder can be
viewed as the first step in a two-step restraint of trade: the first step
reduces the target's ability to compete by transferring key competitive assets to the bidder; the second step extinguishes competition
altogether through merger.345 Normally, the two steps collapse into
a single judicial determination of merger legality or illegality. The
distinction, however, is important at the preliminary injunction
stage because the final injunction cannot effectively restore competition if the target's key informational assets have been lost during
the pendency of the litigation. Thus, the law promotes antitrust
goals when the target has standing to prevent such irreversible loss
of trade secrets.346
Some courts nevertheless object that a trade secret loss cannot
be an antitrust injury because the harm flows from a change in corporate control and bears no relation to the fact that less competi343. The risk of trade secret loss most commonly arises in suits by the federal government, a state, or a competitor, to which of course the target may also be a party. If the target
firm is the only plaintiff, however, the case will not survive a denial of a preliminary injunction and thus the issue of trade secrets becomes academic. See supra text accompanying note
192.
344. See United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1988) (sustaining appointment of equity trustee because hold-separate order would not prevent loss of trade
secrets); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that
hold-separate orders create risks of trade secret loss).
345. Cf. Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 252-53 (5th Cir. 1992)
(Parker, J., concurring) (describing how a takeover target may have suffered antitrust injury
sufficient to establish standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 7 if merger is "climactic"
result of prior anticompetitive conduct), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 378 (1993).
346. See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming
preliminary injunction because of confidential information and unique management); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 15-16 (2d Cir.1981) (affirming preliminary injunction
because of threatened loss of confidential information and serious disruption of business); F.
& M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming
preliminary injunction issued because of threatened loss of trade secrets and potential damage to employee morale).
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tion exists in the market.347 Moreover, they urge that whatever
effect the loss of trade secrets might have on competition generally,
the target firm sustains no injury because its shareholders have received the full market value for their ownership interest in the target, including its trade secrets.348
In fact, the loss of trade secrets may injure both competition and
the target firm when. the target's future viability depends on retention of its trade secrets. In a full acquisition of shares, the transfer
of the target's trade secrets to the bidder injures competition by
frustrating effective relief, if the merger is subsequently held unlawful or abandoned in anticipation of such a finding. Although the
merger is blocked, the bidder's temporary control over the target
gives it the opportunity - and it has every incentive - to appropriate the target's trade secrets. Strikingly, this incentive arises only
when the merger would create collusive conditions injurious to
competition.
The bidder's incentive to take the target's trade secrets arises in
a collusive merger because when the target's continued viability is
essential to competition, the capture of its trade secrets provides
the bidder with an alternative means to reduce the target's competitive viability and thereby earn a supra-competitive return should
the merger ultimately be barred. The bidder prefers to capture
rather than to preserve the target's trade secrets because absent the
collusive conditions created by the merger, the bidder could earn
only a normal return from the sale of the target with its trade
secrets intact. Thus, when the target's future viability depends on
retention of its trade secrets, the bidder's temporary control of the
target gives it both the power and the incentive to frustrate effective
merger relief and thereby injure competition.349
In a partial acquisition between rival firms, transfer of the target's trade secrets to the bidder causes a similar injury to competition. As in a full acquisition, the trade secret transfer injures the
target's future competitive viability. The partial acquisition case
differs in one important respect: the bidder in a partial acquisition
347. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D.N.C. 1987);
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 250 (C.D. Cal. 1984);
Bumup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
348. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 49, at 1162-63; Joseph Gregory Sidak, Antitrust
Preliminary Injunctions in Hostile Tender Offers, 30 KAN. L. REV. 491, 503-04 (1982).
349. The bidder's incentive to gain control of the target's trade secrets remains even if the
bidder must pay the full market price for such secrets. The market price will be based either
on the value of the trade secrets in the premerger competitive market or their enhanced
value in the postmerger collusive market In either event, the bidder gains by taking the
trade secrets.
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has an incentive to take the target's trade secrets even in a competitive market because its ownership of the target is only partial.3so
The prospect of collusive gain from the merger intensifies that incentive and significantly increases the risk that the bidder will attempt to undermine the target's viability by taking its trade secrets.
It follows that when the target holds vital trade secrets, a partial
acquisition threatens injury both to the target and to competition.
The issue remains whether the target may suffer antitrust injury
in cases where there is no prospect that the merger will later be
held unlawful or divested under a consent settlement if a preliminary injunction is denied. In such a case, which will arise when the
target is the sole plaintiff, how can the target be hurt considering
that the merger price necessarily includes the value of the target's
trade secrets? In fact, the conclusion of target injury follows from
our previous discussion of antitrust injury in partial and full acquisitions of shares.351 There, as in the trade secret case, the target sustains injury through merger-induced losses to its nonshareholder
constituents, as well as to minority shareholders in partial acquisitions, who retain an economic and legally recognized interest in the
target's continuing welfare. Of course, in trade secret cases, as in
partial and full acquisitions of shares, the selling shareholders stand
to benefit handsomely from the anticipated collusive effects of the
merger. As discussed earlier, however, the illegal source of that
gain disqualifies it as an appropriate offset to the losses that the
target's nonselling stakeholders sustain.352
Thus, in both partial and full acquisitions, the injury the target
sustains from loss of trade secrets is essentially identical. The injury
flows from the enhanced value the trade secrets have in a collusive
market. The acquisition of the target, whether partial or full, gives
the bidder the power to cripple the viability of the target by seizing
its trade secrets, thereby crippling effective merger relief and injuring competition.
4.

Loss of Independence

The target firm sustains antitrust injury, different in kind but
equally contrary to merger policy, from its extinction as an independent firm. The target's loss of independence causes antitrust
injury because it is both an anticompetitive effect and the indispen350. See F. & M. Schaefer, 591 F.2d at 818; Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch· Co., 114
F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Conn.), affd., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 58-77.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 332-39.
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sable mechanism of the unlawful merger. In its recent Gold Fields
decision, the Second Circuit upheld the standing of a takeover target as a competitor in the restrained market on just such a theory.353 The competitive injury to the target stemmed from its loss
of "the power of independent decision-making as to price and output" as a result of an unlawful acquisition; as Judge Newman
explained:
It is hard to imagine an injury to competition more clearly "of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent," [citing Brunswick],
than the elimination of a major competitor's power to determine its
prices and output. It is precisely the loss of this power that makes a
section 1 conspiracy so pernicious. For this reason, a member of a
section 1 conspiracy has standing to challenge the restraint upon its
freedom to compete, even though, in the long run, it may enjoy the
benefits of the cartel.
... The antitrust laws ensure the right to compete. That is what
Gold Fields [the target] wishes to do, and that is what it will not be
able to do if the threatened takeover succeeds.354

The target's loss of independence is also the indispensable
means by which the violation occurs. Thus, the determination that
the target sustains antitrust injury also finds support in the Supreme
Court's Mccready decision,355 which upheld antitrust injury where
the plaintiff's injury was a necessary step that was "inextricably intertwined" with the violation.356 As the Solicitor General argued
recently to the Supreme Court, the target's loss of independence is
"integral to the violation," which otherwise would have no anticompetitive effect.357 It is precisely the loss of the target as a competitive decisionmaker that injures competition and reduces output.
Under these circumstances, the target's incentive to retain its independence and economic freedom fully accords with antitrust goals.
353. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dis·

missed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
354. 871 F.2d at 258-59 (citations omitted). But see Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Prods.,
Inc., 976 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1992) (declining to follow Gold Fields rule because Fifth Circuit
"narrowly interpret[s]" antitrust injury), cert. dismissed on stipulation, 114 S. Ct. 491 (1993).
355. Blue Shield v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), cited with approval in Associated
Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983} and
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986).
356. 457 U.S. at 484. In Mccready, the plaintiff's injury as a consumer of boycotted
psychological services was a necessary step by M.D. psychiatrists in effectuating a boycott
against the targeted psychologists. The dissenting Justices and some commentators disagree
with the decision in part because the more directly injured psychologists might appear to be
better enforcers. Mccready, 451 U.S. at 487 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 2 AREEDA &
HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, 'l[ 334.1; PAGE, supra note 49, at 1499-1511. But in a takeover
case, destruction of the independence of the target firm is the overarching goal and direct
object of the merger, and clearly there is no more capable enforcer.
357. Brief for the United States, supra note 315, at 7 n.6.
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The loss-of-independence rationale is not weakened by the fact
that the target would also lose its independence if the merger raised
no risks to competition - if, for example, as one judge suggested in
Gold Fields, the target had only a two percent market share.358 To
object to standing on these grounds, however, is to equate standing
with the presence of an antitrust violation. The correct analysis is
to assume the presence of an antitrust violation and then ask if the
plaintiff has standing to challenge it.359 Thus, standing does not depend on whether the plaintiff is likely to win the case but on
whether, assuming the transaction violates the law, the plaintiff's
resulting injury is an anticompetitive effect of the violation. Quite
clearly, the loss of independence from an unlawful merger is an anticompetitive effect of the violation, as well as its essential mechanism. It deprives the target of the power to determine its price,
output, and other competitive terms in a concentrated market
where independent determination is critical to competition.
Indeed, the target's injury from loss of independence bears the
same relation to the underlying antitrust wrong as does the victim's
lost profit in a predation case. In a predation case - as in a target
merger case - the challenged conduct may adversely impact the
plaintiff whether or not it is unlawful. Thus, in the recent Brook
Group case,360 the plaintiff~competitor claimed predatory injury
from below-cost pricing. In rejecting the plaintiff's suit due to its
failure to prove that the defendant had recouped its own losses
through subsequent high prices, the Supreme Court did not question the plaintiff's standing. Yet clearly the plaintiff's losses would
have been the same whether or not the defendant had recouped its
predatory investment. Similarly, in Professional Real Estate, 361 the
Supreme Court did not question the plaintiff's standing to challenge predatory litigation although the plaintiff's injury would have
been precisely the same whether or not the alleged predatory litigation was objectively baseless and brought with malicious purpose,
A plaintiff alleging predation may bring a weak case but does
not for that reason lack antitrust standing. That is to say, the plaintiff's antitrust injury does not depend on whether the challenged
conduct - below-cost pricing or vexatious litigation - would hurt
358. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 264 (Altimari, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
359. 2 AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 67, § 360f. If in fact the plaintiff's suit lacks
legal basis, summary dismissal procedures are available.
360. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
361. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct.
1920 (1993).
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the plaintiff if and only if the conduct is unlawful but on whether,
assuming the conduct is unlawful, the plaintiff sustained an injury
the merger statute aims to prevent. Nothing is changed in this analysis if we substitute the target's loss of independence for the predatory victim's lost profit. In both cases the plaintiff's injury whether lost profits from predation or loss of independence from an
unlawful merger - is a consequence the antitrust laws strive to
prevent.362
Finally, recognition of loss of independence as a measure of antitrust injury validates a key congressional goal in enacting the
merger law and reconciles an apparent divergence between congressional and judicial policy. In adopting the Celler-Kefauver
Act,363 Congress sought to preserve the independence of business
firms threatened by what Congress perceived to be a "rising tide"
of concentration.364 Nevertheless, the Act did not change the statutory test, which was phrased in terms of utmost generality.365 The
courts, in construing the broad statutory language have developed
legal tests that exclude the nonefficiency factors that motivated
Congress.366 The two developments appear at odds. The more expansive congressional purpose, however, can be reconciled with the
narrower judicial test by recognizing the authority of the courts to
define the substantive legal standard but at the same time giving
standing to the class of litigants Congress wished to protect, which
surely would have included takeover targets threatened with loss of
independence.
The problem of managerial conflict of interests remains, of
course. The target's managers may be motivated to sue not for any
of the reasons previously articulated but simply to keep their jobs.
The problem of manager conflict, however, is not confined to the
362. The standing issue is different in a consumer case, where the alleged collusive agreement will injure the plaintiff consumer only if it is unlawful. That difference, however, simply
reflects the differing nature of the antitrust violation in consumer and competitor cases. In
consumer cases, the effects on the victim and on competition are always the same, while in
competitor cases the effects on the victim and on competition may either differ or be the
same, causing a more complex characterization problem, but this problem does not defeat
the plaintiff's standing to sue.
363. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch.1184, 64 Stat.1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18,
21 (1994)).
364. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 228-38, 249-55 (1969); see also Bradley, supra note 98, at 40-44.
365. Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 {1994) (stating the test as being "substantially •••
[to] lessen competition, or ... tend to create a monopoly").
366. Compare Bok, supra note 364, at 249-55 (Congressional goals included preservation
of small locally owned firms from anticompetitive acquisition by larger rivals.) with 4
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 53, Ill 904 (legal standard).
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loss-of-independence rationale but infects all target merger litigation. The answer is not to bar the target from vindicating its antitrust rights but rather to adopt conflict-resolving procedures, as
discussed in the next section.
C.

Controlling Managerial Incentives

The target's managers' perverse incentives are the flaw most
often condemned in merger suits by takeover targets. The critics
insist that the managers want to retain their jobs, not benefit the
target firm. Thus, the incentives of the managers seeking to enjoin
the merger bear no consistent relationship with the public interest
in competition; indeed, the incentives of the target's managers may
be incompatible with both the target's welfare and the public
interest.
Unquestionably, a takeover creates a managerial conflict of interest,367 but it does not follow that courts should bar merger suits
by target firms. If in fact the target is threatened with antitrust injury, the motives of its managers cause no legal disability to the
firm, the real party in interest. As mentioned earlier, the Second
Circuit recognized this point in the recent Gold Fields decision,
where it rejected the notion that a target firm could lose its right to
sue because its managers might have improper motives.368 Indeed,
the antitrust injury principle would exceed all bounds if the target
lost its capacity to sue because the motives of its human agents were
flawed. Thus, at bottom the problem of managerial litigation abuse
presents not an issue of standing but of judicial control of public
interest litigation. Using their broad equitable powers, courts have
ample authority to address this issue.
The incentive compatibility problem of takeover suits arises
from the risk of strategic litigation to upset the delicate timing of a
merger, collusive settlements that defeat antitrust goals even when
the merger claim has merit, and the lesser problem of wrong outcomes caused by the need for speedy decisions. Although these
problems are inherent in merger litigation, they raise an acute problem in the takeover field, where the granting of a preliminary injunction usually suffices to terminate the bid. Existing equity
controls, augmented by improved procedures, however, can effec367. See generally James F. Cotter & Marc Zenner, How Managerial Wealth Affects the
Tender Offer Process, 35 J. FIN. EcoN. 63 (1994) (describing conflict between wealth effects
on managers and on shareholders).
368. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 257-58 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989).
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tively limit opportunistic and abusive litigation conduct by
managers.369

1. Existing Judicial Controls
Available procedures to control managerial behavior in takeover suits include: (1) expedited hearings that significantly reduce
delay costs; (2) "curative relief" proposals by which merger defendants agree to divest themselves of specified assets creating competitive risks, thereby making the balance of the acquisition legitimate;
(3) amicus participation by federal and state enforcement agencies,
which the court may invite on its own motion; (4) possible Rule 11
sanctions against the target's attorneys, including inside counsel, for
ill-founded or improperly prosecuted suits;310 and (5) judicial
weighing of the equities by which the preliminary injunction court
may directly consider factors bearing on possible litigation abuse by
managers.
2. Improved Procedures

Additional procedures can powerfully augment existing equity
controls. First, the target may place control of the litigation in the
hands of disinterested outside directors, advised by independent
counsel. Second, the target may disconnect the managers' continued tenure in office from the target's success in the merger litigation, through a procedure of conditional resignation. Third, the
court may appoint an equity trustee to hold the target's shares during the pendency of the merger litigation. These procedures seek to
harness the high litigation capability of the target firm, while containing the agency risk inherent in control of the litigation by managers with theµ- jobs at stake.
The proposed additional procedures either directly limit the authority of the managers to control the merger litigation or reduce
managerial conflicts of interest by separating the managers' continued tenure in office from the outcome of the merger suit. Effective
containment of the risk of manager litigation abuse, however, does
not imply that the procedures should remove all possibility of man369. In addressing these issues, it is vital to recognize that private merger enforcement
involves an interactive relationship among the equity court, the target, and the target's managers in which multiple moves are possible. As a result, courts are not limited to a single, allor-nothing response to the filing of a takeover merger suit but instead can apply antitrust
procedures and equity controls incrementally and responsively.
370. Rule 11 sanctions against the target itself would not be effective in preventing illfounded target litigation because the bidder who acquires the target's assets would ultimately
pay the sanctions. For the same reason, litigation bonds are ineffective against target firms.
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agerial gain from blocking a merger. Self-interest is a powerful and
unavoidable motivation in litigation, as in other fields of human endeavor. Thus, the goal of the proposed procedures is not to strip
the managers of all personal gain from preventing the merger but to
focus their self-interest on cases where serious antitrust harm is
threatened. Accordingly, the proposed procedures do not remove
the prospect that the managers will benefit from stopping the
merger but aim to prevent them from benefitting through litigation
tactics that defeat antitrust goals. By this means, the zeal of private
ambition can effectively serve the public interest in maintaining
competitive markets.
The outlined procedures depend on the initiative of the target
firm, which must in each case propose the procedure to the equity
court. The target would be motivated to commit itself voluntarily
to such a procedure by the expectation that it would help to convince the court that a preliminary injunction would serve the public
interest. That would be an important gain for the plaintiff in view
of the frequent judicial skepticism concerning target merger suits.
a. Independent Directors. The target can directly limit possible litigation abuse on the part of its managers by placing control of
the litigation in the hands of disinterested outside directors, who
would retain outside counsel to advise them in their decisions. · Of
course, the independent directors would themselves be likely to
lose their positions in the event of takeover, but the degree of conflict is much less because outside directors typically have other positions; indeed, corporate law specifically recognizes the greater
independence of the outside director in merger transactions.37 1 A
requirement that the directors consult outside counsel provides
greater assurance that they will receive unbiased legal advice.
The litigation control of the independent directors might be limited to major litigation decisions, or it might encompass full control
of the litigation by the independent directors. The broader delegation, however, appears preferable. If the independent directors' authority is limited to major litigation decisions, such as the filing of
suit, settlement, and compromise, the directors must continue to
371. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. 637 A.2d 34, 44
(Del. 1994) (emphasizing the importance of outside directors in protecting against management partiality in merger transactions); see also James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors
and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. EcoN. 371 (1994) (describing positive stock market reaction to poison pill adoption when target's board controlled by outside directors, supporting hypothesis that outside directors act in shareholder interest); Jennifer J. Johnson &
Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv.
315, 379.84 (1987).
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rely on the incuinbent managers for day-to-day management of the
litigation. The incumbent managers, however, remain subject to
the conflict of interest that motivated the independent director procedure. The more effective means for the target to achieve managerial neutrality is to place the litigation totally in the hands of the
outside directors and their legal advisors. Because part-time directors lack the time to manage an ongoing litigation, the directors
would probably need to appoint a litigation manager or "special
counsel" with full authority to conduct the antitrust suit, subject to
supervision by the outside directors.
The disinterested-director procedure reduces risks of strategic
litigation and at the same time preserves managerial incentive to
block an anticompetitive merger. Control of the litigation is put in
the hands of independent directors, but success in the merger suit is
likely to assure the managers' continued tenure. Preservation of
the managerial incentive to oppose merger is desirable because the
independent-director procedure, like other equity controls and
mechanisms, requires an initial managerial decision in order to invoke it. If the managers did not stand to benefit from blocking the
merger, they might simply accommodate the takeover, rather than
risk antagonizing the bidder without hope of gain.372 The
independent-director procedure effectively meets these dual needs
by utilizing the managers' motivation to keep their positions while
placing control of the litigation in independent agents who, to some
significant degree, can channel the force of managerial zeal toward
pro-competitive enforcement goals.373
Requiring the directors to disclose the terms of any settlement
agreement to the court and to the public following the issuance of a
preliminary injunction could further strengthen the independentdirector procedure. Disclosure of settlement tends to discourage
collusive or strategic settlements in which competition benefits are
372. This is not to reject the possibility that the managers might act selflessly, opposing a
merger that injured the target even if they obtained no personal benefit. Their efforts will
clearly be strongest, however, when personal gain is joined with fiduciary obligation; the
most effective procedures will combine both motivations.
373. The effectiveness of the disinterested-director procedure turns critically on the independence of the outside directors in making decisions free from managerial influence. A
court, in accepting such a procedure as adequate to assure prosecution of the merger suit in
the public interest, must be confident of the independence and uncorrupted judgment of such
directors. Clearly their stature and prior experience are relevant factors in making such an
assessment. In addition, the court would have to be convinced that the board of directors
had effectively delegated litigation control to the independent directors. The court might
appropriately ask the target to stipulate that it would report promptly to the court any
change in the delegation, subject to the sanction of immediate dissolution of the preliminary
injunction for failure to report or any impairment of the independent directors' authority.
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surrendered for private gain. Although the court has no power to
require approval of settlement agreements in non-class action
suits,314 it has inherent authority to impose reasonable conditions
on the issuance of a preliminary injunction to assure that the injunction promotes the public interest.375 A settlement disclosure condition is a reasonable and limited means to inhibit collusive
settlements that frustrate the public interest goal of private merger
enforcement. Alternatively, in exercising its discretion to issue an
injunction, the court may take into account a voluntary undertaking
by the directors to make such disclosure as a factor bearing on the
public benefit from an injunction. A settlement disclosure provision is likely to constrain the conduct of outside directors, for whom
future reputation effects would normally loom larger than any immediate benefits from allowing the merger.376
b. Conditional Resignations. An alternative approach to limiting possible litigation abuse by the target's managers would be to
leave the managers in full control of the litigation but to separate
the success of the merger suit from the managers' retention of their
positions. A mechanism to achieve this objective would be corporate adoption, with managerial assent, of a procedure under which
the managers and inside directors would make binding and irrevocable commitments to resign in the event a merger is enjoined or
abandoned after a suit is filed.
Following defeat of a merger bid, the disinterested directors,
acting on the advice of an: outside management consulting firm having no prior relation with the target, would determine whether the
target's officers were then the best persons available to continue as
managers. The outside directors would be obligated to rehire the
old managers only if so advised. The outside directors might of
course rehire the old managers, or some of them, even if they were
not the best persons available because of the advantage of management continuity, but the letter-of-resignation procedure would disconnect assured continuity in office from defeat of the hostile bid.
374. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e) (authorizing judicial approval only for class action
settlements).
375. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); supra text accompanying notes
281-84; supra note 288.
376. By contrast, a settlement disclosure requirement would probably not be effective for
full-time managers because of the many ways in which a successful bidder could reward the
target's managers after they become employees of the bidder-controlled firm.
The subject of settlement disclosure is discussed further in connection with competitor
suits, where the procedure is generally more effective. See supra text accompanying notes
281-89.
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To that extent, the letter-of-resignation procedure reduces the managers' incentive to resist takeover in order to retain their offices;
this is especially true in the case of underperforming managers.
The conditional resignation procedure thus mimics a takeover in its
effect on managerial tenure because an outside management consultant is likely to replace weak managers with more qualified
replacements.377
The problem with the conditional-resignation approach comes
from the risk that after the merger bid is defeated, either the directors or the managers might renege. The inside directors might attempt to repudiate the resignation procedure, retaining the old
managers. Alternatively, the managers might refuse to honor their
resignations, threatening the target with costly and disruptive litigation. Thus, as in the disinterested director procedure, a preliminary
injunction court must have confidence that the procedure will be
carried out before accepting it as adequate to protect the public
interest. One means to increase judicial confidence would be for
the inside directors and managers to agree to substantial bonds subject to forfeiture in the event they reneged. Thus, the inside directors would forfeit their bonds if they sought to withdraw control of
the resignation process from the outside directors; the managers
would forfeit their bonds if they failed to carry out their agreements
to resign. In addition, the managers could be asked to agree to an
attorney's-fees provision requiring them to pay the target's attorney's fees if the target prevailed in any suit by the managers challenging the resignation procedure. This mechanism will work only
if the outside directors are resolute in enforcing any conditional resignations and bonds or penalties to which the parties have agreed.

c. Equity Trustee. The most comprehensive approach to the
problem of litigation abuse by managers would be the appointment
of an equity trustee. Following the precedent of a recent Ninth Circuit decision,378 the court might appoint a trustee in equity to hold
the target's shares and to manage the target during the pendency of
the litigation.379 The trustee device serves both to limit managerial
control of the merger suit and to disconnect the managers' continued tenure from the litigation outcome. Under such a procedure,
377. The availability of this procedure also gives independent directors a viable strategy
by which to oppose an unlawful takeover without assuring continuity of an underperfonning
management team.
378. See United States v. BNS Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988).
379. See United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the trustee would have full control of the litigation but need not
intervene in other managerial decisions that do not affect the
merger litigation. At the conclusion of. the suit, the trustee would
either transfer the target's shares to the bidder if the bidder prevails
or sell the shares to a less anticompetitive buyer if the target
prevails.380
The Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. BNS Inc. 381 upheld
the appointment of an equity trustee to manage the takeover target
during merger litigation brought by the United States. Admittedly,
the circumstances in BNS differed from those in a private merger
suit because the appointment of the trustee was aimed not at controlling litigation abuse by the target's managers but at protecting
the target's trade secrets from the bidder during pendency of the
government suit.382 Nevertheless, the rationale of BNS applies
equally to a private merger suit because protection of the target
from managerial litigation abuse is as vital to the target's welfare as
protection of its trade secrets. In both instances, appointment of an
equity trustee stems from the court's broad equitable power to "use
novel and flexible methods to mold its decree to fit the necessities
of a specific case and effectuate the intent of Congress. "383
A possible objection to the use of the trusteeship device arises
from the anomalous position in which it places the trustee. As the
legal holder of the target's shares, the trustee must both protect the
bidder's equitable interest in the target and manage litigation that
may reduce the value of that interest. To resolve this anomaly, the
court should instruct the trustee to manage the litigation so as to
maximize the target's "stand alone" value - the value of the target
as a separate entity apart from the bidder. This instruction is justified because it preserves the status quo pending the court's ruling
380. The same result often is achieved by a hold-separate order, which allows the merger
to go forward with the acquired assets held separately until the antitrust issues are resolved,
thereby allowing the bidder to acquire the target while preserving the ability to achieve effective relief. See supra text accompanying note 127. A hold-separate order, however, is not
feasible in takeover litigation because the bidder gains full control of the target and is then
free to order the target's managers to dismiss the suit. In addition, the bidder gains access to
the target's trade secrets, threatening the target's competitive viability if the merger later is
held unlawful. Use of an equity trustee overcomes these difficulties.
381. 858 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1988).
382. The target intervened in the consent proceeding to protect its trade secrets, and the
appointment of the trustee effectuated that purpose. See 858 F.2d at 465-66.
383. 858 F.2d at 466. See generally 1 ABA ANlITRUST SEcnoN, supra note 124, at 36569; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 2947-48 (discussing general authority and discretion of
courts in granting preliminary injunctive relief); Leubsdorf, supra note 124, at 549 (noting the
increasing judicial concern with impact of preliminary injunctive relief on society and the
public interest).
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on the merits. At the same time, appointment of an equity trustee
benefits the bidder by providing a less inhibiting alternative than a
preliminary injunction because it allows the bidder to purchase the
target's shares, thereby avoiding delay risks. Thus, the equity
trustee achieves the purpose of a hold-separate order without its
drawbacks.
Nevertheless, because the procedure places the trustee in such
an unusual position with respect to the beneficiary, some courts
may be reluctant to appoint an equity trustee without the consent
of both target and bidder. That consent, however, might well be
given. The target would be likely to consent if it thought that in the
absence of the equity trustee, the court would deny the preliminary
injunction. The bidder would be likely to consent if it thought that
once the target had proposed an equity trustee, the bidder's refusal
to join in the arrangement might lead the court to grant the injunction.384 For these reasons, both parties might well agree to the
trustee's appointment, especially if the preliminary injunction court
suggests that it might react adversely to a failure to agree. Used in
this manner, the trusteeship device facilitates the sale of the target's
shares, removes control of the litigation from the managers, and
disconnects success in the litigation from the managers' continuance
in office.385
The equity trustee approach is limited because it may leave the
managers with insufficient incentive to oppose the merger. If the
trustee succeeds in blocking the merger, the trustee must then sell
the target's shares to the highest eligible bidder. Thus, in all likelihood, the target will come under the control of an outside owner,
placing the continued tenure of the managers at risk. On the other
hand, if the bidder prevails, the managers, having actively resisted
384. In consenting to an equity trustee, the bidder might reason as follows: by requesting
appointment of a trustee, the target has signaled its good faith to the court because even if
the target prevails, its shares will be sold to an unknown buyer that is free to appoint new
managers; thus, the court will understand that the target's managers have substantially severed their own welfare from the litigation outcome. In addition, the target has placed control
of the litigation in an independent trustee, who will no doubt quickly dismiss the suit should
it lack merit.
The bidder reasons further: if under these conditions, I refuse to consent to the trustee
procedure, the court may well conclude that the target's suit has solid basis. After all, if the
target's suit is as weak as I claim, I should be able to convince the trustee to dismiss the case,
and in the meantime, use of this procedure assures my ability to purchase the target's shares.
If I refuse to consent to a trusteeship that imposes only a short delay cost on a lawful bidder,
the court may assume the worst and grant the preliminary injunction. Thus, the bidder is
likely to give its consent.
385. The trustee is free to allow the managers to continue to manage the business including the litigation but can intervene if litigation-induced motivations of the managers threaten
the corporate interest.
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the merger, are even more likely to be ousted.386 As a result, managers may have little incentive to evoke the equity trustee procedure, even when available, and thus it is unclear how frequently the
target will use this procedure.387 Nevertheless, the availability of
the procedure is beneficial because it so effectively resolves the
problem of managerial confiict.388
3. Effectiveness of Proposed Procedures
Existing equity procedures, augmented by one or more of the
suggested improved procedures, can effectively contain risks of
managerial abuse in takeover litigation, including risks of strategic
litigation, anticompetitive settlements, and the lesser risk of wrong
outcomes.

a. Strategic Litigation. Several existing procedures reduce the
problem of strategic suits filed to block or delay a lawful merger.
Expedited hearings can shorten preliminary injunction proceedings
to a few weeks, reducing the ability to frustrate a merger through
delay. Curative relief, proposed by the defendant, often enables
the court to resolve the antitrust problem short of divestiture of the
target. Moreover, the preliminary injunction court can directly discourage strategic litigation by denying or dissolving the injunction if
the court observes or suspects the suit is purely strategic.389 In ad386. See Cotter & Zenner, supra note 367, at 66 (discussing above-average manager turnover after takeover).
387. Clearly, a court should draw no negative inference about the merits of a merger suit
from the target's failure to propose an equity trustee.
388. 1\vo other improved procedures are possible, but both have serious drawbacks.
First, to resolve the issue of managerial conflict, the target's managers might agree to indemnify the target for attorney's fees and court costs if the suit lacks significant merit. Enforcement of such an undertaking presents difficulties. If the bidder prevails, it can release the
target's managers from their agreement after it gains control of the target. If the bid is withdrawn, the target remains under the control of its old managers from whom the obligation is
owed. Even if the managers nominally pay, indirect reimbursement remains possible when
the managers continue to work for the corporation they head. Moreover, enforcement of the
undertaking requires a separate proceeding to determine whether the merger suit was
meritorious.
Second, the target may issue "golden parachutes" to its managers payable in the event of
a takeover in order to compensate them for losing their positions - and to neutralize their
incentive to resist a takeover. Golden parachutes, however, may tilt the balance too heavily
in favor of a merger, inducing managers to avoid takeover challenges of unlawful mergers
injurious to the target and the public. Moreover, although golden parachutes may align the
managers' interests with those of selling shareholders, it separates the managerial interest
from nonselling shareholders and other corporate constituencies. See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 106-07 (1986) (discussing golden parachutes); Rosenzweig, supra note 337, at 148-50
(proposing similar procedures).
389. Strategic behavior sometimes benefits the target. For example, the target may bring
an antitrust suit to allow time for additional bids to raise the tender offer price. But strategic
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dition, powerful supplemental procedures are available to contain
strategic abuse by managers. The most feasible of these is probably
the independent-director device, under which the target would
place full control of the litigation in the hands of its disinterested
outside directors. Alternatively, conditional resignation of the
managers or appointment of an equity trustee both disconnect managerial tenure from litigation success, thereby removing the managers' incentive to pursue strategic suits.
b. Colllisive Settlements. The independent-director and the
equity-trustee procedures reduce the problem of collusive settlements under which anticompetitive mergers may be compromised
without benefit to the target or the public. Independent directors
with external positions are far less susceptible to collusive inducement than managers whose jobs are threatened. An equity trustee
presents an even smaller risk of collusive settlement because the
trustee has no continuing stake in the target. In addition, conditioning a preliminary injunction on disclosure of settlement terms
also discourages collusive settlements.
Even if these procedures are not available, target litigation remains beneficial in deterring anticompetitive mergers. The bidder
can never be certain the target will settle short of effective relief,
and in any event, the bidder must bear settlement costs that increase with the strength of the antitrust cases. Moreover, settlement does not bar government suit, which becomes more probable
if the target develops strong evidence of anticompetitive effects.
Thus, target suits retain significant deterrence value despite residual
risks of settlements that fail to achieve effective relief.
c. Wrong Outcomes. The problem of wrong outcomes caused
by compressed time schedules for preliminary injunction hearings
appears exaggerated in view of the target's sophistication, litigation
resources, and knowledge of the industry, which permit the target
to retain a large team of knowledgeable lawyers able to accomplish
within a few weeks what might ordinarily require months.390 The
problem of time-induced wrong outcomes, of course, would be
completely avoided under the equity-trustee device, which allows
behavior benefiting the target presents no problem of managerial conflict - the focus of the
takeover suit critique. Moreover, such behavior is not invariably inconsistent with antitrust
goals to the extent that it makes anticompetitive bids more costly. In any event, existing
equity procedures constrain strategic behavior by targets.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39, 302-10.
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the merger to go forward and thus reduces the pressure for an immediate decision.
D. Gravity of Violation
The powerful enforcement capabilities of takeover targets
should be concentrated on merger violations that raise the most serious risks to competition. Two mechanisms are available to
achieve this result. First, enforcement should focus on horizontal
mergers - the most anticompetitive type of merger. Horizontal
merger enforcement forms the bedrock of merger policy because
the successful prevention of mergers that directly create market
power removes the need for other types of merger enforcement. In
fact, the federal courts have recognized the primacy of horizontal
merger enforcement both in their decisions and in explicit
statements.391
In a leading and often cited Second Circuit decision, Judge
Friendly declined to issue an.injunction in a private nonhorizontal
merger, noting that the challenged merger "differs totally from the
horizontal merger illustrated by United States v. Philadelphia National Bank. "392 In reaching that decision, Judge Friendly explicitly
recognized the possible strategic use of antitrust litigation and the
need for caution in issuing preliminary injunctions that might frustrate takeovers.393 Since that time, antitrust lawyers have assumed
that preliminary injunctions in private cases generally are not available against nonhorizontal mergers.394 Consistent with this appreciation, my fourteen-year review of private merger cases revealed
only one instance in which a nonhorizontal merger was enjoined.395
Equity procedures and internal corporate controls provide a
second means by which courts can focus the enforcement efforts of
takeover targets on the most serious violations. As discussed
above, courts can apply direct judicial controls and separating
mechanisms to channel the keen enforcement capability of take391. See Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, f!Jl
LJ. 1, 42 (1977).
392. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.) (involving large
horizontal merger) (citing United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
393. Cargil~ 498 F2d at 854; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp.
799, 806 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that strategic litigation makes denial of preliminary injunction "particularly compelling").
394. See generally ABA MONOGRAPH No. 16, supra note 1, at 32-36.
395. See McCaw Personal Communications, Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp.
1166 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
YALE

106

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1

over targets to challenge horizontal mergers that raise the gravest
antitrust concerns. In addition, when balancing the equities, the
preliminary injunction court must directly consider gravity of the
violation.396 Assessment of this factor is particularly feasible for
horizontal mergers because precisely stated Justice Department
guidelines permit a threshold determination of potentially serious
antitrust violations.397 By these means, the highly effective but unruly enforcement efforts of takeover targets can be focused on horizontal mergers that involve the most serious anticompetitive risks.
CONCLUSION

Private antitrust enforcement raises difficult issues of accommodating public enforcement goals and the self-interested agendas of
private enforcers. Effective private merger enforcement is
threatened because the courts have focused on a single input into
the private enforcement system - the incentive incompatibility of
private enforcers. The isolated focus on that factor alone has
caused the present crisis in private merger enforcement in which
the courts frequently hold that the only two viable enforcers competitors and takeover targets - lack standing to sue. To restore effective enforcement, the courts must view private merger
enforcement as a coherent system with a desired output - a mechanism by which legislative goals are to be achieved through perceptive judicial procedures.
The legislative goals of dual enforcement, deterrence of anticompetitive mergers, and vindication of core merger enforcement
objectives require that the most capable merger enforcers be able
to challenge the most anticompetitive mergers with the least incentive incompatibility between their own private agendas and public
antitrust goals. Effective private merger enforcement requires that
courts face the fact that the only capable private enforcers, takeover targets and competitors, have flawed incentives. The courts,
however, must view the issue realistically, recognizing that perfect
purity of incentives by self-interested enforcers is an impossible and
self-defeating illusion; that effective enforcement can be achieved
only through a balancing of the factors necessary for enforcement
396. Cf. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. HI-Shear Indus., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1122, 1134
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that preliminary injunction in merger case warranted where violation "fairly clear" and citing Cargill, 498 F.2d at 870); Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., 1977-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 'JI 61,717, at 72,932 (N.D. III. 1977) (granting injunction in target merger
where violation "very clear").
397. Merger Guidelines, supra note 97.
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viability; and that the courts themselves must talce an active role in
assuring that private suits promote the public interest, using their
equity powers to control and modify the litigation conduct and incentives of private enforcers.
.
By these means, the courts can reconcile the divergent forces of
private self-interest and public enforcement goals, restoring the
shattered unity of the concept of private attorney general and combining the high idealism of public enforcement goals with the motive power of private economic incentive. Such reconciliation could
provide a model for other areas of antitrust law and perhaps for
public interest litigation generally.

Michigan Law Review

108

[Vol. 94:1

APPENDIX
REPORTED PRIVATE MERGER
CASES

1977-1990

State
Competitor Target Customer Consumer Supplier Atty. Gen. Total:
No.

SmTS:
1977-1981
1982-1983
1984-1986
1987-1990

8
4
9
10

13
2
4
4

3
0
1
0

1
0
0
1

0
0
0
0

0
1
1

s

25
7
14*
20

31

23

4

2

0

7

66

1
0
2
3

4
0
1
2

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
O**
1***

6

7

0

0

0

1

14

0
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
1

PRELIM.

INJUNC.

GRANTED
1977-1981
1982-1983
1984-1986
1987-1990

s
0
3
6

PERM.

INJUNC.

GRANTED
1977-1981
1982-1983

* Suit brought by dual status competitor and customer, thus the total number of
cases brought was 14.
** In addition, one consent decree was entered.
*** In addition, three consent decrees were entered.

